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A CRASH COURSE IN MODERN GEOPOLITICS

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The Wars, Rivalries, and Revolutions

Reshaping Our World

A Crash Course on Modern GeoPolitics
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CONTENTS

Table of Contents

CONTENTS

PROLOGUE: THE OLD MAP IS BURNING

PART I

CHAPTER 1: THE CHIP THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING

CHAPTER 2: THE TAIWAN TINDERBOX

CHAPTER 3: ROCKS AND REEFS

CHAPTER 4: THE BELT THAT BINDS

CHAPTER 5: TIKTOK AND THE DIGITAL IRON CURTAIN

CHAPTER 6: THE AI ARMS RACE

CHAPTER 7: MAR-A-LAGO TO BEIJING

CHAPTER 8: PACIFIC OVERTURE

PART II

CHAPTER 9: THE LONGEST WINTER

CHAPTER 10: PUTIN'S GAMBLE

CHAPTER 11: THE NORDIC SHIELD

CHAPTER 12: THE PEACE THAT WON'T COME

CHAPTER 13: FORTRESS EUROPE

CHAPTER 14: SYRIA AFTER ASSAD

PART III

CHAPTER 15: OCTOBER'S CHILDREN

CHAPTER 16: THE ABRAHAM GAMBIT

CHAPTER 17: THE HOUSE OF SAUD PLAYS BOTH SIDES

CHAPTER 18: OPERATION: IRAN

CHAPTER 19: THE NUCLEAR QUESTION

CHAPTER 20: THE HOUTHIS AND THE SHIPPING LANE

CHAPTER 21: AFTER THE AYATOLLAHS

PART IV

CHAPTER 22: THE SHAKSGAM TRIGGER

CHAPTER 23: MODI'S INDIA

CHAPTER 24: THE HANDSHAKE IN DHAKA

CHAPTER 25: BANGLADESH'S REVOLUTION

CHAPTER 26: THE TALIBAN'S EMIRATE
CHAPTER 27: PAKISTAN ON THE BRINK
CHAPTER 28: SRI LANKA: AFTER THE COLLAPSE
CHAPTER 29: THE INDIAN OCEAN: EVERYONE'S BACKYARD
PART V
CHAPTER 30: BRICS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER
CHAPTER 31: THE DOLLAR'S CHALLENGERS
CHAPTER 32: AFRICA'S MOMENT
CHAPTER 33: LATIN AMERICA: CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE
CHAPTER 34: THE INFRASTRUCTURE WARS
CHAPTER 35: DE-DOLLARIZATION: DREAM OR DESTINY?
PART VI
CHAPTER 36: CYBER WARS
CHAPTER 37: THE RACE TO THE MOON
CHAPTER 38: AI GOVERNANCE: WHO WRITES THE RULES?
CHAPTER 39: THE ENERGY TRILEMMA
CHAPTER 40: THE CRITICAL MINERALS SCRAMBLE
PART VII
CHAPTER 41: THE MULTIPOLAR MOMENT
CHAPTER 42: THE MIGRATION CENTURY
CHAPTER 43: THE POLYCRISIS
CHAPTER 44: THE MAP WE'RE DRAWING NOW
EPILOGUE: THE ONLY CONSTANT

PROLOGUE: THE OLD MAP IS BURNING

On the morning of February 28, 2026, two hundred Israeli fighter jets lifted off from bases scattered across the Negev Desert. They flew in waves, tight formations cutting through airspace that had been quietly cleared by American electronic warfare aircraft orbiting at forty thousand feet. Their targets: five hundred military installations spread across western and central Iran. Air defense batteries. Missile launchers. Command bunkers. And four nuclear facilities that had kept the world's intelligence agencies awake for the better part of two decades.

By the time the sun rose over Tehran the following morning, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran was dead. More than seven hundred people had been killed. The state broadcaster had gone silent. UNESCO World Heritage sites lay in rubble. And the geopolitical order that had held, however tenuously, since the end of the Cold War was officially, irrevocably finished.

But this book does not begin with that night. It begins much earlier, in the years when the foundations cracked and nobody wanted to look down.

If you had asked a diplomat in 2019 to describe the international system, they would have used words like "rules-based" and "multilateral" and "interconnected." They would have pointed to trade agreements and climate accords and the architecture of institutions built after 1945. They would have been wrong about all of it, or at least about its permanence, but they would have sounded perfectly

reasonable.

Then the pandemic came. And with it, the revelation that the supply chains binding the world together were not bonds of cooperation but chains of dependency. Nations that had outsourced their manufacturing discovered they could not produce their own surgical masks. Countries that had welcomed globalization found themselves begging for vaccines. The illusion of a flat, frictionless world evaporated in a matter of weeks.

What replaced it was something older and more honest. Competition. Spheres of influence. The language of power, stripped of its diplomatic polish.

Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, and the post-Cold War European security order collapsed overnight. China accelerated its military buildup around Taiwan, and the most dangerous flashpoint on Earth got hotter. The United States, whipsawed between administrations with radically different visions, lurched from engagement to confrontation and back again. The Middle East, never truly stable, descended into a cycle of violence that culminated in the strikes on Iran. India positioned itself as the swing state of a new multipolar world, courted by everyone, allied with no one. The Global South, tired of being a chessboard for great powers, began building its own institutions and demanding its own seat at every table that mattered.

This is not the world your textbooks described. The old categories do not hold. "East" and "West" are relics. "First World" and "Third World" are insults dressed up as geography. Even "democracy" and "authoritarianism," the defining binary of the twentieth century, have blurred into something messier. Democratic nations conduct mass surveillance. Authoritarian states hold elections. Everyone spies on everyone.

The map we grew up with is burning. The question is what replaces it.

This book is an attempt to answer that question, or at least to ask it honestly. It is not a history of ideas or a survey of theories. There are plenty of those, most of them gathering dust on university shelves. This is a book about what is actually happening: the wars being fought, the deals being struck, the alliances being forged and broken, the technologies being weaponized, and the people making the decisions that will shape the century.

It is organized around the fault lines that matter most. The contest between the United States and China, which touches everything from semiconductors to shipping lanes. The war in Ukraine, which has redrawn the security architecture of Europe. The Middle East, where ancient grievances and modern weapons have created a tinderbox that finally exploded. South Asia, where the world's most populous country is rising while its neighbors struggle. The Global South, where billions of people are refusing to accept a system designed without their input. And the invisible battlefields of cyberspace, outer space, and artificial intelligence, where the next great conflicts may already be underway.

Each chapter tells a story. Some are stories of crisis. Others are stories of ambition, of miscalculation, of courage, of catastrophic error. Together, they form a portrait of a world in transition, caught between an order that no longer works and one that has not yet been born.

A word about perspective. This book does not have a hero. It does not have a villain, either, though some of the people in it have done villainous things. It is written with the conviction that geopolitics is not a morality play. It is a system, and systems operate according to logic that often has little to do with what is right or just. Understanding that logic is the first step toward changing it. Pretending it does not exist is the surest way to be crushed by it.

One more thing. The events described in these pages are not distant abstractions. The price you pay for gasoline, the interest rate on your mortgage, the security of your pension, the quality of the air

your children breathe, the probability that your country will go to war in your lifetime: all of these are shaped, daily, by the dynamics this book describes. Geopolitics is not something that happens to other people in faraway places. It is the operating system of your life, whether you know it or not.

So let us begin. Not with a theory, but with a chip. A tiny sliver of silicon, smaller than your thumbnail, that became the most fought-over object on Earth.

PART I

THE NEW COLD WAR

CHAPTER 1: THE CHIP THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING

In a clean room in Hsinchu, Taiwan, where the air is filtered to remove particles a thousand times smaller than a human hair, the most important manufacturing process in human history takes place every single day. Workers in white bunny suits, their faces covered, their movements precise, oversee machines that print circuits onto wafers of silicon with beams of ultraviolet light. The features on these chips are measured in nanometers. A nanometer is one billionth of a meter. A human hair is roughly eighty thousand nanometers wide. The transistors on the most advanced chips are three nanometers across.

This is the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, TSMC, and it produces roughly ninety percent of the world's most advanced semiconductors. Not sixty percent. Not seventy. Ninety. Every major technology company on Earth, from Apple to Nvidia to Qualcomm, depends on this single facility on a small island in the western Pacific. And that fact, more than any missile or treaty or diplomatic communique, explains why the United States and China are locked in the most consequential rivalry of the twenty-first century.

The semiconductor is to our era what oil was to the twentieth century and what coal was to the nineteenth. It is the substrate of everything. Your phone, your car, your refrigerator, your bank, your hospital, your military, your power grid: all of them run on chips. Artificial intelligence, the technology that promises to reshape every industry and every battlefield, is fundamentally a story about who has the best chips and who has enough of them. Without advanced semiconductors, there is no AI. Without AI, there is no military advantage. Without military advantage, there is no superpower status.

The Chinese Communist Party understood this before most Western governments did.

In 2015, Beijing published a document called "Made in China 2025." It was a blueprint, ambitious and methodical, for transforming the Chinese economy from a factory floor for the world into a technology superpower. Semiconductors sat at the top of the priority list. China was spending more money importing chips than it spent importing oil. The strategic vulnerability was obvious and intolerable.

The plan was to pour hundreds of billions of yuan into domestic chip manufacturing. State-backed funds would finance research, acquisitions, and the construction of fabrication plants. Chinese companies would move up the value chain, from assembling chips designed elsewhere to designing and manufacturing their own. By 2025, China intended to produce seventy percent of the semiconductors it consumed. By 2030, it would be self-sufficient.

It did not work. Or rather, it worked well enough to terrify Washington.

The problem, from Beijing's perspective, was that chipmaking is not like building railroads or assembling smartphones. You cannot brute-force your way to the frontier. The most advanced chips require a machine called an extreme ultraviolet lithography system, or EUV. Only one company in the world makes it: ASML, a Dutch firm whose technology represents decades of accumulated physics, engineering, and optics expertise from across Europe, Japan, and the United States. An EUV machine costs roughly three hundred million dollars, weighs nearly two hundred tons, and contains more than one hundred thousand components sourced from dozens of countries. China does not have one. China cannot buy one.

That last sentence is the direct result of a decision made in Washington.

Beginning in 2022 and accelerating through 2023 and 2024, the United States government imposed a series of export controls on advanced semiconductors and the equipment used to make them. The logic was straightforward, if unprecedented: if you cannot stop a rival

from developing artificial intelligence that could be used for military purposes, you can at least deny them the hardware they need to do it at the cutting edge.

The October 2022 controls were the opening salvo. The Commerce Department restricted the sale of advanced chips and chipmaking equipment to China. American citizens and permanent residents were barred from working in Chinese semiconductor facilities. The rules were then expanded to include allied nations. The Netherlands agreed to restrict ASML's exports. Japan limited the sale of critical manufacturing chemicals and equipment. The semiconductor supply chain, a marvel of globalization that had linked factories and research labs across three continents, was being deliberately severed along geopolitical lines.

Inside Zhongnanhai, the walled compound in central Beijing where China's leaders work and sometimes live, the response was a mixture of fury and acceleration. Publicly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs denounced the controls as "technology terrorism." Privately, the leadership doubled down on self-reliance. Huawei, the telecommunications giant that had been crippled by earlier American sanctions, became the standard-bearer for a national cause. When Huawei released its Mate 60 Pro smartphone in August 2023, equipped with an advanced chip made by China's Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, it was treated as a victory on par with a military triumph. State media ran the story for days. The message was clear: we can do this without you.

But the celebrations papered over a more complicated reality. SMIC's chip, impressive as it was, had been manufactured using older-generation deep ultraviolet lithography, pushed to its theoretical limits through clever engineering workarounds. It was a remarkable achievement, the equivalent of building a sports car out of tractor parts. But it was not a path to the frontier. Without EUV machines, China could iterate and optimize, but it could not make the leap to the smallest, fastest, most efficient chips that would power the next

generation of AI.

And AI was where the real race was being run.

By 2025, the artificial intelligence revolution had moved from the laboratory to the battlefield, the boardroom, and the trading floor. Large language models were writing code, analyzing satellite imagery, designing drugs, and planning military logistics. The companies at the forefront, OpenAI, Google DeepMind, Anthropic, required staggering quantities of computing power to train their models. That computing power came from graphics processing units, GPUs, designed by Nvidia and manufactured by TSMC. A single training run for a frontier AI model could cost hundreds of millions of dollars in compute. Access to the best chips was not an advantage. It was a prerequisite.

The United States held this advantage, and it intended to keep it.

In January 2026, the Commerce Department issued a new directive. Instead of automatic denials for all chip exports to China, it would evaluate applications on a case-by-case basis, with strict security conditions attached. It was a subtle shift, a recognition that a total embargo was pushing China toward self-sufficiency faster than a controlled leak would. Nvidia and AMD, whose revenues from the Chinese market had cratered, lobbied hard for the change. Revenue-sharing arrangements were negotiated, complex deals in which a portion of Chinese sales would fund American AI safety research and military modernization. The firms would sell chips, but not the best chips, and not without conditions.

Beijing saw the shift for what it was: a tactical adjustment, not a change of heart. The fundamental American strategy remained the same. Keep China one or two generations behind on the most advanced semiconductors. Make that gap impossible to close without cooperation that Washington could withdraw at any time. Turn silicon into leverage.

The Chinese response was to accelerate on every front. Government spending on semiconductor research reached record

levels. Thousands of engineers were recruited from Taiwanese and South Korean firms, often with salary packages that doubled or tripled their previous compensation. An entire ecosystem of equipment manufacturers was being built from scratch, reverse-engineering where possible, innovating where necessary. Intelligence agencies on both sides reported a surge in industrial espionage cases. The FBI opened more counterintelligence investigations related to Chinese technology theft in 2025 than in any previous year.

Meanwhile, TSMC found itself at the center of a geopolitical earthquake. The company had begun construction on fabrication plants in Arizona, a move driven less by economics than by American political pressure. The Arizona fabs were expensive, plagued by construction delays and cultural clashes between Taiwanese engineers and American workers, and would not produce chips at the same volume or cost as the facilities in Hsinchu. But their purpose was strategic, not commercial. If China ever moved against Taiwan, the United States needed to ensure it had domestic access to advanced chip manufacturing.

The irony was exquisite and terrifying. The most important factory in the world sat on an island that China's president had declared would be reunified with the mainland, by force if necessary. The technology that powered the American military depended on a supply chain that ran through the Taiwan Strait, one of the most militarily contested waterways on Earth. The chip that made everything possible was also the chip that could make everything fall apart.

Morris Chang, TSMC's founder, had understood this dynamic for years. In a rare public moment of candor, he had described Taiwan's semiconductor industry as a "silicon shield," the idea that the world's dependence on Taiwanese chips made an invasion too costly to contemplate. Destroy TSMC, and you destroy the global economy. No rational actor would do it.

But rationality, as the history of the twentieth century

demonstrated with brutal clarity, is not always the operating principle of great powers. And the chip war was not just about chips. It was about something larger and more dangerous: the question of who would control the technologies that would define the rest of the century. Artificial intelligence. Quantum computing. Autonomous weapons. Biotechnology. All of it ran on semiconductors. All of it flowed through a bottleneck on an island of twenty-three million people.

The old joke in defense circles was that World War III would be fought over Taiwan. It was not a joke anymore. It was a scenario that Pentagon planners gamed out quarterly, that insurance companies priced into their models, and that kept the lights on late at the National Security Council.

But before we get to the island itself, we need to understand the other dimension of the US-China technology war: the battle for artificial intelligence. Because the chips were just the hardware. The real question was what you could do with them. And in that race, the finish line kept moving.

CHAPTER 2: THE TAIWAN TINDERBOX

On a humid afternoon in Taipei in the summer of 2024, a retired Taiwanese general sat in a tea house near the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and made a prediction that would prove uncomfortably close to the truth. "The Americans will arm us to the teeth," he said, stirring his oolong tea with a calm that seemed practiced. "They will sell us everything we ask for and some things we did not. And then, one day, Beijing will decide that the arming has gone far enough. That is the day the shooting starts."

He was not wrong about the arming. In February 2026, the United States announced the single largest arms package ever delivered to Taiwan: $11.15 billion worth of military hardware. The list read like a catalog of American industrial might. Eighty-two High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, the same HIMARS launchers that had shattered Russian logistics in Ukraine. Four hundred and twenty Army Tactical Missile Systems, the ATACMS that could strike targets at three hundred kilometers. Sixty self-propelled howitzers. Swarms of drones. Missile refurbishment kits. Anti-ship missiles. Air defense upgrades. It was enough to turn the island into a bristling fortress, a porcupine in military parlance, too painful to swallow even for an adversary with overwhelming numerical superiority.

The package landed on Xi Jinping's desk in Zhongnanhai with the force of a provocation. China's response was immediate and unambiguous. In a phone call with American officials shortly after the announcement, Xi described Taiwan as "the most important issue" in the US-China relationship and warned that Washington must exercise "extreme caution" regarding arms sales. The choice of words was deliberate. In the diplomatic lexicon of the Chinese Communist Party, "extreme caution" is not a suggestion. It is a red line, spoken softly.

To understand why Taiwan generates this kind of heat, you need to understand what the island represents to both sides of the Pacific.

For China, Taiwan is unfinished business. Not a foreign policy objective. Not a strategic interest. Unfinished business. The island has been governed separately from the mainland since 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces, defeated by Mao Zedong's Communists in the Chinese Civil War, retreated across the Taiwan Strait and established a rival government. For seventy-seven years, the two sides have existed in a state of suspended hostility, separated by a hundred miles of water and an ocean of ideology. China has never renounced the use of force to achieve reunification. Taiwan has never formally declared independence. The ambiguity has kept the peace, but ambiguity has a shelf life, and it is running out.

Xi Jinping has made reunification a centerpiece of his legacy. He has said so publicly, repeatedly, and with increasing specificity. In a landmark speech, he called the resolution of the Taiwan question a "historic mission" that "cannot be passed from generation to generation." The implication was clear: this would happen on his watch. The People's Liberation Army has reorganized, modernized, and expanded with Taiwan as the primary planning scenario. Amphibious assault ships. Landing craft. Ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan's air bases and naval ports. Cyber capabilities designed to paralyze the island's communications and financial systems in the opening hours of a conflict. China's military buildup opposite Taiwan is the largest peacetime military mobilization since the Soviet Union faced NATO across the Fulda Gap.

For the United States, Taiwan represents something equally fundamental but far more awkward to articulate. Officially, Washington maintains a policy of "strategic ambiguity." It does not formally recognize Taiwan as an independent country. It does not have a defense treaty with Taiwan. It does not promise to defend the island in the event of a Chinese attack. What it does is sell Taiwan weapons, lots of them, under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, and maintain the "capacity" to come to Taiwan's defense without committing to doing so.

This deliberate vagueness was designed to deter both sides: to prevent China from attacking by suggesting that America might intervene, and to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence by suggesting that America might not. For decades, it worked. But the policy was built for an era of relative calm and rough military parity in the Strait. That era is over.

The military balance has shifted dramatically in China's favor over the past two decades. In 2000, a cross-strait conflict would have been a one-sided American rout. By 2010, it would have been a costly American victory. By 2020, it had become a genuine contest. Pentagon war games consistently showed that a 2027 conflict over Taiwan would result in catastrophic losses on both sides: dozens of American ships sunk, hundreds of aircraft destroyed, thousands of casualties in the first weeks alone. The insurance firm Lloyd's of London modeled a Taiwan conflict in 2024 and estimated the global economic cost at ten trillion dollars, roughly ten percent of global GDP, making it the most expensive war in history before a single shot had been fired for a full year.

These numbers explain the $11.15 billion arms package. If deterrence is your strategy, the island needs to be armed to the point where the cost of invasion becomes unbearable. The model is Ukraine, where Western-supplied weapons, especially precision-guided missiles and drones, inflicted devastating losses on the invading Russian military. The lesson of Ukraine, as interpreted by strategists in Washington and Taipei, was simple: you do not need to match your adversary tank for tank or ship for ship. You need to make the first seventy-two hours of their attack so bloody, so chaotic, so costly, that the political calculus shifts from "we can take the island" to "we cannot afford to try."

This is the porcupine strategy, and the 2026 arms package was its most aggressive implementation. HIMARS launchers dispersed across the mountainous eastern coast of Taiwan could rain rockets on any landing force approaching the western beaches. ATACMS missiles

could strike staging areas on the Chinese coast itself. Anti-ship missiles could turn the Taiwan Strait into a kill zone. Drones, cheap and expendable, could swarm landing craft and supply vessels. The idea was not to fight a conventional war but to create a defensive nightmare, an island so bristling with lethal capability that even a military as large as China's would think twice.

Beijing, of course, saw it differently. From China's perspective, every American weapon delivered to Taiwan was not a defensive measure but an offensive escalation. Each HIMARS launcher was proof that the United States intended to keep Taiwan permanently separated from the mainland. Each missile was a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the agreements that had governed the US-China relationship since Nixon flew to Beijing in 1972. And the sheer scale of the 2026 package suggested something worse: that Washington was preparing Taiwan not just to deter an attack but to fight one. That distinction mattered enormously inside Zhongnanhai.

The Chinese military response was methodical and alarming. PLA Navy vessels increased their presence in the waters surrounding Taiwan. Chinese aircraft crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, the informal boundary that both sides had respected for decades, with increasing frequency. In early 2026, the PLA conducted a series of exercises that simulated a blockade of the island, practicing the interdiction of commercial shipping and the enforcement of an exclusion zone. A blockade, military analysts noted, was in many ways more dangerous than an invasion. It would strangle Taiwan's economy without requiring a single amphibious landing, and it would force the United States to make a binary choice: break the blockade, which means firing on Chinese ships, or accept it, which means abandoning Taiwan.

Neither option was palatable. Both were being planned for.

The Taiwanese people, caught between two superpowers, responded with a mixture of resolve and fatigue. Polls showed that a majority of Taiwan's citizens identified as Taiwanese rather than

Chinese, a trend that had accelerated sharply among younger generations. Support for formal independence remained a minority position, partly because most Taiwanese understood the catastrophic consequences. But the desire to maintain the status quo, democratic self-governance without a formal break, was overwhelming. The problem was that the status quo was precisely what both Beijing and, increasingly, Washington seemed incapable of sustaining.

Taiwan's own military preparations were extensive but constrained. The island's defense budget had increased steadily, but it was a fraction of China's military spending. Conscription, which had been reduced to four months of largely symbolic service, was extended back to a full year in 2024. Reserve mobilization plans were overhauled. Civil defense exercises, once treated as a minor inconvenience, took on new urgency. In Taipei, office buildings practiced evacuation drills. In the countryside, farmers were briefed on how to recognize military aircraft. The government stockpiled critical supplies: fuel, food, medical equipment, the essentials of a society preparing for siege.

But the greatest variable in the Taiwan equation was not military. It was economic. TSMC, as described in the previous chapter, produced the vast majority of the world's most advanced semiconductors. A Chinese attack on Taiwan would not just be a military conflict. It would be an economic earthquake of unimaginable proportions. Every iPhone, every Nvidia GPU, every advanced weapon system in the American and allied arsenals depended on chips that came from an island in the crosshairs.

This created a paradox that defined the entire crisis. China needed Taiwan's chips as much as the rest of the world did. An invasion that destroyed TSMC's fabrication plants, which were designed to be precisely calibrated and could not function with even minor damage, would set China's own technology industry back by a decade. The silicon shield, Morris Chang's famous concept, was real, but it was a shield made of glass. It could deter, but if it failed, it

would shatter completely, leaving both sides worse off.

Some analysts believed that China would attempt a decapitation strike: a rapid, overwhelming assault designed to seize the island so quickly that TSMC's facilities could be captured intact. Others argued that Beijing would pursue a gray-zone strategy, gradually tightening the noose through blockades, cyber attacks, economic coercion, and political warfare, making Taiwan's position untenable without ever firing a shot. Still others maintained that the deterrence calculus remained stable, that the costs of conflict were so high that neither side would risk it.

The Trump administration, returned to office in January 2025, added another layer of complexity. Trump's approach to Taiwan was transactional in a way that previous administrations' had not been. He viewed the island less as a strategic commitment and more as a bargaining chip. In negotiations with Beijing, Taiwan was something to be leveraged, a card to be played in exchange for trade concessions, fentanyl cooperation, or help managing North Korea. This approach appalled the foreign policy establishment in Washington but resonated with a public weary of overseas commitments.

The March 2026 Trump-Xi summit, scheduled for late in the month, would put all of these tensions on a single table. Xi was expected to push hard for a reduction in arms sales. Trump, flush from the Iran strikes and facing midterm elections in November, had his own calculations. The American public wanted strength abroad but not another war. Taiwan was popular in Congress but poorly understood by voters. The summit would test whether two leaders with vastly different systems, motivations, and constraints could manage a crisis that neither had created but both had inflamed.

In Taipei, the mood was watchful. The Taiwanese had lived with this threat for their entire national existence. They had built a democracy under the shadow of invasion, a prosperous society on borrowed time. They understood, perhaps better than anyone in Washington or Beijing, that the Taiwan Strait was not just a body of

water. It was the seam where two visions of the world's future met, and where they might, one day, violently collide.

The retired general in the tea house had one more thing to say before he paid his bill and walked into the Taipei heat. "Everyone talks about what happens if China invades," he said. "Nobody talks about what happens if they don't. If they just wait. If they squeeze. That is the scenario that keeps me up at night. Because a squeeze is slow, and democracies are not good at slow."

He left a generous tip and stepped into the street, where scooters weaved through traffic and office workers checked their phones and the skyline of one of Asia's most vibrant cities hummed with the ordinary business of a Tuesday afternoon. Behind him, across the Strait, one hundred and sixty of the People's Liberation Army's most advanced missiles sat in their silos, pointed east.

CHAPTER 3: ROCKS AND REEFS

Twelve hundred miles south of Taiwan, in waters so shallow that fishing boats occasionally scrape the coral, a different kind of confrontation has been unfolding for decades. It is slower than the Taiwan crisis, less dramatic, less likely to produce a single catastrophic moment. But it is, in many ways, more corrosive, because it is eroding the very idea of international law, one reef at a time.

The South China Sea is roughly 1.4 million square miles of water, about the size of the Mediterranean. It is one of the most important maritime thoroughfares on Earth. A third of global shipping passes through it each year, carrying roughly three trillion dollars in trade. It connects the factories of East Asia to the consumers of Europe and the energy producers of the Middle East. It sits atop vast reserves of oil, natural gas, and fisheries that feed hundreds of millions of people. And it is claimed, in almost its entirety, by the People's Republic of China.

The claim is extraordinary. It is based on what Beijing calls the "nine-dash line," a cartographic assertion first drawn on a map by the Republic of China in 1947 and inherited by the Communist government after 1949. The nine-dash line sweeps in a vast U-shape from China's southern coast, enclosing waters that lie hundreds of miles from the Chinese mainland but within spitting distance of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. If you drew the equivalent in the Atlantic, it would be as if France claimed the entire Bay of Biscay, the waters off West Africa, and half the Caribbean.

In 2016, an international tribunal at The Hague ruled that China's nine-dash line had no basis in international law. It was one of the most consequential rulings in the history of maritime jurisprudence. China's response was to ignore it entirely. "That ruling is null and void," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said at the time, and Beijing has behaved accordingly ever since.

What China has done instead of complying with international law is one of the most ambitious engineering projects of the twenty-first century. Starting in 2013 and accelerating through the following decade, China dredged millions of tons of sand and coral from the seafloor and used it to construct artificial islands atop submerged reefs and atolls that were, in their natural state, barely visible above the waterline at high tide. On these manufactured landmasses, China built military bases. Runways capable of handling fighter jets. Radar installations. Anti-ship missile batteries. Barracks. Ports. Some of these islands have three-thousand-meter airstrips, longer than most commercial airports.

Seven reefs in the Spratly Islands were transformed into what the Pentagon calls "forward operating bases." Mischief Reef. Subi Reef. Fiery Cross Reef. Names that sound like they belong in a fantasy novel but represent a hard, concrete reality: China has militarized a body of water the size of Western Europe, and it has done so while telling the world, over and over, that it had no intention of doing exactly that.

In 2015, Xi Jinping stood in the Rose Garden of the White House beside Barack Obama and declared that China "does not intend to pursue militarization" of the South China Sea. Within two years, satellite imagery showed anti-aircraft guns, missile shelters, and military-grade radar on the very islands he was talking about. It was, by any honest measure, a lie told to the face of a sitting American president. But geopolitics does not have a perjury statute.

By 2026, the situation had escalated further. In October 2025, Chinese dredging vessels began new land reclamation at Antelope Reef, a previously unbuilt feature in the Paracel Islands. The operation was monitored in real time by Philippine coast guard vessels and reported to ASEAN. By February 2026, Philippine surveillance had identified forty-eight Chinese vessels, including warships, operating in the area around disputed reefs in the Spratlys.

The Philippines, which assumed the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN in 2026, found itself at the center of the storm. Under

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Manila had taken a dramatically more confrontational approach to China's claims than his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, who had essentially shelved the Philippines' legal victory and courted Beijing's economic favor instead. Marcos reversed course. He reopened military bases to American forces under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. He publicly challenged Chinese encroachments. He allowed Philippine coast guard vessels to resupply the BRP Sierra Madre, a World War II-era transport ship deliberately grounded on Second Thomas Shoal in 1999 to mark the Philippines' territorial claim.

The resupply missions to the Sierra Madre became, improbably, one of the most closely watched flashpoints in the world. Chinese coast guard vessels used water cannons, blocking maneuvers, and even military-grade lasers to harass Filipino boats attempting to deliver food and water to the small marine garrison stationed on the rusting hull. Collisions occurred. Filipino sailors were injured. Videos of the confrontations went viral, generating outrage across Southeast Asia and providing the international media with dramatic footage of what David-versus-Goliath looks like when the Goliath has a coast guard fleet larger than most nations' navies.

The United States responded with a dramatic increase in military cooperation with the Philippines. In 2026, over five hundred joint military exercises were planned between the two countries, more than in any previous year. American forces rotated through Philippine bases on an almost continuous basis. The US deployed thirty-six Boeing F-15EX Eagle II fighter jets to Okinawa, positioning its most advanced air-superiority aircraft within easy striking distance of the South China Sea. The message to Beijing was unsubtle: the Philippines is a treaty ally, and the mutual defense pact is not decorative.

But the military buildup, on both sides, masked a deeper structural problem: no one had a political solution.

A South China Sea Code of Conduct had been under negotiation between China and ASEAN for over two decades. The idea was to

create a binding set of rules governing behavior in the disputed waters: no new construction, no military escalation, freedom of navigation, peaceful resolution of disputes. It was supposed to prevent exactly the situation that now existed. In early 2026, a prominent maritime security analyst offered a blunt assessment: a code of conduct was "one hundred percent not likely" to be signed that year. The negotiation had become a diplomatic fiction, a process designed to look like progress while producing none.

The reasons were structural. China had no incentive to agree to rules that would constrain its freedom of action in waters it already controlled through sheer physical presence. ASEAN, a consensus-based organization of ten member states with wildly divergent interests and relationships with Beijing, could not present a unified front. Vietnam, which has its own significant claims in the South China Sea, was one of China's most vocal critics in private but cautious in public, wary of economic retaliation. Cambodia, heavily dependent on Chinese investment, routinely blocked ASEAN statements critical of Beijing. Indonesia, the largest nation in Southeast Asia, tried to play mediator but found itself increasingly drawn into disputes over its own exclusive economic zone near the Natuna Islands.

The result was a slow-motion erosion of the rules-based order in maritime Asia. Each new artificial island, each harassed resupply mission, each unreturned diplomatic protest was a chip off the edifice of international law. And the precedent was not lost on other revisionist powers watching from afar. If China could redraw the map of the South China Sea by simply building islands and daring anyone to stop it, what was to prevent Russia from claiming the Arctic, or Turkey from expanding its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean, or any nation with the means and the will from doing whatever it pleased?

The answer, for now, was American military power. The US Navy conducted regular "freedom of navigation operations" in the South China Sea, sailing warships within twelve nautical miles of Chinese-

claimed features to demonstrate that Washington did not recognize Beijing's expansive claims. These operations were carefully choreographed: enough to signal resolve, not enough to trigger a shooting war. But they were a band-aid on a bullet wound. American ships could sail through the South China Sea indefinitely, but they could not undo the islands that China had already built or the weapons that sat upon them.

In Beijing, strategists took a long view. The South China Sea strategy was not about any single confrontation. It was about fait accompli, the slow accumulation of physical facts that would, over time, make China's claims irrefutable through sheer presence. International law says one thing. The concrete runway on Fiery Cross Reef says another. And in the contest between paper and concrete, concrete usually wins.

The fishermen of the Philippines, who had worked these waters for generations, understood this better than any diplomat. An aging fisherman from the town of Masinloc, whose family had fished the Scarborough Shoal for as long as anyone could remember, put it simply. "They built a wall in the sea," he said. "And now the fish are on the other side."

He was talking about fish. But he could just as easily have been talking about the international order itself.

CHAPTER 4: THE BELT THAT BINDS

On the outskirts of Gwadar, a small port city on the southwestern tip of Pakistan where the Arabian Sea meets the Indian Ocean, the future arrived in the form of Chinese construction cranes. They appeared in 2015, tall steel silhouettes against the desert sky, and they have not stopped working since. The cranes are building a deep-water port, a highway, a power plant, a fiber optic cable, and a special economic zone. When the project is complete, goods manufactured in western China will travel by road and rail through the Karakoram mountains, across the length of Pakistan, and onto ships at Gwadar for export to Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. The journey that currently takes weeks by sea through the Strait of Malacca will be cut to days.

This is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, CPEC, and it is just one thread in the most ambitious infrastructure project in human history: the Belt and Road Initiative.

When Xi Jinping announced the BRI in 2013, first in a speech at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan and then at a forum in Indonesia, the scope of his vision was so vast that many Western observers dismissed it as propaganda. A network of roads, railways, ports, power plants, and digital infrastructure spanning Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Europe. A modern Silk Road, Beijing called it, echoing the ancient trade routes that had connected China to the Mediterranean two thousand years ago.

Nobody is dismissing it anymore.

By the end of 2025, 150 countries had signed BRI cooperation agreements with China. The cumulative value of Chinese construction contracts and investments through the initiative had reached $1.399 trillion. In a single year, 2025, Chinese engagement in BRI member countries totaled $213.5 billion spread across roughly 350 deals. To put that in perspective, the Marshall Plan, America's post-World War II

reconstruction of Europe, cost approximately $150 billion in today's dollars. China has spent almost ten times that, and it is not done.

The BRI is not a single project. It is an ecosystem. It includes the port of Piraeus in Greece, now majority-owned by the Chinese shipping giant COSCO, which has been transformed from a sleepy Mediterranean harbor into one of Europe's fastest-growing container terminals. It includes a high-speed rail line in Laos, connecting the landlocked Southeast Asian nation to the Chinese rail network for the first time. It includes power plants in Pakistan, highways in Kenya, data centers in Indonesia, fiber optic cables running along the ocean floor from Southeast Asia to East Africa.

In Africa, the BRI has been particularly transformative. The Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, completed in 2018, was the first modern electrified railway on the continent. China funded, designed, built, and now largely operates it. In Nigeria, Chinese firms are building the Lekki Deep Sea Port outside Lagos, poised to become West Africa's largest. In Zambia, Chinese companies mine copper. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, they mine cobalt. In Guinea, they mine bauxite. Across the continent, Chinese telecommunications firms, principally Huawei, have built cellular networks that serve hundreds of millions of Africans.

The strategic logic of the BRI is not subtle, but it is sophisticated. China imports vast quantities of energy and raw materials, principally through maritime chokepoints controlled by the US Navy: the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal. Any conflict with the United States would leave China's supply lines catastrophically vulnerable. The BRI is, in part, an insurance policy against that vulnerability. Overland routes through Central Asia and Pakistan bypass the chokepoints. Ports in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean provide alternative supply chains. Digital infrastructure ensures that Chinese technology, rather than American, becomes the default across the developing world.

But the BRI is also something more than a logistics network. It is

a system of influence. Countries that accept Chinese infrastructure investment become, to varying degrees, dependent on Chinese technology, Chinese financing, and Chinese goodwill. The ports run on Chinese software. The power plants burn fuel purchased with Chinese credit lines. The railways use Chinese gauge. The debt is denominated in Chinese terms. And when the debt cannot be repaid, as happened in Sri Lanka, Zambia, and elsewhere, the negotiations that follow give Beijing leverage that no amount of UN votes or human rights resolutions can match.

The "debt trap" narrative has been contested, and not without reason. China has restructured loans, forgiven interest, and extended repayment periods in numerous cases. The terms of Chinese lending are not uniformly predatory, and many BRI recipient countries actively sought Chinese investment because Western alternatives were slow, conditional, and patronizing. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund imposed structural adjustment programs that demanded austerity, privatization, and political reforms as conditions for lending. China offered infrastructure with fewer strings attached. For leaders in Nairobi, Islamabad, and Jakarta, the choice was often straightforward: wait years for a Western loan with conditions, or break ground next month with a Chinese one.

But the strategic implications were real, regardless of the intentions behind them. The port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, built with Chinese loans that the government could not repay, was leased to a Chinese state-owned firm for ninety-nine years. China now operates port facilities in Pakistan, Myanmar, Djibouti, and Greece. It has military basing rights in Djibouti, a tiny nation at the mouth of the Red Sea that also hosts American, French, and Japanese bases. The Indian Ocean, which India has long considered its strategic backyard, is increasingly dotted with Chinese-operated or Chinese-influenced facilities. Indian strategists call it the "string of pearls," a necklace of ports and installations that could, in a crisis, be converted to military use.

By 2026, the BRI had entered what analysts called its "third phase." The first phase, from 2013 to roughly 2018, was characterized by mega-projects: massive railways, highways, and ports that generated headlines and geopolitical anxiety in equal measure. The second phase, from 2019 to 2023, was a period of retrenchment, as the pandemic disrupted supply chains, several high-profile projects ran into trouble, and Beijing tightened lending standards in response to criticism. The third phase, now underway, emphasized what Chinese officials called "small yet smart" projects: digital infrastructure, renewable energy, health facilities, and capacity-building programs that generated less controversy but potentially more influence.

The digital dimension of the BRI was particularly significant. Huawei and ZTE had built 5G networks across much of Africa and Southeast Asia. Chinese cloud computing firms were building data centers that would store the information of hundreds of millions of people on Chinese servers, governed by Chinese data laws. Chinese surveillance technology, including facial recognition systems, was being exported to governments in Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, often as part of "safe city" packages that bundled cameras, software, and training. The digital BRI was not just about connectivity. It was about establishing the technological ecosystem, the digital operating system, that would shape how a large portion of the world communicated, transacted, and was governed.

The Western response to the BRI was slow, fragmented, and, by most honest assessments, inadequate. In 2021, the G7 announced the Build Back Better World initiative, rebranded in 2022 as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, pledging $600 billion in infrastructure spending for the developing world. It was a fraction of what China had already deployed, and much of it existed on paper rather than in concrete. The European Union launched its Global Gateway initiative with similar ambitions and similar limitations. The fundamental problem was that democratic governments, constrained by budget cycles, parliamentary oversight,

and the need to show returns to taxpayers, could not move with the speed or scale of a state capitalist system that could direct banks, construction firms, and state-owned enterprises to build whatever, wherever, whenever the Party directed.

This did not mean the BRI was without problems. Many projects suffered from cost overruns, corruption, environmental damage, and local backlash. In Kenya, the Nairobi-Mombasa railway, one of the BRI's flagship African projects, was struggling to generate enough revenue to service its debt. In Pakistan, CPEC projects faced security threats, political instability, and community resistance. In Latin America, several countries elected governments skeptical of Chinese investment and eager to renegotiate terms. The BRI was not a frictionless machine. It was a sprawling, messy, continent-spanning enterprise with as many failures as successes.

But the aggregate effect was undeniable. China had built a network of physical and digital infrastructure that gave it influence in every region of the world. It had created dependencies that would take decades to unwind. It had offered an alternative development model that, for all its flaws, was attractive to hundreds of millions of people who had never seen a Western construction crew break ground in their neighborhood.

The belt that Xi Jinping described in 2013 had become, by 2026, something closer to a web. And in the contest for global influence, the country that builds the roads, lays the cables, and keeps the lights on has a seat at every table, whether it is invited or not.

In Gwadar, the cranes continued to rise. Across the road from the port, a fisherman mended his nets in the same spot his father had used. The highway running past him led to China. The ships in the harbor would carry goods to Africa. And the future, whatever it looked like, was being poured in Chinese concrete.

CHAPTER 5: TIKTOK AND THE DIGITAL IRON CURTAIN

At 11:59 PM Eastern Time on January 18, 2025, approximately 170 million Americans lost access to TikTok. The app went dark. Videos stopped loading. The algorithm, the most sophisticated content recommendation engine ever built, fell silent. For roughly fourteen hours, the most popular social media platform among Americans under thirty simply ceased to exist.

Then it came back. And the story of how it came back tells you more about the future of the internet than a thousand policy papers.

TikTok's near-death experience was the culmination of a political battle that had consumed Washington for the better part of four years. The core issue was simple to state and nearly impossible to resolve: TikTok was owned by ByteDance, a Chinese company headquartered in Beijing, and its algorithm processed the data and shaped the information diet of a significant fraction of the American population. US intelligence agencies warned that the Chinese government could, in theory, compel ByteDance to hand over user data or manipulate the algorithm to serve Beijing's interests. TikTok denied that this had ever happened. But the theoretical capability was enough to drive bipartisan legislation demanding that ByteDance divest its American operations or face a ban.

The April 2024 law gave ByteDance nine months to sell. ByteDance, predictably, did not. It challenged the law in court, arguing that a forced sale violated the First Amendment. The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed. On January 17, 2025, the Court upheld the law, clearing the way for the ban to take effect the following day.

Then Donald Trump intervened. Three days before his inauguration on January 20, he signaled that he would not enforce the ban, issuing an executive order on his first day in office that gave ByteDance an additional ninety days to negotiate a deal. Over the following months, a complex arrangement took shape. On January 22,

2026, TikTok formally announced the establishment of TikTok USDS Joint Venture LLC, a new corporate entity that would operate the American version of the platform. Under the deal, ByteDance would retain a minority stake, American investors would hold the majority, and a board approved by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States would oversee data security and algorithmic transparency.

The deal satisfied almost no one. Hawks in Congress argued that any continued ByteDance involvement left the fundamental security risk unaddressed. Privacy advocates noted that American tech companies were hardly paragons of data protection. TikTok creators, who had built businesses and careers on the platform, were exhausted by the uncertainty. Chinese state media called the forced restructuring an act of economic coercion, a powerful country using national security as a pretext to steal a successful Chinese technology company.

But the TikTok saga was never really about TikTok. It was about something much larger: the fracturing of the global internet along geopolitical lines.

For the first two decades of the commercial internet, a single assumption governed the thinking of technologists, policymakers, and entrepreneurs: the internet was global. Information would flow freely across borders. Platforms would serve users everywhere. The same Google search, the same Facebook feed, the same YouTube video would be available to a teenager in Topeka and a teenager in Tokyo. This was not just a technical arrangement. It was an ideological proposition, rooted in the post-Cold War conviction that open information networks would promote democracy, economic development, and mutual understanding.

China broke that assumption long before TikTok existed. The Great Firewall, China's system of internet censorship and control, went operational in the early 2000s. It blocked access to Google, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Wikipedia, and thousands of other websites. In their place, a parallel internet ecosystem emerged: Baidu instead of

Google, WeChat instead of WhatsApp, Weibo instead of Twitter, Youku instead of YouTube, and, eventually, Douyin (TikTok's Chinese twin) instead of Instagram Reels.

This parallel internet was not merely a censorship tool, though it was certainly that. It was also an industrial policy. By blocking foreign competitors, China created a protected market in which domestic technology companies could grow to enormous scale. These companies, nurtured behind the firewall, eventually became global competitors. Huawei built telecommunications infrastructure across the developing world. TikTok became the most downloaded app on Earth. Chinese e-commerce platforms, Temu and Shein, flooded Western markets with ultra-cheap goods powered by algorithms that knew what you wanted before you did.

The West's response was to begin building its own walls. Not as tall, not as comprehensive, and certainly not as elegant as China's, but walls nonetheless. The TikTok divestiture was the most visible example, but it was hardly the only one. The European Union's Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act imposed significant new regulations on large platforms, with enforcement mechanisms that gave Brussels real power over American and Chinese tech companies. India banned TikTok and dozens of other Chinese apps in 2020, following the border clash with China in the Galwan Valley. The ban was presented as a security measure, but its economic effect was to clear the field for domestic competitors and American platforms.

The emerging picture was of an internet dividing into three blocs: an American-dominated ecosystem, a Chinese-dominated ecosystem, and a European regulatory sphere that would try to impose its values on both. Countries in the Global South would have to choose which ecosystem to inhabit, or try to navigate between them, a digital version of the non-aligned movement that emerged during the Cold War.

The stakes of this digital partition went far beyond which app teenagers used to share dance videos. Data had become the most

valuable resource on Earth, the raw material of artificial intelligence, targeted advertising, political persuasion, and intelligence collection. Whoever controlled the platforms controlled the data. Whoever controlled the data had an advantage in the AI race. And whoever won the AI race would have an advantage in everything else.

Consider the implications. TikTok's algorithm did not just recommend videos. It learned. It absorbed the preferences, behaviors, anxieties, and aspirations of 170 million Americans, processing that information through machine learning models that became more sophisticated with every swipe. The same was true of every major platform. Google knew what you searched for. Meta knew who you were connected to. Amazon knew what you bought. Apple knew where you went. And TikTok, with its uniquely addictive short-video format, knew what captured your attention at the deepest, most instinctive level.

This data was not just commercially valuable. It was strategically significant. An intelligence agency with access to the behavioral patterns of a hundred million people could identify targets, predict social movements, and conduct influence operations at a scale and precision that would have been unimaginable a generation ago. You did not need to read someone's emails to understand them. You just needed to know what videos they watched at two in the morning.

Whether China was actually using TikTok data for intelligence purposes was, in some sense, beside the point. The capability existed. The legal framework in China, which required companies to cooperate with intelligence agencies upon request, was unambiguous. And the principle that a potential adversary should not have privileged access to the behavioral data of your population seemed, to most national security professionals, self-evident.

But the TikTok debate also exposed an uncomfortable hypocrisy. The United States, through its own technology companies and intelligence agencies, conducted global data collection on a scale that made TikTok's potential look modest by comparison. The Snowden

revelations of 2013 had demonstrated that the NSA was hoovering up communications data from around the world, including from allied nations. American tech companies, operating under legal frameworks like Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, provided user data to the US government under a system that much of the world found deeply problematic. When Washington argued that TikTok was a security threat because of its connection to a foreign government, many countries heard a message that was less about protecting privacy than about controlling the terms of surveillance.

This was the paradox at the heart of the digital iron curtain. Every government wanted to protect its citizens' data from foreign adversaries while retaining the ability to access that data itself. Every government wanted open markets for its own technology exports while restricting market access for competitors. Every government wanted the internet to be free, except for the parts that threatened its power.

By 2026, the fragmentation was accelerating. Russia had passed laws requiring data localization, forcing companies to store Russian users' data on servers within Russian borders. India was building a domestic digital infrastructure, the Unified Payments Interface, that processed more transactions than Visa and Mastercard combined. Brazil, Indonesia, and Nigeria were all developing data sovereignty frameworks that would reshape how information flowed across their borders.

The global internet, the dream of a single, unified, borderless digital space, was not dead. But it was dying. In its place was emerging something more familiar, something that looked a lot like the physical world: a landscape of competing powers, competing systems, and competing visions of what information should be free, what should be controlled, and who gets to decide.

The teenager in Topeka would still watch videos on TikTok, or whatever TikTok became under its new American corporate structure. The teenager in Chengdu would still watch videos on Douyin. But the

algorithm that curated their reality would be different. The data that flowed from their fingertips would travel along different paths, governed by different laws, analyzed by different intelligence agencies. Two people, the same age, the same species, the same fundamental curiosity, living in different digital universes.

The iron curtain of the twentieth century was made of barbed wire and concrete. The iron curtain of the twenty-first century was made of code. And it was being drawn, line by line, across the world.

CHAPTER 6: THE AI ARMS RACE

In a nondescript office park in San Francisco's Mission District, behind a door with no logo and a receptionist who asked for two forms of identification, a team of researchers at OpenAI watched their latest model solve a problem that, two years earlier, had been considered a benchmark of human-level reasoning. The problem was a graduate-level physics question involving quantum entanglement. The model solved it in four seconds. It also suggested an alternative approach that the researchers had not considered.

That moment, unremarkable in the daily workflow of a company that had grown accustomed to surpassing its own benchmarks, captured something that governments around the world were only beginning to grapple with: artificial intelligence was not just getting better. It was getting better at getting better. The rate of improvement was itself accelerating, compounding in ways that outstripped the ability of policymakers, ethicists, and military planners to keep pace.

By 2026, the AI arms race had become the defining technology competition of the era, overtaking semiconductors, space, and even nuclear weapons in its potential to reshape the global balance of power. The race was primarily between two countries, the United States and China, though the European Union, the United Kingdom, and a handful of other nations were competing at the margins.

The American advantage was concentrated in a small number of companies. OpenAI, Google DeepMind, Anthropic, and Meta's AI division represented the frontier of large language models and multimodal systems. These companies had access to the most advanced hardware (Nvidia's GPUs, manufactured by TSMC), the deepest pools of training data, and the most talented researchers, many of them recruited from the world's top universities. The total investment in American AI companies from 2023 to 2025 exceeded $300 billion. Silicon Valley had bet its future on artificial intelligence,

and the bet was paying off in capabilities that surprised even the people building them.

China's AI ecosystem was different in structure but formidable in scale. Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, and a newer generation of startups like Zhipu AI and Moonshot AI were developing large language models that, while generally a generation behind the American frontier, were improving rapidly. China had two advantages that the United States could not replicate: a massive domestic market of 1.4 billion people generating training data at an extraordinary rate, and a government that was willing to direct resources, talent, and regulatory attention toward AI development as a matter of national priority.

The Chinese approach to AI development was characteristic of Beijing's broader technology strategy: state direction, massive investment, aggressive talent recruitment, and a willingness to trade privacy for data. China had no equivalent of the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation. Facial recognition was deployed across public spaces, transportation networks, and retail environments. The social credit system, however unevenly implemented, demonstrated a willingness to use AI-powered surveillance as a tool of governance. Chinese AI companies had access to datasets that, in their scale and granularity, were unmatched anywhere in the world.

The military applications of AI were what kept the generals awake.

In October 2025, the Pentagon released a classified assessment, portions of which were subsequently leaked to the press, that described AI as "the single most disruptive technology in the history of warfare since the invention of nuclear weapons." The assessment was not hyperbolic. AI was already being integrated into military operations across multiple domains.

In Ukraine, both sides were using AI for target identification, drone operations, and intelligence analysis. Ukrainian forces used

machine learning algorithms to process satellite imagery and identify Russian military equipment with a speed and accuracy that no human analyst could match. Russian forces experimented with AI-guided loitering munitions, drones that could select and engage targets autonomously. The war in Ukraine had become, among many other things, a testing ground for AI-enabled warfare.

The implications for a potential US-China conflict were staggering. The Taiwan Strait scenario, which Pentagon planners had been gaming for years, was being completely rethought in light of AI capabilities. Autonomous underwater vehicles could mine the Strait without risking human operators. AI-powered electronic warfare systems could jam and deceive enemy communications at machine speed. Swarms of cheap drones, coordinated by AI, could overwhelm air defenses that were designed to counter individual manned aircraft. Decision-making loops that had previously taken minutes or hours could be compressed to seconds.

This compression of time was, perhaps, the most dangerous aspect of AI in a military context. In a crisis between nuclear-armed powers, the time available for human judgment, for reassessment, for de-escalation, was already dangerously short. AI-enabled systems that could identify, target, and engage threats at machine speed reduced that window further. The nightmare scenario was a conflict in which AI systems on both sides escalated faster than human leaders could intervene, a flash war triggered not by political miscalculation but by algorithmic interaction.

Both the United States and China recognized this risk, at least in principle. In November 2023, at a summit in San Francisco, Biden and Xi agreed to open discussions on AI safety in a military context. By 2026, those discussions had produced some modest confidence-building measures, including a hotline for AI-related military incidents and a mutual commitment to maintain human control over nuclear weapons. But the broader question of how to govern AI in warfare remained unresolved, trapped in the same logic of competition that

made cooperation so difficult. Neither side wanted to constrain its own AI development when the other side might not.

The civilian applications of AI were equally transformative and equally contested. Large language models were being deployed across healthcare, finance, education, legal services, and scientific research. AI-powered drug discovery was cutting the time to identify new pharmaceutical compounds from years to months. AI tutoring systems were providing personalized education to millions of students, particularly in developing countries where qualified teachers were scarce. AI-driven financial models were reshaping how markets operated, how risk was assessed, and how capital was allocated.

But the economic disruption was profound. By 2025, measurable job displacement had begun in sectors ranging from customer service to content creation to basic legal work. Goldman Sachs estimated that AI could automate the equivalent of 300 million full-time jobs globally within a decade. The political implications of that displacement, coming on top of decades of manufacturing job losses due to globalization and automation, were explosive. Populist movements in the United States, Europe, and parts of Asia had already been fueled by economic anxiety. AI promised to accelerate that anxiety to levels that no existing political framework was equipped to handle.

The governance of AI was, consequently, one of the most urgent geopolitical questions of 2026. Three competing models had emerged. The European Union, characteristically, had regulated first and asked questions later. The EU AI Act, which came into force in stages beginning in 2024, classified AI systems by risk level and imposed strict requirements on high-risk applications, including mandatory impact assessments, transparency obligations, and prohibitions on certain uses like real-time biometric surveillance in public spaces. The EU approach was comprehensive, principled, and, critics argued, so burdensome that it risked driving AI development to less regulated jurisdictions.

The United States had taken a lighter-touch approach, relying on

voluntary commitments from industry, executive orders, and sector-specific guidance rather than comprehensive legislation. The Trump administration, returned to office in 2025, had revoked its predecessor's executive order on AI safety and replaced it with a framework that prioritized innovation and commercial competitiveness over precautionary regulation. The result was a permissive environment for American AI companies, which were growing, hiring, and deploying at a pace that left regulators perpetually behind.

China's approach was, predictably, the most centralized. Beijing had issued a series of regulations governing specific AI applications: algorithmic recommendations, deepfakes, generative AI content. These regulations were designed not primarily to protect individual rights, as in the EU model, but to ensure that AI served the interests of the state. Content generated by AI had to align with "socialist core values." Algorithms that recommended content were required to "uphold mainstream value orientation." The Chinese model was AI development at state speed, with state oversight and state objectives.

The Global South, meanwhile, watched these three models compete and asked a question that none of them adequately answered: where is our seat at the table? The countries that would be most affected by AI, those with large, young populations, developing economies, and limited technical capacity, had the least voice in shaping the rules. A farmer in Kenya whose livelihood might be disrupted by AI-driven agricultural automation had no input into the EU AI Act. A garment worker in Bangladesh whose job might be replaced by AI-powered manufacturing had no say in China's algorithmic regulations. The governance of AI was being shaped by the countries that built it, not the countries that would live with its consequences.

By 2026, the outlines of a global governance framework were emerging. The United Nations had launched a Global Dialogue on AI Governance and an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI,

modeled loosely on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. These initiatives were well-intentioned but toothless, advisory bodies with no enforcement power and no capacity to slow the technology's development. The real decisions about AI governance would be made in Washington, Beijing, Brussels, and the boardrooms of the companies building the systems. Everyone else would adapt.

The AI arms race was, in the end, a race without a finish line. The technology would continue to improve. The capabilities would continue to expand. The military applications would continue to proliferate. And the fundamental question, whether humanity could control a technology that was, by design, becoming smarter than the people who built it, would remain unanswered for years, perhaps decades, to come.

In the nondescript office park in San Francisco, the researchers had moved on to their next experiment. The physics problem was already forgotten, another data point in a trajectory of improvement that showed no sign of leveling off. Outside, the fog rolled in from the Pacific, as it always did in the late afternoon, cold and quiet and indifferent to the revolution taking place behind the unmarked door.

CHAPTER 7: MAR-A-LAGO TO BEIJING

The invitation arrived through unofficial channels, as all consequential diplomatic communications between the United States and China did in this era. A message from Beijing's ambassador in Washington to a senior member of the National Security Council, conveyed over dinner at a Georgetown restaurant in January 2026. President Xi Jinping would welcome President Donald Trump to Beijing for a state visit. The dates proposed were March 31 to April 2. The agenda would include trade, technology, Taiwan, and what the Chinese side delicately referred to as "regional stability," meaning everything from the South China Sea to North Korea to the recent military strikes on Iran.

Trump accepted within forty-eight hours. He had been looking for a summit. The strikes on Iran had generated the kind of headlines he craved: bold, decisive, historic. But they had also generated instability that was rattling energy markets and alarming allies. A state visit to Beijing, with its pageantry and photo opportunities and the unmistakable message that the two most powerful men on Earth were talking, would reframe the narrative. Trump was, above all things, a performer, and the global stage was his preferred theater.

Xi had his own calculations. The Chinese economy, while still growing, was under pressure. The property sector crisis that had begun with Evergrande's default in 2021 had metastasized, dragging down consumer confidence and local government finances. Youth unemployment, officially reported at around fifteen percent but widely believed to be much higher, was a source of quiet but persistent social tension. The trade war that had begun during Trump's first term and intensified under Biden had redirected supply chains away from China, with manufacturing shifting to Vietnam, India, Mexico, and Indonesia. The semiconductor export controls were a constant irritation, a reminder that America still held chokepoints that China could not circumvent.

A summit with Trump offered an opportunity to ease some of these pressures. Xi would push for relaxation of chip export controls, arguing that restricting Nvidia's sales to China hurt American companies without meaningfully slowing Chinese AI development. He would seek a stabilization of trade tensions, perhaps a return to the managed competition that had characterized the Phase One deal of 2020. And he would deliver, in person, China's firmest possible message on Taiwan: the arms sales must stop, or consequences would follow.

Trump, for his part, wanted deliverables he could sell to the American public. A trade deal that reduced the deficit. Chinese cooperation on fentanyl precursor chemicals, which had become a potent political issue. Some form of commitment on North Korea, however vague. And, ideally, a personal triumph: the image of two alpha leaders cutting deals that lesser politicians could not.

The paradox of the Trump-Xi relationship was that it functioned better than anyone in the foreign policy establishment expected, precisely because both men viewed diplomacy as a transaction rather than a process. Trump did not care about the rules-based international order. He did not care about alliance management or diplomatic protocols or the carefully calibrated language of joint communiques. He wanted outcomes: money, leverage, spectacle. Xi, operating within a very different political system, was equally transactional. He wanted stability on his terms: no interference in Taiwan, no containment of China's rise, no moral lectures about human rights.

This transactional alignment produced results that surprised observers on both sides. During Trump's first term, the Phase One trade deal had averted a full-blown economic war, though its terms were widely criticized as favorable to China. Trump's personal rapport with Xi, built on flattery and the promise of "beautiful deals," had created a diplomatic channel that bypassed the usual bureaucratic friction. Trump called Xi a "brilliant leader." Xi called Trump "my friend." The relationship was superficial, performative, and, at critical

moments, effective.

But the structural forces driving the US-China rivalry were stronger than any personal relationship. The technology competition was accelerating, not slowing. The military buildup in the Pacific was intensifying. The ideological gap between a one-party authoritarian state and a chaotic but resilient democracy was not something that two men could bridge over dinner. And the domestic politics on both sides demanded confrontation. In Washington, being tough on China was one of the few truly bipartisan positions in a hyperpartisan era. In Beijing, nationalist sentiment, stoked by state media and amplified by social media, made any appearance of weakness toward the United States politically dangerous.

The March 2026 summit would test whether the transactional approach could produce meaningful results or whether it was simply delaying an inevitable collision.

The pre-summit negotiations, conducted through a web of back channels, official envoys, and business intermediaries, revealed the fault lines. On trade, progress was possible. China was willing to increase purchases of American agricultural products, particularly soybeans and corn, which played well in the Midwestern states that Trump needed for the 2028 presidential race (or, more precisely, for the Republican congressional candidates he wanted to support in the 2026 midterms). American companies wanted access to China's consumer market, still the world's second largest and growing. A deal on commodities, packaged with investment commitments and some tariff adjustments, was within reach.

On technology, the picture was grimmer. China wanted Nvidia's H200 and next-generation chips. The United States was willing to sell some advanced chips under strict conditions but not the ones that mattered most for frontier AI training. The gap between what Beijing wanted and what Washington would give was too wide to close in a single summit. At best, both sides would agree to continue talking, which in diplomatic language meant agreeing to disagree while

buying time.

On Taiwan, the positions were irreconcilable. Xi's message was expected to be the hardest it had ever been: the $11.15 billion arms package was unacceptable, and future sales at that scale would be met with responses that went beyond diplomatic protests. What those responses might look like was left deliberately vague, which was part of the point. Ambiguity was China's weapon as much as it was America's.

Trump's approach to Taiwan was the wildcard. He had publicly mused about whether defending Taiwan was worth the cost, comparing the island's semiconductor industry to "a candy store" that both the US and China wanted to control. His advisors were split between hawks who saw Taiwan as the linchpin of the American alliance system in Asia and pragmatists who viewed it as a bargaining chip that could be traded for concessions elsewhere. The risk was that Trump, in pursuit of a "big deal" with Xi, would offer security assurances on Taiwan that undermined the island's confidence in American support without actually reducing the military threat from China.

The summit also took place against the backdrop of the Iran strikes, which had fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape. Beijing had maintained a careful neutrality on Iran, condemning the strikes in measured language while privately calculating how the collapse of the Iranian regime might affect Chinese energy imports and Middle Eastern stability. China purchased a significant portion of its oil from Iran, often through sanctions-evading shadow fleets. A destabilized Iran, or a new government more aligned with the West, could complicate those arrangements.

For Xi, the Iran strikes also sent a message about American military reach. If the United States could coordinate a massive air campaign against a country the size of Iran with minimal international resistance, what did that imply for other potential conflicts? The lesson Beijing drew was not to back down but to accelerate: more

missile development, more naval construction, more investment in anti-access and area-denial capabilities that would raise the cost of American intervention in the western Pacific.

The summit itself, when it arrived, would be a spectacle of geopolitical theater. State dinners, military honor guards, bilateral meetings in gilded rooms, press conferences calibrated to domestic audiences on both sides. The substance would be negotiated in smaller rooms, by diplomats who understood that the real work of summitry happened in the margins.

But the fundamental dynamic would remain unchanged. The United States and China were two great powers with incompatible visions of the future, bound together by economic interdependence and separated by strategic competition. They traded more than $700 billion in goods and services annually, making their economic relationship one of the largest and most complex in history. They were also preparing for the possibility of war, stockpiling weapons, fortifying positions, and building alliances aimed at each other.

This was the paradox that defined the US-China relationship in 2026: too intertwined to decouple, too distrustful to cooperate, too powerful to ignore. Every summit was simultaneously a step toward stability and a reminder of how fragile that stability was. Every handshake between the two presidents was photographed, analyzed, and parsed for signals of warmth or coldness that might indicate which direction the relationship was heading.

The answer, as always with great power relationships, was both directions at once. Toward cooperation and conflict. Toward engagement and containment. Toward a deal and a crisis. The old foreign policy hands in Washington had a phrase for this kind of relationship: competitive coexistence. It sounded sophisticated. What it meant, in practice, was that nobody knew what came next.

In Beijing, preparations for the summit proceeded with the precision that characterized Chinese state events. Every detail was

controlled, from the color of the flowers to the angle of the flags. In the Great Hall of the People, workers polished the marble floors and tested the sound systems. Outside, security teams swept the surrounding streets.

Somewhere in the building, in a room that few foreigners had ever entered, Xi Jinping reviewed his briefing papers. Across the Pacific, in the residence at Mar-a-Lago, Donald Trump did the same. Two men, two systems, two visions of the century ahead. The cameras would capture the handshake. The real conversation would happen behind closed doors, and the world would have to guess at the rest.

CHAPTER 8: PACIFIC OVERTURE

On a sweltering afternoon in September 2021, leaders from the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and a handful of senior defense officials gathered in a secure video conference that spanned three continents and four time zones. When the call ended, the world learned a new acronym: AUKUS. Under its terms, the United States and the United Kingdom would help Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines, the most significant transfer of military technology between the three nations since the Manhattan Project. France, which had been building conventional submarines for Australia under a separate deal worth $90 billion, learned about its cancellation from the news. Paris recalled its ambassadors from Washington and Canberra. The diplomatic fallout was severe but short-lived. The strategic signal was permanent: the United States was building a new architecture of alliances in the Pacific, and it was doing so with an urgency that left little room for diplomatic niceties.

AUKUS was not an isolated initiative. It was one pillar of a broader American strategy to construct a network of partnerships, alliances, and military arrangements aimed at maintaining the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific against a rising China. The other pillars included the Quad, an informal grouping of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia; an expanded set of bilateral defense agreements with the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea; new military basing arrangements across the Pacific Islands; and a deepening of intelligence-sharing relationships that bound allied militaries closer together than at any point since the Cold War.

The logic behind this architecture was straightforward. The United States, for all its military power, could not contain China alone. The distances were too vast, the Chinese military too large, and the political constraints on American intervention too significant. What Washington needed was a web of capable partners who could, collectively, raise the cost of Chinese aggression to prohibitive levels.

No single ally could match China's military, but together, the combined naval, air, and missile capabilities of the United States, Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, and potentially India and the United Kingdom would present a problem that no Chinese war plan could solve without catastrophic risk.

AUKUS was the sharpest edge of this strategy. Nuclear-powered submarines, unlike their diesel-electric counterparts, can operate underwater for months at a time, traveling vast distances at high speed without surfacing. They are nearly undetectable. In the deep waters of the Pacific, where distances between potential conflict zones are measured in thousands of miles, nuclear-powered submarines are the premier instrument of naval power projection. Australia's acquisition of these vessels, expected to begin with the delivery of Virginia-class submarines from the United States in the early 2030s followed by a new class of jointly designed boats, would give Canberra a capability that only six nations in the world currently possessed.

China's reaction to AUKUS was volcanic. Beijing accused the three nations of fostering a "Cold War mentality" and of pursuing an "exclusive clique" that threatened regional stability. State media drew explicit comparisons to NATO, warning that AUKUS was the first step toward a Pacific military alliance aimed squarely at China. The comparisons were not entirely inaccurate. While AUKUS lacked NATO's formal mutual defense commitment, its practical effect was to create a tier of deeply integrated military partners in the Pacific that could, in a crisis, function as a unified force.

The Quad was a different instrument, softer in its language and broader in its scope. Launched in its current form in 2017 and elevated to a leaders-level forum in 2021, the Quad brought together the United States, Japan, India, and Australia around a shared interest in maintaining a "free and open Indo-Pacific." Its agenda spanned supply chain resilience, vaccine distribution, climate change, cybersecurity, and maritime security. It did not have a military

component, at least not formally, and its communiques were careful to avoid naming China as a threat.

But the Quad's strategic significance was unmistakable. It brought India, the world's most populous country and a major military power, into an alignment with the United States and its closest Asian ally, Japan. India's participation was driven by its own deteriorating relationship with China, particularly the 2020 border clash in the Galwan Valley that killed twenty Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops. For New Delhi, the Quad offered a hedge against Chinese pressure without the formal commitment of a military alliance, which India's tradition of strategic autonomy would not permit.

Japan, America's closest ally in Asia, had undergone its own dramatic strategic transformation. In December 2022, Tokyo announced a doubling of its defense budget and the acquisition of long-range cruise missiles capable of striking targets on the Asian mainland, a capability that Japan had foresworn since the end of World War II. The shift was driven entirely by the China threat. Japan's southwestern islands, stretching from Kyushu toward Taiwan, lay directly in the path of any potential Chinese military operation against Taiwan. Okinawa, home to the largest concentration of American military forces outside the continental United States, was being reinforced with thirty-six F-15EX fighter jets deployed in spring 2026.

South Korea, historically focused on the North Korean threat, was being drawn into the broader Pacific competition as well. The Yoon Suk-yeol government, which took office in 2022, had tilted South Korea's foreign policy firmly toward the United States and Japan, attending Camp David trilateral summits and expanding intelligence-sharing. South Korean defense firms were booming, selling weapons to Poland, Australia, and other nations at a pace that made Seoul one of the world's largest arms exporters.

The Philippines, as described in a previous chapter, had become

the frontline state in the South China Sea confrontation. Manila's decision to reopen bases to American forces and to confront Chinese encroachments directly had transformed the bilateral relationship. The five hundred-plus joint military exercises planned for 2026 were not symbolic. They were preparation for a contingency that both sides hoped would never arrive but were determined to be ready for if it did.

Farther afield, the United States was expanding its military presence in the Pacific Islands, a region that had been largely neglected since World War II. New defense agreements with Papua New Guinea, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia gave American forces access to airfields and ports scattered across thousands of miles of ocean. These facilities, small and austere, would be critical for logistics and resupply in any major Pacific conflict. They were also a response to China's own diplomatic offensive in the region, which had included a security agreement with the Solomon Islands in 2022 that alarmed Canberra and Washington.

The United Kingdom's involvement in AUKUS represented a post-Brexit bet on the Indo-Pacific. Having left the European Union, Britain was looking for strategic relevance beyond Europe. The "tilt to the Indo-Pacific," as the UK's Integrated Review called it, was partly aspirational and partly a function of the AUKUS submarine deal, which gave British defense firms a major new market and British diplomats a seat at the most important strategic table in the world.

But the Pacific alliance architecture also had significant weaknesses. The first was India. While New Delhi was a willing participant in the Quad and shared America's concerns about Chinese expansion, it was not and would not become a formal treaty ally. India maintained significant defense relationships with Russia, including purchases of S-400 air defense systems that Washington viewed with deep suspicion. India's foreign policy tradition of non-alignment, though updated for the twenty-first century as "multi-alignment," meant that it would cooperate with the United States on

its own terms and at its own pace.

The second weakness was internal. The American alliance system depended on sustained American commitment, and American politics was not reliably committed to anything. The isolationist strain in American public opinion, which had manifested in skepticism about Ukraine aid and grumbling about NATO burden-sharing, could easily extend to the Pacific. If a future American administration decided that defending Taiwan was not worth the risk, or that the alliance network was too expensive, the entire architecture could unravel.

The third weakness was escalation. The more capable the alliance network became, the more threatening it appeared to Beijing, and the more Beijing invested in its own military response. This was the classic security dilemma: every defensive measure by one side was perceived as an offensive threat by the other, triggering a countermeasure that increased the overall level of danger. The Pacific was becoming more heavily armed, more tightly wired, and more prone to the kind of miscalculation that starts wars no one intended.

In 2026, the Pacific alliance architecture was stronger than it had been at any point since the height of the Cold War. But strength and stability were not the same thing. A system designed to deter aggression could also, through accident or miscalculation, trigger it. The submarines under construction, the missiles being deployed, the exercises being conducted, were all instruments of peace only so long as they were never used. The moment they were needed, they would become instruments of destruction on a scale that the Pacific had not seen since 1945.

The American strategists who designed the architecture understood this. They spoke of deterrence, of raising costs, of maintaining the status quo. But status quo was a strange term for a situation in which both sides were arming as fast as they could, in which military exercises grew larger and more frequent each year, in which the distance between a provocation and a war was measured in minutes of flight time and milliseconds of electronic decision-making.

In the western Pacific, the sun set each evening over an ocean that carried a third of the world's trade, hosted the world's most advanced military forces, and contained enough firepower to end civilization. It was, by any measure, the most dangerous body of water on Earth. And every day, it got a little more so.

PART II

EUROPE'S RECKONING

CHAPTER 9: THE LONGEST WINTER

The power went out in Kharkiv at 3:17 in the morning on a Tuesday in January 2026. It was not the first time. It was not even the hundredth time. By that point in the war, the residents of Ukraine's second-largest city had developed a vocabulary for darkness. There was the "short dark," a few hours of blackout caused by localized grid damage, fixable by morning. There was the "long dark," days without electricity after a major Russian missile strike on a transformer station or power plant, endured with generators, candles, and the particular stubborn patience that had become Ukraine's defining national characteristic. And there was the "deep dark," the kind that came when the temperature dropped below minus fifteen Celsius and the heating system died along with the lights and you could see your breath crystallize in the beam of your phone's flashlight as you pulled another blanket over your sleeping children.

January 2026 was a deep dark.

Russia's systematic campaign against Ukraine's energy infrastructure had been underway since October 2022, when the first waves of cruise missiles and Iranian-made Shahed drones struck power plants and substations across the country. The campaign was deliberate, methodical, and devastating. Its purpose was not primarily military. It was psychological: to break the will of the Ukrainian population by making their country uninhabitable during winter.

The numbers told a story of slow-motion destruction. Before the full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine's power generation capacity was 33.7 gigawatts, enough to run a modern industrialized nation of forty-four million people. By January 2026, that capacity had been cut to approximately fourteen gigawatts. More than half the country's ability to generate electricity had been physically destroyed. Thermal power plants had been hit repeatedly, their cooling towers and turbine halls reduced to twisted metal and concrete dust.

Hydroelectric dams had been targeted. Transformer stations, the critical nodes that distribute electricity from power plants to homes and businesses, had been struck so many times that Ukrainian engineers stopped repairing some of them because the repairs were destroyed faster than they could be completed.

The human cost of this campaign was measured not in body counts, though those were horrific, but in the grinding degradation of daily life. Hospitals operated on generator power that ran out of diesel. Schools held classes in underground shelters, children doing math problems by the light of battery-powered lanterns. Businesses closed because they could not keep the lights on or the computers running. Factories that had managed to continue production through the first two years of the war finally shut down because the power grid could not sustain them.

And yet Ukraine held. That was the fact that confounded Russian military planners, Western pessimists, and historical precedent alike. The country did not collapse. The government did not flee. The population did not demand surrender. Something in the Ukrainian national character, forged in the Maidan revolution of 2014 and tempered by two years of full-scale war, proved harder than Russian missiles could crack.

Volodymyr Zelensky, the former comedian who had become a wartime president of Churchillian stature, remained in Kyiv throughout. His nightly video addresses, filmed on his phone in bunkers and government buildings and occasionally in the open air, had become a global phenomenon, watched by millions and quoted by heads of state. He was exhausted, visibly older, his face lined with fatigue. But the message never wavered: Ukraine would fight as long as it took.

The military situation in early 2026 was one of grinding stalemate. Russia controlled approximately twenty percent of Ukrainian territory, roughly 45,639 square miles, including most of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions in the east, a land corridor to Crimea

in the south, and Crimea itself, which Russia had annexed in 2014. Throughout 2025, Russian forces had advanced at an average rate of 171 square miles per month, a pace that was glacially slow by the standards of conventional warfare but cumulatively significant over time.

The Russian advances came at an extraordinary cost. Casualty figures were closely guarded secrets on both sides, but Western intelligence estimates suggested that Russia had suffered well over 300,000 killed and wounded since the invasion began, with another 100,000 or more among the various proxy forces, Wagner mercenaries, and conscripts from occupied territories who had been fed into the front lines. Ukraine's losses, while lower in absolute terms due to its defensive posture, were devastating for a smaller country. The war had consumed the fighting-age male population at a rate that was demographically catastrophic.

The front line itself had ossified into something resembling the Western Front of World War I. Trenches zigzagged across the Donbas, separated by minefields so dense that some stretches of farmland contained more explosives per square meter than any battlefield since Verdun. Drones, the defining weapon of this war, buzzed overhead constantly, cheap commercial quadcopters modified to drop grenades alongside sophisticated military systems that could loiter for hours before striking. Artillery, the king of this battlefield as it had been of every battlefield since the Napoleonic Wars, thundered day and night, each side firing thousands of shells per day in an ammunition expenditure that strained the industrial capacity of both nations and their backers.

Ukraine's summer 2023 counteroffensive, the much-anticipated push to break through Russian defensive lines in the south, had failed to achieve its strategic objectives. The minefields were too deep, the Russian fortifications too extensive, the air superiority that Ukraine needed but never received too decisive an absence. The offensive gained a few miles of ground at terrible cost and left both sides

sobered. Ukraine would not win a war of liberation through maneuver warfare. Russia would not win a war of conquest through attrition alone.

What emerged instead was a war of exhaustion, in which each side sought to wear the other down until the political will to continue dissolved. Russia bet that Western support for Ukraine would erode, that the cost of sustaining a distant war would eventually exceed what European and American publics were willing to pay. Ukraine bet that Russia's economy, squeezed by sanctions and drained by military spending, would crack before its own resilience failed.

By early 2026, both bets remained live. Western support had indeed wavered. The Biden administration had spent its final year in office struggling to push Ukraine aid packages through a Republican-controlled House of Representatives that was deeply divided on the issue. Trump's return to office in January 2025 had sent shockwaves through Kyiv. Trump had long expressed skepticism about Ukraine aid and admiration for Putin. He had promised to end the war "in twenty-four hours," a pledge that no one in the foreign policy establishment took literally but that signaled a dramatic shift in American posture.

In practice, Trump's approach was more complex than his rhetoric suggested. Rather than cutting off Ukraine entirely, his administration adopted a strategy of pressure on both sides, leaning on Zelensky to negotiate while threatening Russia with increased sanctions and military aid if it refused to come to the table. A deadline of June 2026 was communicated to both parties: reach a deal by then, or face unspecified consequences.

Europe, meanwhile, had undergone its own painful reckoning. The war had exposed the continent's military weakness and energy dependence in brutal terms. Germany, which had spent decades building its economy on cheap Russian gas and minimal defense spending, was scrambling to rearm and diversify its energy supply. France, under Emmanuel Macron, was pushing for European strategic autonomy, arguing that the continent could not rely on American

protection forever. Poland, the Baltic states, and the Nordic countries, the nations closest to the Russian threat, were spending more on defense than at any time since the Cold War.

But the European commitment to Ukraine was fraying at the edges. Hungary's Viktor Orban had consistently blocked or delayed EU aid packages and called for negotiations that would effectively concede Russian territorial gains. Right-wing populist parties across the continent, some with financial or ideological ties to Moscow, questioned the cost of the war and argued that European money should be spent at home. The refugee crisis generated by the war, with millions of Ukrainians scattered across Europe, had generated backlash in some communities.

For the people of Ukraine, the geopolitical calculations of distant capitals were secondary to the immediate reality of survival. In Kharkiv, when the power went out that January morning, a woman named Olena, who had been a schoolteacher before the war and was now a volunteer at a warming center in a former supermarket, lit a kerosene lamp and began boiling water on a camping stove. The warming center served about a hundred people each night: the elderly who could not heat their apartments, families with young children, people whose homes had been damaged and who had nowhere else to go.

Olena had been doing this for three winters. She had stories she did not tell, about the missile that hit her school, about the colleague who had been killed at a bus stop, about the sound that cruise missiles make as they pass overhead, a sound that she described as a low whistle that grew into a roar and ended in silence or destruction, depending on whether you were lucky. She did not talk about these things because everyone she knew had similar stories, and there was nothing to be gained from comparing horrors.

What she talked about instead was the boiler. The warming center's boiler had broken for the third time, and the replacement parts were stuck in a warehouse in Dnipro because the road had been

damaged by shelling. She needed the parts by Friday or the warming center would have to close, and a hundred people would have nowhere to go when the temperature dropped to minus twenty.

This was the war in microcosm. Not the grand strategies or the diplomatic negotiations or the weapons systems. The war was a broken boiler and a road with a hole in it and a woman who would not quit because the people sleeping on cots in a former supermarket needed hot water more than they needed hope.

Four years into the largest land war in Europe since 1945, Ukraine endured. Battered, exhausted, diminished, grieving, angry, and profoundly, stubbornly alive.

CHAPTER 10: PUTIN'S GAMBLE

In the mythology that Vladimir Putin has constructed around himself, the decision to invade Ukraine on February 24, 2022, was an act of strategic necessity. NATO was expanding toward Russia's borders. The West was arming a hostile government in Kyiv. Ukrainian nationalism, which Putin viewed as an artificial construction designed to weaken Russia, was threatening the cultural and linguistic unity of the Slavic world. Intervention was not a choice. It was an obligation.

The mythology, like most mythologies, contained grains of truth embedded in a framework of fantasy. NATO had expanded eastward, though this expansion was driven by the desires of Central and Eastern European nations terrified of exactly the kind of Russian behavior that the invasion represented. Ukraine was moving toward the West, though this movement was the result of democratic choices by the Ukrainian people, not a conspiracy hatched in Washington. And Ukrainian national identity was real, as the ferocity of the resistance demonstrated beyond any possible doubt.

But the gap between the mythology and reality was where the catastrophe lived. Because the invasion was not planned as a long war. It was planned as a short one.

Russian intelligence had assured Putin that the Ukrainian government would collapse within days. Zelensky would flee. The Ukrainian military, outgunned and outmanned, would offer token resistance before surrendering or switching sides. The Russian flag would fly over the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's parliament, within a week. A puppet government would be installed. The West would protest, impose sanctions, and eventually accommodate the new reality, as it had accommodated the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Almost none of this happened. The Russian advance on Kyiv was stopped and then reversed, driven back by a combination of Ukrainian

resistance, Russian logistical incompetence, and the devastating effectiveness of Western-supplied anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. The northern front collapsed. The siege of Kyiv, which was supposed to be the war's decisive moment, became its most humiliating failure. Russian convoys, stalled on muddy roads, were picked apart by Ukrainian special forces and Turkish-made Bayraktar drones.

The shock inside the Kremlin was profound, though it was never publicly acknowledged. Putin replaced commanders, restructured the military chain of command, and shifted to a strategy of attrition and territorial consolidation in the east and south. The "special military operation," as Russian state media was required to call it, became a full-scale war in everything but name. Partial mobilization was declared in September 2022, pulling hundreds of thousands of Russian men into military service and triggering the largest wave of emigration since the fall of the Soviet Union.

By 2026, the war had transformed Russia as fundamentally as it had transformed Ukraine, though in different ways.

The Russian economy, which Western sanctions were supposed to crush, had proven more resilient than predicted. Energy revenues, particularly from oil sold to China and India at discounted prices, continued to flow. A wartime economy directed by the state created demand for military production that kept factories running and unemployment low. GDP growth in 2024 and 2025, while not spectacular, was positive, defying the forecasts of those who expected economic collapse.

But the resilience was deceptive. The war was consuming Russia's future. Military spending, which had risen to levels not seen since the Soviet era, crowded out investment in infrastructure, education, healthcare, and technology. The brain drain was severe: an estimated half a million to one million educated, skilled Russians had left the country since the invasion, taking with them the human capital that any modern economy needs. The sanctions, while not delivering the knockout blow that some had predicted, were slowly degrading

Russia's technological base. Precision-guided munitions ran short. Microchips were smuggled in through third countries at inflated prices. Aircraft could not be properly maintained because Western manufacturers refused to supply spare parts.

The demographic cost was staggering. Russia, already facing a population decline driven by low birth rates and high mortality, was burning through its young men at a rate that would have consequences for decades. The exact casualty figures were a state secret, but independent analyses and Western intelligence estimates pointed to numbers that were, by any historical standard, enormous. In some Russian regions, the absence of young men was visible: empty apartments, shuttered businesses, women doing jobs that had previously been male-dominated.

Putin's response to these pressures was characteristically authoritarian: tighten control, suppress dissent, and double down on the narrative. Independent media had been effectively destroyed in the first months of the war. Opposition figures were in prison, in exile, or dead. The word "war" itself was criminalized; Russians could be prosecuted for calling the invasion anything other than a "special military operation." The information space inside Russia was nearly hermetic, with state television providing the only widely available narrative and social media platforms either blocked or heavily censored.

Yet cracks were appearing. In December 2025, a remarkable shift in Russian public opinion was detected by the Levada Center, an independent polling organization that somehow continued to operate despite constant pressure. For the first time since the invasion, support for continuing the war dropped to twenty-five percent. Sixty-six percent of respondents said they favored peace negotiations. The numbers were striking, not because they represented an anti-war movement, nothing so organized existed in Putin's Russia, but because they suggested a deep and spreading war fatigue that even the most sophisticated propaganda apparatus could not fully contain.

The implications of this shift were uncertain. Russia was not a democracy, and public opinion did not determine policy. Putin's power rested on a combination of security service loyalty, oligarchic dependence, and the absence of any viable alternative. There was no opposition party, no independent judiciary, no free press through which public dissatisfaction could be channeled into political change. The system was designed to be impervious to popular pressure, and it had largely succeeded.

But history offered some cautionary precedents. The Soviet war in Afghanistan, which lasted ten years and killed fifteen thousand Soviet soldiers, a fraction of the losses in Ukraine, contributed to the delegitimization of the Soviet system and the rise of reformist pressures that eventually led to its collapse. The Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905, a military humiliation, triggered the revolution of 1905. The First World War destroyed the Tsarist regime. Russian history suggested that wars that dragged on without clear purpose or prospect of victory had a way of corroding even the most apparently stable authoritarian systems.

Putin was aware of this history. He had studied it. His entire political career was built on the premise that Russia needed a strong leader to prevent the chaos that had followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. The war in Ukraine was supposed to demonstrate that strength. Instead, it had demonstrated its limits.

The military itself was strained in ways that would take years to repair. Russia's pre-war professional army, built around contract soldiers and elite units, had been largely destroyed in the first two years of fighting. Its replacement, an awkward mixture of mobilized reservists, convicts recruited from prisons, soldiers from Central Asian countries lured by financial incentives, and the remnants of the original force, was larger but less capable. Discipline problems, already endemic in the Russian military before the war, had worsened. Reports of units refusing orders, of friendly fire incidents, of alcohol abuse and desertion, filtered out through social media and

intercepted communications.

The war had also exposed the deep corruption that pervaded every level of the Russian military-industrial complex. Equipment that was supposed to have been maintained was found to be rusted and inoperable. Ammunition stocks that should have been full were depleted or filled with defective rounds. Body armor that soldiers were issued turned out to be stuffed with cardboard rather than ceramic plates. The gap between the military that Russia claimed to have on paper and the military it actually fielded was a chasm, and thousands of Russian soldiers fell into it.

Putin's strategic options had narrowed considerably by 2026. A decisive military victory, the conquest of all of Ukraine, was no longer achievable with the forces available. A negotiated settlement that recognized Russian control over the occupied territories was possible but would require Western complicity that was not guaranteed. A continuation of the current stalemate, absorbing casualties and resources indefinitely, was sustainable in the short term but destructive in the long term. And a withdrawal, the option that might have been strategically rational, was politically impossible for a leader who had staked his legacy on the war.

So the war continued. Each day, Russian artillery fired thousands of shells into Ukrainian positions. Each day, drones flew over the front lines, watching, targeting, killing. Each day, young men on both sides died in trenches that could have been dug in 1916. And each night, in a palatial office in the Kremlin that Peter the Great would have recognized, Vladimir Putin reviewed the situation reports, adjusted the strategy at the margins, and calculated how much longer his country, his army, and his grip on power could endure.

The gamble he had placed on February 24, 2022, had not paid off. But in the logic of authoritarian power, admitting that was more dangerous than continuing to play. So he played on, with chips he was borrowing from Russia's future.

CHAPTER 11: THE NORDIC SHIELD

On the morning of April 4, 2023, the Finnish flag was raised at NATO headquarters in Brussels. It was a modest ceremony by the standards of international diplomacy: a few speeches, a handshake, the unfurling of a blue-and-white banner alongside thirty other national flags. But the symbolism was seismic. Finland, a country that had maintained military neutrality for seventy-five years, that had fought a brutal war against the Soviet Union in 1939 and had spent the entire Cold War walking a tightrope between East and West, had joined the Western military alliance.

Eleven months later, on March 7, 2024, Sweden followed.

The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO was, by any measure, the most consequential unintended consequence of Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine. Putin had justified the war partly on the grounds that NATO expansion threatened Russia's security. The invasion was supposed to push NATO back, to demonstrate that there were red lines the alliance could not cross without consequences. Instead, it had achieved the precise opposite: two of Europe's most capable military powers, nations with long traditions of neutrality and deep reservoirs of public skepticism toward military alliances, had concluded that the only way to be safe from Russia was to join the club that Russia feared most.

The speed of the transformation was remarkable. Before the invasion, public support for NATO membership in Finland was around twenty-five percent. By the summer of 2022, it had risen to eighty-two percent. In Sweden, where neutrality was woven into the national identity as deeply as the social welfare state, support went from roughly thirty percent to sixty percent in a matter of weeks. Two generations of strategic culture were overturned in the time it took Russian tanks to cross the Ukrainian border.

The strategic impact was enormous. Finland's accession added

approximately eight hundred miles to NATO's border with Russia, more than doubling the previous length. The Finnish-Russian border runs from the Arctic to the Gulf of Finland, through some of the most inhospitable terrain in Europe: forests so dense that a division could disappear into them, winters so harsh that vehicles freeze solid. Finland had maintained a large, well-trained military precisely because of the Russian threat, spending more on defense as a percentage of GDP than most NATO members and maintaining a reserve force of nearly a million troops in a country of 5.5 million people. Its military was built for one scenario: defending against a Russian invasion. Now that capability was integrated into the NATO command structure.

Sweden brought different but complementary strengths. Its navy, built around a fleet of sophisticated corvettes and the world-class Gotland-class submarines, was designed to control the Baltic Sea, the narrow body of water that connected Russia's western fleet to the Atlantic. Swedish air power, centered on the Gripen fighter jet, one of the most cost-effective combat aircraft in the world, gave NATO additional capability over the Nordic and Baltic regions. Sweden's defense industry, from Saab's aircraft to Bofors' artillery, was among the most advanced in Europe.

Together, Finland and Sweden transformed NATO's northern flank from a vulnerability into a strength. The Baltic Sea, which had been a zone of ambiguity where Russian naval forces could operate with relative freedom, was now virtually a NATO lake. Every coastline surrounding it, from Norway to Denmark to Germany to Poland to Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and now Sweden, belonged to an alliance member. Russian naval vessels leaving their base at Kaliningrad or their fleet headquarters at Baltiysk now sailed through waters monitored by NATO sensors, shadowed by NATO submarines, and within range of NATO anti-ship missiles.

The Arctic dimension was equally significant. Finland's northern territory extended well above the Arctic Circle, and its accession gave

NATO a direct Arctic border with Russia. As climate change opened new shipping routes and revealed new resource deposits in the Arctic, the region was becoming an arena of great power competition. Russia had invested heavily in Arctic military infrastructure, reopening Cold War-era bases and deploying new icebreakers. With Finland and Sweden in the alliance, NATO's ability to monitor and, if necessary, contest Russian activity in the Arctic was dramatically enhanced.

Putin's response to the Nordic accession was a study in strategic dissonance. Publicly, he declared that he saw "no direct threat" from Finnish and Swedish NATO membership. The statement was technically accurate: neither country had any interest in attacking Russia, and NATO's charter was defensive. But it was also transparently disingenuous. Eight hundred new miles of NATO border was, by any military calculation, a direct threat to Russian defensive planning. Troops that had been stationed elsewhere would need to be redeployed. Defenses that had been designed for a neutral neighbor would need to be redesigned for an alliance member. The cost, in money, personnel, and strategic attention, was significant, and it came at a time when Russia could least afford it.

Privately, Russian military planners were alarmed. The addition of Finland and Sweden meant that any future conflict between Russia and NATO would unfold across a dramatically expanded front. The Kola Peninsula, home to Russia's Northern Fleet and its submarine-based nuclear deterrent, was now within easier reach of NATO forces operating from Finnish and Norwegian territory. The St. Petersburg region, Russia's second-largest city and a major industrial center, was within conventional strike range of forces positioned in Finland and the Baltic states. The calculus of deterrence had shifted fundamentally, and not in Russia's favor.

The Nordic nations also brought something less tangible but equally important to the alliance: credibility. Finland and Sweden were among the world's most stable, prosperous, and well-governed countries. Their militaries were professional, well-equipped, and

respected. Their intelligence services had decades of experience monitoring Russian activities. Their decision to join NATO was not driven by economic incentives or political pressure from Washington. It was a considered, democratic decision, made by informed publics who had weighed the costs and benefits and concluded that their security required it.

This democratic legitimacy mattered because it undermined one of Russia's core propaganda narratives: that NATO expansion was an American imperial project, foisted on reluctant European nations by Washington. Finland and Sweden's accession was the opposite. The United States had not lobbied for it. It was driven entirely by the decisions of the Finnish and Swedish people, made in response to Russian aggression. If Putin's goal had been to demonstrate that NATO was a threatening, expansionist alliance, the Nordic accession told a different story: that NATO was a defensive alliance that countries chose to join when they felt threatened by Russia.

Finland's military contribution to Ukraine was also significant. From the beginning of the full-scale invasion through early 2024, Finland had provided $2.21 billion in military aid to Ukraine, a remarkable figure for a country of its size. Finnish weapons, particularly anti-tank mines, howitzers, and armored vehicles, were widely used by Ukrainian forces. Finland's military experience, particularly its expertise in cold-weather operations and defense against a numerically superior adversary, was shared through training programs that helped Ukrainian forces adapt to the conditions of the eastern front.

The broader lesson of the Nordic accession was about the nature of alliances and the consequences of aggression. Putin's invasion of Ukraine was designed to demonstrate that force could redraw the map of Europe, that the post-Cold War settlement was negotiable at the point of a gun. Instead, it demonstrated the opposite: that aggression triggers solidarity, that threats create alliances, and that the use of force against one country can lead to the strategic encirclement of the

aggressor.

This was not a new lesson. It was as old as Thucydides. But it was one that authoritarian leaders, insulated from honest advice and surrounded by sycophants, had a persistent tendency to forget. The invasion of Ukraine was supposed to shatter NATO. Instead, it made the alliance larger, more unified, and more capable than at any point since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

In Helsinki and Stockholm, the transition to NATO membership was managed with characteristic Nordic efficiency. Defense planners integrated their command structures. Joint exercises were planned. Communication protocols were harmonized. The bureaucratic machinery of alliance membership, complex and sometimes tedious, was handled with the same professionalism that these countries brought to everything from public transportation to tax collection.

But beneath the administrative competence, there was something deeper: a recognition that the world had changed. The comfortable assumption that geography and neutrality could protect a small country from the ambitions of a large neighbor had been shattered by Russian tanks rolling into Ukraine. The lesson was stark: in a world where the rules were breaking down, the only reliable security was collective security. And collective security, for the nations of northern Europe, now had a name: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The flag that flew over NATO headquarters in Brussels had been joined by two more. The alliance that Putin had tried to weaken now stretched from the Arctic to the Mediterranean, from the coast of Portugal to the border of Russia. Thirty-two nations, bound by a single commitment: an attack on one is an attack on all.

Whether that commitment would hold in the crucible of an actual conflict remained the most important unanswered question in European security. But the commitment existed, and it was stronger in 2026 than it had been at any point in living memory. Vladimir Putin, more than any other single individual, was responsible for making it

so.

CHAPTER 12: THE PEACE THAT WON'T COME

The conference room in Abu Dhabi's Emirates Palace Hotel was designed for a different kind of negotiation. Its marble floors and gold-leafed columns spoke of oil wealth and commercial ambition, of deals struck between sovereign wealth funds and multinational corporations. On February 4, 2026, it hosted something far more fraught: the second round of peace talks aimed at ending the war in Ukraine.

The delegations arrived through separate entrances. The Russian team, led by a deputy foreign minister whose face had become familiar from years of contentious UN sessions, carried thick binders and an air of patient obstructionism. The Ukrainian team, smaller and more intense, carried counterproposals that had been refined through months of back-channel consultations with Washington, London, and Paris. American mediators shuttled between the two groups, carrying messages and gauging red lines.

By the end of the day, the talks had produced nothing. Not a ceasefire. Not a framework. Not even an agreement to meet again on a specific date. The communique issued afterward was a masterpiece of diplomatic emptiness, expressing "the shared desire for a just and lasting peace" while committing to nothing that would bring one closer.

This was the pattern. Peace talks about Ukraine had become a kind of geopolitical theater, performances of diplomacy that served everyone's interests except the people doing the dying.

The fundamental obstacle to peace was not diplomatic skill or mediator selection or even the personalities involved. It was the incompatibility of the two sides' minimum demands.

Russia's position, as articulated through various official and unofficial channels, had crystallized around several non-negotiable

points. First, Ukraine must recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea and the four partially occupied regions that Russia had formally annexed in September 2022: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. Second, Ukraine must accept permanent neutrality, meaning no NATO membership, no foreign military bases, and no Western security guarantees that would amount to de facto alliance membership. Third, and most provocatively, Russia demanded Ukrainian control over the remaining portions of Donetsk province that Russian forces had not been able to capture militarily. In other words, Russia wanted Ukraine to hand over territory that Russia itself had failed to conquer on the battlefield.

The audacity of this demand was not lost on anyone. It was the equivalent of a burglar demanding the homeowner hand over the silverware that the burglar had been unable to steal. But it was consistent with the broader Russian negotiating strategy, which was to demand everything, concede nothing, and wait for the other side's position to erode.

Ukraine's position was equally firm, though grounded in different principles. Kyiv insisted on the restoration of its internationally recognized borders, meaning all territory occupied since 2014, including Crimea. It demanded security guarantees that would prevent a future Russian invasion, whether through NATO membership, bilateral defense pacts with major Western powers, or some novel arrangement that would provide credible deterrence. And it rejected any settlement that rewarded Russian aggression, arguing that a peace that legitimized territorial conquest by force would not just be unjust but would be an invitation for future aggression, by Russia and by any other power that drew the lesson that borders could be redrawn at the barrel of a gun.

Between these positions, the space for compromise was vanishingly small. Ukraine could not cede territory without a political revolution at home. The Ukrainian public, after four years of war and tens of thousands of dead, would not accept a government that

handed their land to the invader. Zelensky knew this. Any leader who signed such a deal would be finished, and possibly much worse.

Russia could not withdraw without a political revolution of its own, though of a very different kind. Putin had staked his presidency, his historical legacy, and his personal survival on the war's success. A withdrawal that left Russia with nothing to show for hundreds of thousands of casualties and billions in economic damage would be an existential threat to his regime. The history of Russian leaders who lost wars was not encouraging: Nicholas II was overthrown and executed; Khrushchev was removed after the Cuban Missile Crisis humiliation; Gorbachev presided over the Soviet collapse.

The United States, the only power with enough leverage to force both sides to the table, was itself conflicted. The Trump administration wanted a deal, any deal, that could be presented as a diplomatic triumph before the 2026 midterm elections. Trump personally wanted the credit for ending Europe's biggest war since 1945. But his administration was divided between hawks who believed that supporting Ukraine was essential to deterring China and pragmatists who viewed the war as a European problem that was draining American resources and attention.

The June 2026 deadline that Zelensky publicly referenced, reportedly communicated by the Americans, was a pressure tactic with unclear consequences. What would the United States do if the deadline passed without a deal? Cut aid to Ukraine, effectively forcing Kyiv to negotiate from weakness? Increase military support, escalating the confrontation with Russia? Wash its hands of the conflict and tell the Europeans to manage it themselves? Each option had advocates within the administration, and the ambiguity of the deadline was itself a source of anxiety in Kyiv and calculation in Moscow.

The European players had their own frameworks. The United Kingdom and France had proposed a plan under which Western military "hubs" would be established in Ukraine as a security guarantee, a form of tripwire deployment that would deter Russian

attack by ensuring that any future invasion would directly involve NATO countries. The proposal was bold, but it raised as many questions as it answered. Would Russian forces fire on British or French troops? Would London and Paris actually deploy forces in sufficient numbers to constitute a credible deterrent? Would the presence of Western troops on Ukrainian soil become a permanent casus belli for Russia?

Germany, the economic engine of Europe, wanted peace above all. The war had disrupted German energy supply, forced a painful and expensive transition away from Russian gas, and threatened the industrial model that had made Germany prosperous. Berlin was willing to support Ukraine but wanted the war to end on terms that would allow the resumption of some form of economic relationship with Russia, however distant that prospect seemed in 2026.

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Poland and the Baltic states foremost among them, took the hardest line. They understood, from their own historical experience with Russian imperialism, that any concession would be read as weakness and would be followed by further demands. Poland had provided massive military and humanitarian support to Ukraine and had accepted millions of Ukrainian refugees. It was not prepared to see that investment wasted on a peace deal that left Russia stronger and emboldened.

Meanwhile, the fighting continued. Every day that the diplomats failed to reach agreement, soldiers died. Villages were shelled. Families were separated. Children grew up in basements. The human cost accumulated in a ledger that no peace deal could ever fully settle.

There were moments of progress, or what passed for progress in the grim arithmetic of war. Prisoner exchanges continued, the most tangible humanitarian achievement of the diplomatic track. In March 2026, both sides freed two hundred prisoners of war, a gesture that demonstrated that channels of communication existed even when formal negotiations stalled. The exchanges were negotiated through

intermediaries, often the United Arab Emirates, which had positioned itself as a neutral mediator with relationships on both sides.

But prisoner exchanges were not peace. They were management of suffering, not resolution of conflict. The war in Ukraine had entered a phase that historians would recognize from countless previous conflicts: the zone of mutual exhaustion, where both sides were too weak to win and too committed to quit. The Thirty Years' War. The Iran-Iraq War. The Western Front of World War I. These were the historical parallels that kept scholars of conflict awake at night, because they suggested that wars could last far longer than anyone expected, consuming far more lives than anyone anticipated, before exhaustion finally produced a settlement that both sides could have reached years earlier.

The peace that Ukraine needed was not the peace that Russia would accept. The peace that Russia demanded was not the peace that justice required. And the gap between justice and reality, between what should be and what could be, was where thousands of people continued to die.

In Abu Dhabi, the marble floors were polished. The delegations departed. The Emirates Palace returned to its usual business of hosting conferences about investment and technology and the future of clean energy. Outside, in the desert heat, the world turned its attention to the next crisis.

In Ukraine, the artillery did not stop.

CHAPTER 13: FORTRESS EUROPE

On a cold evening in December 2025, a boat carrying forty-three people capsized in the English Channel. The passengers were from Afghanistan, Syria, Eritrea, and Sudan. They had paid smugglers between two and five thousand euros each for a place on an inflatable dinghy that was designed to hold twelve. The Channel, which separated France from England by roughly twenty-one miles at its narrowest point, was frigid, rough, and unforgiving. Rescue came too late for nine of them.

The tragedy was not exceptional. It was routine. Hundreds of people had drowned or frozen to death attempting the Channel crossing in the preceding years. Thousands more had died in the Mediterranean, the deadliest migration route on Earth, where the distance between the North African coast and the Italian island of Lampedusa was longer but the boats were no better.

The European migration crisis, which had first erupted as a headline in 2015, had never truly ended. It had simply become permanent, a structural feature of European life that generated political conflict, humanitarian suffering, and diplomatic tension in roughly equal measure.

The numbers told one story. More than two million refugees had entered Europe from Ukraine alone since the 2022 invasion, scattered across Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, and other countries. Hundreds of thousands more arrived each year from the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, driven by war, persecution, economic desperation, and the simple human impulse to seek a better life. The EU's border agency, Frontex, recorded hundreds of thousands of irregular border crossings annually, though the actual number was certainly higher.

The politics told another. Immigration had become the single most potent political issue in Europe, more divisive than the economy,

more emotionally charged than defense policy, more capable of reshaping electoral outcomes than any other topic. Right-wing populist parties, whose primary message was opposition to immigration, had surged across the continent. Marine Le Pen's National Rally in France. The Alternative for Germany. The Sweden Democrats. Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom in the Netherlands. Giorgia Meloni's Brothers of Italy, which had won power in 2022 partly on an anti-immigration platform. Viktor Orban's Fidesz in Hungary, which had built its entire political identity around the rejection of immigration.

These parties differed in many respects, but they shared a common diagnosis: that mainstream political elites had lost control of Europe's borders, that unchecked immigration was threatening European identity and social cohesion, and that the institutions of the European Union were incapable of or unwilling to address the problem. This diagnosis was, in significant parts, correct, which was why it was so politically powerful.

The European Union's approach to migration was a patchwork of inadequate policies, broken agreements, and institutional inertia. The Dublin Regulation, which required asylum seekers to apply for protection in the first EU country they entered, placed a disproportionate burden on frontline states like Greece, Italy, and Spain. These countries, overwhelmed by arrivals, repeatedly called for a mandatory redistribution of asylum seekers across EU member states. Eastern European countries, led by Hungary and Poland, refused. The result was a system that pleased no one and functioned poorly.

The EU's New Pact on Migration and Asylum, agreed in 2024 after years of negotiation, attempted to reform the system by introducing faster border procedures, a "solidarity mechanism" that allowed countries to choose between accepting relocated asylum seekers or providing financial contributions, and stronger provisions for returning those whose claims were rejected. On paper, it was a

comprehensive framework. In practice, its implementation was slow, contested, and insufficient to the scale of the challenge.

The deeper problem was that European migration policy was caught between two truths that were both valid but irreconcilable. The first truth was humanitarian: people fleeing war, persecution, and destitution had a moral and legal right to seek protection, and European nations, which had enshrined that right in their constitutions and international treaties, were obligated to provide it. The second truth was political: large-scale immigration into societies that were struggling with housing shortages, wage stagnation, and cultural anxiety generated backlash that threatened the political stability of democratic governments.

Leaders who acknowledged only the first truth lost elections. Leaders who acknowledged only the second truth abandoned the values that made European democracies worth defending. The politicians who thrived were those who managed, however imperfectly, to navigate between the two.

The war in Ukraine had, paradoxically, both illustrated the possibilities and the limits of European solidarity on migration. The response to Ukrainian refugees was remarkably generous. The EU activated the Temporary Protection Directive for the first time in its history, granting Ukrainians immediate residency and work rights across the bloc. Millions were housed, enrolled in schools, and integrated into labor markets with a speed and efficiency that would have seemed impossible based on Europe's response to previous refugee crises.

But the generosity was not color-blind. The contrast with the treatment of refugees from the Middle East and Africa was stark and uncomfortable. Ukrainians were welcomed in part because they were European, Christian, and culturally familiar. Syrians, Afghans, and Somalis faced barbed wire, pushbacks, and bureaucratic limbo. The double standard was widely noted and deeply felt in the Global South, where it reinforced the perception that European humanitarianism

had limits that corresponded suspiciously closely to racial and religious boundaries.

By 2026, the political landscape of Europe was being reshaped by immigration in ways that went far beyond border policy. The rise of populist parties was transforming coalition politics. Traditional center-left and center-right parties, which had governed Europe since the war, were being squeezed from both sides. Some responded by adopting harder positions on immigration, attempting to reclaim voters who had drifted to the populist right. Others doubled down on liberal values, gambling that the populist wave would recede. Neither strategy seemed to be working.

In France, the political center had collapsed. Macron's presidency had been defined by his attempt to hold the line against Le Pen's populism, but each election cycle saw her party gain ground. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany had established itself as a permanent fixture of the political landscape, drawing support from regions where immigration was a daily reality and from regions where it was a distant fear, which seemed to suggest that the issue was as much about perception as experience. In Italy, Meloni governed as a pragmatist on most issues but maintained the anti-immigration rhetoric that had brought her to power.

The migration issue intersected with every other challenge Europe faced. The war in Ukraine generated refugees. The energy crisis generated economic anxiety that made native populations less tolerant of newcomers. Climate change was expected to drive future migration from North Africa and the Sahel at a scale that would dwarf current flows. The aging of European populations created labor shortages that immigration could fill, but the political will to make that argument was scarce.

Europe in 2026 was a continent turning inward, building fences as fast as it built institutions. The dream of a borderless, united Europe, the vision that had animated the European project since its founding, was not dead. But it was wounded, bleeding from a

thousand cuts inflicted by the collision between ideals and reality.

The boat that capsized in the English Channel was one of hundreds that would cross or attempt to cross that year. The people on it had names, histories, families waiting for word. They were teachers and farmers and engineers and children. They had paid everything they had for the chance at a life their home countries could not provide. And Europe, the continent that prided itself on its civilization, its values, its commitment to human dignity, could not figure out what to do with them.

That failure was not just a humanitarian crisis. It was a political crisis, a moral crisis, and, increasingly, a crisis of identity. Europe was asking itself the oldest political question: who are we, and who gets to belong? The answer it was giving, haltingly, inconsistently, and with considerable anguish, would define the continent's future as much as any trade agreement, defense pact, or energy policy.

The bodies in the Channel did not care about the answer. They were past caring about anything. But the question remained, carried forward by the living, by the people who were, at that very moment, packing their bags in Kabul and Aleppo and Asmara, heading north toward a continent that was not sure it wanted them, but that they were determined to reach.

CHAPTER 14: SYRIA AFTER ASSAD

Bashar al-Assad left Damascus on a military transport plane in December 2024, accompanied by his wife Asma, their three children, and a security detail of approximately forty men. Their destination was Moscow, where Vladimir Putin had offered asylum. The flight path, routed through Iraqi and then Turkish airspace under an emergency diplomatic arrangement brokered by Russia and Iran, took approximately five hours. By the time the plane landed at a military airfield outside Moscow, the Assad family's forty-year grip on Syria was over.

The regime did not fall in a single dramatic moment. It collapsed over weeks, the way a building comes apart after years of structural damage: slowly, then suddenly, then all at once. The catalyst was a surprise offensive by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, HTS, the Islamist rebel group that controlled Idlib province in northwestern Syria. Led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former jihadist who had reinvented himself as a pragmatic political leader, HTS forces swept south through Aleppo and then toward Hama, encountering far less resistance than anyone expected.

The Syrian Arab Army, once the backbone of Assad's power, had been hollowed out by thirteen years of civil war. Its best units had been ground down. Its conscripts, many of them serving under duress, had no desire to die for a regime that had lost the loyalty of much of the population. Russian air support, which had been decisive in saving Assad during the darkest days of 2015, was no longer available at the same scale; Moscow's attention and resources were consumed by the war in Ukraine. Iran, Assad's other principal backer, was preoccupied with its own escalating confrontation with Israel and the United States.

The dominoes fell with startling speed. Aleppo, Syria's largest city and the site of a devastating siege in 2016, was abandoned by

government forces within days. Hama, a city of deep symbolic importance where Assad's father had crushed an uprising in 1982 by killing an estimated ten to twenty thousand people, fell next. Then Homs. Then the suburbs of Damascus. By the time Assad boarded his plane, his government controlled little more than a few military installations and the coastal Alawite heartland, and even those were crumbling.

The jubilation that greeted the regime's fall was genuine and widespread. Syrians poured into the streets of Damascus, many of them weeping, tearing down statues of Assad and his father Hafez, embracing strangers, and firing weapons into the air. Political prisoners, some of whom had been held for over a decade in the regime's notorious detention facilities, emerged blinking into daylight. The scale of the regime's cruelty, already well documented by human rights organizations, was further exposed as prison doors opened and stories tumbled out.

But the celebrations masked a reality that every Syrian understood: the fall of Assad was the beginning of a new chapter, not the end of the story, and new chapters in Syrian history had a tendency to be as brutal as the ones that preceded them.

The country that Assad left behind was a ruin. Thirteen years of civil war had killed an estimated half a million people, displaced half the population, destroyed entire cities, and reduced the economy to a fraction of its pre-war size. In 2026, more than ninety percent of Syria's population lived in poverty. Infrastructure was devastated. The healthcare system had collapsed. Schools were bombed or repurposed. An entire generation of Syrian children had grown up knowing nothing but war.

Ahmed al-Sharaa, the HTS leader who had led the final offensive, was declared transitional president in January 2025. A provisional constitution was adopted in March 2025, outlining a five-year transition period. A transitional government was formed, drawing on technocrats, former opposition figures, and representatives of Syria's

diverse ethnic and religious communities. An interim parliament was selected, though its authority was contested and its composition was a constant source of negotiation.

The transition was fraught from the start. Syria was not a nation in any meaningful sense. It was a collection of territories controlled by different armed groups, each with its own backers, ideologies, and agendas. In the northeast, the Syrian Democratic Forces, dominated by Kurdish fighters, controlled a vast territory that they had carved out during the war against the Islamic State. The SDF had been America's most effective partner against ISIS, and it was not inclined to surrender its autonomy to a government led by a former jihadist in Damascus.

The resolution of the Kurdish question came through a combination of military pressure and political negotiation. In January 2026, the transitional government launched an offensive against SDF positions, and after weeks of fighting, an agreement was reached under which the SDF would nominally integrate into the national military structure while retaining significant local authority. It was a messy, imperfect arrangement that satisfied no one completely but prevented a full-scale inter-factional war.

The security situation remained dire. No single armed force controlled the country. Militias, some loyal to the transitional government and some autonomous, operated throughout the territory. Incidents of sectarian violence persisted. Alawites, the minority community from which the Assad family hailed, faced retribution in some areas. In March 2026, reports of violence against Alawite communities in the coastal region circulated on social media, generating international condemnation. Druze communities in the south reported intimidation. Christian communities, which had been relatively protected under Assad's secular authoritarianism, worried about their status under a government led by Islamists.

Al-Sharaa, to his credit, attempted to project moderation. He publicly committed to a pluralistic Syria that respected minority rights

and the rule of law. He appointed Christians and Alawites to government positions. He invited international observers to monitor the transition. But his credibility was complicated by his past. He had been the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria, before breaking with the group and rebranding as a pragmatic nationalist. Western intelligence agencies were divided on whether the transformation was genuine or tactical. The United States, which had designated HTS as a foreign terrorist organization, removed the designation in July 2025, a decision that reflected a pragmatic assessment that working with the transitional government was better than trying to undermine it.

The international response to the transition was cautiously supportive. The UK, the EU, and the US lifted many of the sanctions that had been imposed on Syria during the Assad era, recognizing that reconstruction required economic normalization. Investment pledges were made. Humanitarian aid continued to flow, though never in sufficient quantities. The UN estimated that $8 billion would be needed annually for basic humanitarian assistance, a figure that donor fatigue and competing global crises made impossible to fully fund.

The refugee question loomed over everything. Of the approximately twelve million Syrians displaced by the war, about 6.5 million had fled abroad, to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Europe. In the months following Assad's fall, roughly 581,000 returned. But 4.5 million remained in their host countries, many of them having built new lives, enrolled children in school, found employment, and established communities. The question of return was deeply personal and deeply political. Turkey, which hosted the largest Syrian refugee population at roughly 3.5 million, was eager for returns. European countries, many of which had granted Syrians long-term residency or citizenship, faced complex legal and practical questions about repatriation.

The economy was the most fundamental challenge. Syria's GDP had contracted by more than sixty percent since the start of the war.

The Syrian pound had lost nearly all its value. Basic commodities were scarce and expensive. Unemployment was catastrophic, particularly among young people and displaced populations. Reconstruction estimates ranged from $250 billion to $400 billion, figures that no combination of donors and investors was prepared to provide. The World Bank projected economic growth of just one percent in 2025, a figure so modest that it would take decades to return to pre-war living standards.

The geopolitical dimensions of Syria's reconstruction were as complex as the humanitarian ones. Russia, which had maintained its military bases at Tartus and Hmeimim under an arrangement with the transitional government, wanted to preserve its influence. Iran, weakened by the 2026 strikes but still a regional player, sought to maintain its supply corridor to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Turkey wanted to prevent the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish entity on its southern border. Israel, which had conducted hundreds of airstrikes in Syria during the civil war, watched warily as the new government's relationship with Iran and Hezbollah evolved.

For the Syrian people, geopolitics was secondary to survival. In the ruins of eastern Aleppo, families picked through rubble for salvageable building materials. In Homs, shopkeepers reopened businesses in buildings with no roofs. In Damascus, the national museum, which had been closed for years, reopened its doors, and people came to look at artifacts from a civilization that was five thousand years old and wondering whether it would survive to see a hundred more.

Syria after Assad was a country between death and rebirth, caught in the painful, uncertain space where the old order had been destroyed but the new one had not yet solidified. It was, in miniature, the story of the modern Middle East: a region where the collapse of authoritarian stability did not lead to democratic flourishing but to a long, agonizing search for something to replace it.

The search was underway. Its outcome was far from certain. And

the world, which had watched Syria burn for thirteen years, was already looking away, distracted by the next fire.

PART III

THE MIDDLE EAST ON FIRE

CHAPTER 15: OCTOBER'S CHILDREN

On October 7, 2023, approximately three thousand Hamas fighters breached the security fence separating the Gaza Strip from southern Israel. They came by land, by sea, and by paraglider. They attacked military bases, kibbutzim, and a music festival. By the time the Israeli military regained control of the border area, more than 1,200 Israelis had been killed, the deadliest single day for the Jewish people since the Holocaust. Approximately 250 hostages were taken back to Gaza.

What followed was one of the most intense and controversial military campaigns of the twenty-first century. Israel declared war on Hamas and launched a ground invasion of Gaza, a densely populated strip of land roughly 25 miles long and six miles wide, home to 2.3 million people. Over the following months, Israeli forces dismantled much of Hamas's military infrastructure: tunnel networks, command centers, weapons caches, rocket launchers. The campaign was prosecuted with a firepower and intensity that had few modern parallels, drawing on precision-guided munitions, armored divisions, and intelligence capabilities that reflected decades of preparation for exactly this kind of urban warfare.

The cost to the civilian population of Gaza was catastrophic. The territory's dense urban fabric, where apartment buildings stood alongside schools, hospitals, and mosques, made the separation of combatants from civilians extraordinarily difficult, even assuming the best intentions. Israel argued that Hamas deliberately embedded its military infrastructure within civilian areas, using the population as human shields, a charge that was supported by substantial evidence but that did not diminish the suffering of the people trapped in the middle.

By the time a ceasefire was reached in October 2025, Gaza lay in ruins. Entire neighborhoods had been leveled. The death toll, disputed

by both sides but running into the tens of thousands, included a devastating number of children. The healthcare system had collapsed. Clean water was scarce. Food distribution was sporadic. The psychological trauma inflicted on a population that had endured years of blockade before the war had added a new layer of suffering that no ceasefire could undo.

The ceasefire itself was fragile and incomplete. Fighting had not formally resumed by early 2026, but Israel had closed crossings into the Strip, including those used by humanitarian workers. The flow of aid, never sufficient during the war, slowed further. International relief organizations described the situation as a humanitarian emergency that was worsening, not improving, despite the cessation of active combat.

The political reverberations of October 7 and its aftermath extended far beyond Gaza. Within Israel, the attack shattered the sense of security that had defined Israeli society since the construction of the security barrier around Gaza. The failure of intelligence, the failure of the military to respond quickly, the sheer scale of the massacre, produced a trauma that reshaped Israeli politics and public discourse in ways that were still being processed in 2026.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose government had been among the most right-wing in Israeli history, faced intense criticism for the intelligence failures that preceded the attack and the military's slow initial response. But the political dynamics of wartime Israel favored continuation of the campaign over accountability. Coalition members from the far right, including Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, pushed for the permanent reoccupation of Gaza and the expansion of settlements. The Israeli center and left called for a hostage deal and a political strategy that went beyond military operations.

The hostage crisis added an agonizing dimension to the conflict. Families of the hostages held in Gaza conducted a relentless public campaign, demanding that the government prioritize their return over

military objectives. The tension between rescuing hostages and pursuing military victory was a genuine and terrible dilemma, one that divided Israeli society along lines that cut through families and friendships.

Internationally, the Gaza war produced a polarization that surpassed even the most contentious episodes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Massive protests in support of Palestine erupted across the Muslim world and in Western cities. University campuses in the United States and Europe became sites of intense political activism, with encampments, confrontations, and debates that reignited fundamental questions about colonialism, self-determination, and the limits of solidarity.

The legal dimension of the conflict intensified as well. South Africa filed a case against Israel at the International Court of Justice, accusing it of genocide in Gaza. The ICJ issued provisional measures ordering Israel to prevent acts of genocide and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. Israel rejected the case as politically motivated and continued its military operations. The International Criminal Court's prosecutor sought arrest warrants for Israeli and Hamas leaders, a step that, regardless of its legal outcome, signaled that the conflict had crossed thresholds that the international legal system could not ignore.

For the Palestinian people, October 7 and its aftermath represented both the culmination and the continuation of a tragedy that had begun in 1948. The Nakba, the "catastrophe" of the mass displacement that accompanied Israel's founding, was not ancient history for Palestinians. It was living memory, passed from grandparents to grandchildren in stories, in keys to homes that no longer existed, in the names of villages that had been erased from the map. Each generation of Palestinians experienced its own version of the Nakba: the 1967 war and occupation, the First Intifada, the Second Intifada, the repeated wars in Gaza in 2008, 2012, 2014, 2021, and now 2023.

The cycle of violence had become so deeply embedded in the structure of Israeli-Palestinian relations that it seemed immune to disruption by diplomacy, international pressure, or military force. Every ceasefire was a pause, not a resolution. Every peace process was either a failure or an exercise in postponement. The fundamental issues, borders, refugees, Jerusalem, security, sovereignty, remained unresolved after decades of negotiation, and the political space for compromise was shrinking on both sides.

In Gaza, as 2026 began, the ceasefire held but the future did not. The territory was shattered, its infrastructure destroyed, its population traumatized, its governance uncertain. Hamas, though militarily degraded, was not destroyed as a political or social force. Its ideology, rooted in resistance and Islamic nationalism, had survived previous military campaigns and would survive this one. The question was not whether Hamas would reconstitute but in what form, and whether the conditions that had given rise to it, the blockade, the occupation, the hopelessness, would change enough to make a different future possible.

The children of Gaza, who had spent their earliest years in bomb shelters and refugee camps, who had lost parents and siblings and homes, who had known nothing but conflict for their entire lives, were October's children. They would grow up in the rubble, and what they became would depend, in large part, on what the world decided to do about the place where they were born.

So far, the world had not decided much of anything.

CHAPTER 16: THE ABRAHAM GAMBIT

The Abraham Accords were supposed to change the Middle East. In some ways, they did. In other, more fundamental ways, they revealed how little had changed.

Signed in September 2020 in a ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House, the Accords normalized diplomatic relations between Israel and four Arab states: the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. It was a genuine breakthrough, the first formal peace agreements between Israel and Arab nations since the 1994 treaty with Jordan. The ceremony was grand, the handshakes were warm, and the message was clear: a new Middle East was being born, one in which shared economic interests and a common fear of Iran would override the Palestinian question that had defined the region's politics for seventy years.

The architect of the Accords, at least in the American telling, was the Trump administration, particularly Jared Kushner, the president's son-in-law, who had spent years building personal relationships with Gulf leaders. The deals were structured as exchanges: the UAE received advanced American weapons, including F-35 fighter jets and Reaper drones. Bahrain received security guarantees. Morocco received American recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara, a disputed territory that the UN still classified as non-self-governing. Sudan received removal from the US state sponsor of terrorism list. Israel received what it had wanted for decades: acceptance and normalization from the Arab world.

The missing piece, conspicuously, was Saudi Arabia. The kingdom was the prize, the largest and most influential Arab state, whose recognition of Israel would fundamentally alter the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, was known to be open to normalization. The economic logic was compelling: technology

partnerships, investment flows, tourism, and a united front against Iran. But Saudi Arabia had a condition that neither Israel nor the United States was willing to meet: concrete, irreversible progress toward Palestinian statehood.

The Palestinian Authority, which governed parts of the West Bank under the Oslo framework, rejected the Accords entirely. The deals were negotiated without Palestinian input, offered nothing to Palestinian aspirations, and, in the Palestinian view, sold out the principle that had governed Arab-Israeli diplomacy for decades: that normalization should be contingent on Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories.

This was the fundamental gambit of the Abraham Accords: the wager that you could have peace in the Middle East without addressing the Palestinian question. That economic incentives, security alignment, and great power diplomacy could bypass the conflict at the heart of the region. That the Palestinians, sidelined and divided between Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, could be marginalized into irrelevance.

October 7, 2023, destroyed that wager.

The Hamas attack demonstrated, with a brutality that shocked even hardened observers, that the Palestinian question could not be bypassed. It could be ignored, suppressed, managed, contained, but it could not be wished away. The anger, desperation, and militancy that had driven thousands of young men to breach the Israeli border had roots that no normalization agreement could cut.

The Accords survived October 7, but they were wounded. The UAE, which had been the most enthusiastic participant, quietly downgraded the pace of normalization. Bahrain recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv during the Gaza war. Morocco, always the most ambivalent signatory, limited its public engagement with Israel. Sudan, consumed by its own civil war, was in no position to pursue normalization even if it wanted to.

Saudi Arabia, the country whose participation would have been the Accords' crowning achievement, moved further away. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman publicly reiterated that normalization was impossible without progress on Palestinian statehood, a position that hardened as the Gaza war continued and public opinion across the Arab world swung decisively against Israel.

Yet the Accords were not dead. In early 2026, a surprising new member emerged: Kazakhstan. The Central Asian nation, seeking closer ties with both the United States and Israel and positioning itself as a bridge between the Islamic world and the West, formalized its entry into the Accords framework. It was the first expansion beyond the original four signatories, and it demonstrated that the Accords, while weakened, retained a certain gravitational pull.

The strategic logic of the Accords remained sound even if the political conditions had deteriorated. The Middle East was undergoing a fundamental realignment driven by three forces: the decline of American attention, the rise of Chinese economic influence, and the persistent threat of Iranian expansionism. Countries like the UAE, which had built an economy on trade, technology, and tourism, needed security partners beyond the United States, which was increasingly focused on the Pacific. Israel, with its advanced military technology, intelligence capabilities, and entrepreneurial economy, was a natural partner.

The economic benefits of normalization were tangible. Trade between Israel and the UAE exceeded $3 billion annually by 2025. Tourism between the two countries flourished. Technology partnerships in cybersecurity, agricultural technology, and artificial intelligence generated real economic value. Dubai's property market saw significant Israeli investment. These commercial ties created constituencies for continued normalization even when political conditions deteriorated.

But the Saudi question remained the elephant in the room. Without Riyadh, the Accords were a partial achievement at best. With

Riyadh, they could fundamentally reshape the region. The Biden administration had invested significant diplomatic effort in brokering a Saudi-Israeli normalization agreement, offering Saudi Arabia a package that included a US-Saudi defense treaty, cooperation on civilian nuclear energy, and advanced weapons. The negotiations were reportedly close to a breakthrough when October 7 intervened.

The Trump administration, returned to office in 2025, resumed the push. Republican Senator Lindsey Graham publicly claimed that Saudi Arabia would join the Accords following the collapse of Iran's government in the wake of the February 2026 strikes. The logic was that with Iran weakened or removed as a threat, the primary strategic rationale for Saudi-Israeli alignment was even stronger.

But Saudi Arabia was playing a more complex game than Graham's optimism suggested. The Kingdom was not simply anti-Iran. It was pursuing a strategic diversification that included improving relations with all regional players. The Saudi-Iran rapprochement that began with a Chinese-brokered agreement in March 2023 was part of this strategy, as was Saudi Arabia's engagement with Turkey and Qatar, countries that shared a more sympathetic stance toward Islamist politics and Palestinian rights than the UAE.

Mohammed bin Salman's calculation was sophisticated: maintain the option of normalization with Israel as leverage, extract maximum concessions from the United States, but do not move until the Palestinian issue could be addressed in a way that would not generate domestic and regional backlash. For a leader who was simultaneously modernizing Saudi society and consolidating absolute power, the optics of normalizing with Israel while Palestinian children were dying in Gaza were unacceptable, regardless of the strategic benefits.

The Abraham Accords, six years after their signing, thus existed in a state of suspended promise. They had proven that Arab-Israeli peace was possible. They had created economic and security relationships that would be difficult to reverse entirely. They had introduced a new model of Middle Eastern diplomacy, one based on

interest alignment rather than conflict resolution. But they had not solved the problem they were designed to circumvent: the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians that lay at the moral and political center of the region.

That conflict continued to burn, defying the logic of normalization, resisting the pressure of great power diplomacy, and reminding the world, as it did periodically and always violently, that some problems cannot be negotiated around. They can only be negotiated through.

Whether the Abraham Accords would ultimately be remembered as a turning point or a footnote depended on a question that no one in 2026 could answer: was it possible to build a new Middle East on foundations that did not include justice for the Palestinians? The Accords had bet yes. The evidence, so far, suggested that the bet was still open.

CHAPTER 17: THE HOUSE OF SAUD PLAYS BOTH SIDES

In the spring of 2023, in a meeting room in Beijing that neither Washington nor Tel Aviv had been invited to, the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia and Iran shook hands. The handshake, captured in a photograph that circulated globally within minutes, ended a seven-year diplomatic rupture between the two most powerful nations in the Middle East. China had brokered the deal. The United States, which had spent decades positioning itself as the indispensable mediator of Middle Eastern diplomacy, learned about the agreement from the news.

The Saudi-Iran rapprochement was not a peace treaty. It was not even a friendship. It was something more calculated and, in its way, more significant: a recognition by both parties that their rivalry, which had fueled proxy wars across Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, was becoming too expensive and too dangerous to sustain. Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia's thirty-something crown prince, had ambitions that required stability: a $500 billion futuristic city called NEOM, an entertainment industry that would rival Hollywood, a tourism sector that would welcome millions of visitors, a post-oil economy that could not be built while missiles rained down from Yemen.

Iran, under the aging Ayatollah Khamenei, had its own reasons for de-escalation. The economy was strangled by sanctions. The population was restive, as demonstrated by the massive protests that followed the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022. The government needed to reduce its expenditure on foreign adventures and focus on domestic stability.

The Beijing-brokered agreement was, from Saudi Arabia's perspective, a masterstroke of strategic hedging. It signaled to Washington that Riyadh had options, that the era of exclusive Saudi dependence on the United States was over, and that the Kingdom

would pursue its interests through whatever partnerships served them best. If America would not deliver the security guarantees and weapons that Saudi Arabia wanted, China would provide diplomatic leverage. If Israel would not accommodate Palestinian aspirations, Saudi Arabia would not accommodate Israel.

This was the defining characteristic of Saudi foreign policy under Mohammed bin Salman: the refusal to be pigeonholed. The Kingdom maintained its alliance with the United States, still its primary security guarantor and the buyer of billions of dollars in Saudi oil. It deepened its relationship with China, which was Saudi Arabia's largest trading partner and an increasingly important customer for Saudi crude. It pursued rapprochement with Iran while simultaneously maintaining its hostility toward Iranian proxy groups. It explored normalization with Israel while insisting on conditions it knew Israel was unlikely to meet.

The result was a foreign policy of extraordinary complexity, one that made Saudi Arabia the most consequential swing state in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Every regional and global power wanted Riyadh on its side. None could be entirely certain that it was.

The US-Israel strikes on Iran in February 2026 threw a grenade into this carefully balanced equation. The attack killed Khamenei, devastated Iran's military infrastructure, and plunged the Islamic Republic into uncertainty. From Washington's perspective, the elimination of Iran as a military threat should have cleared the path for Saudi-Israeli normalization. With Iran weakened, the strategic rationale for the Abraham Accords was stronger than ever.

But Mohammed bin Salman did not see it that way. Or rather, he saw it but drew different conclusions.

The Saudi calculation was multidimensional. First, public opinion across the Arab and Muslim world was overwhelmingly hostile to the strikes on Iran, despite the fact that most Gulf states had quietly feared and resented Iranian power for decades. The images of

destruction, the death toll, and the targeting of cultural sites generated anger that a leader with modernization ambitions could not afford to ignore. Normalizing with Israel in the immediate aftermath of an attack on a fellow Muslim nation would be politically toxic.

Second, the power vacuum created by Iran's weakening was not necessarily good for Saudi Arabia. Iran's proxies, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, various militias in Iraq, were not simply extensions of Tehran. They had their own leadership, their own resources, and their own motivations. A weakened Iran did not automatically mean weakened proxies. In some scenarios, it meant more autonomous, more unpredictable, and more dangerous ones.

Third, Saudi Arabia was building relationships that extended beyond the traditional US-Israel axis. Turkey, under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was an increasingly important partner. The two countries had overcome the diplomatic crisis triggered by the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018, and were cooperating on defense, trade, and regional diplomacy. Qatar, which Saudi Arabia had blockaded from 2017 to 2021, had been rehabilitated as a partner. The alignment of Saudi Arabia with Turkey and Qatar created a loose bloc of Sunni Muslim states that was ideologically sympathetic to political Islam, at least more so than the UAE-Israel axis, and that took a harder line on Palestinian rights.

This did not mean Saudi Arabia was turning against the West. The Kingdom's economic vision, its defense needs, and its energy relationships all required continued partnership with the United States and Europe. But it meant that the simple binary that Washington preferred, "you're either with us or against us," did not describe the way Riyadh operated. Saudi Arabia was with everyone and no one, simultaneously, adjusting its position based on the issue, the moment, and the opportunity.

The defense relationship with the United States remained the anchor. Saudi Arabia's military was equipped almost entirely with American weapons: F-15 fighters, Patriot missile batteries, Abrams

tanks, Apache helicopters. The training, maintenance, and supply chains for these systems created a dependency that could not be replaced overnight. But the Kingdom was diversifying. Chinese drones were being evaluated. Turkish defense systems were being purchased. The message was clear: loyalty was not guaranteed, and neither were weapons contracts.

The energy dimension of Saudi foreign policy was equally complex. Saudi Arabia remained the world's largest oil exporter, and its ability to increase or decrease production had a direct impact on global oil prices. This gave the Kingdom enormous leverage in its relationships with both the United States and China. When Washington pressured Riyadh to increase production to lower prices, Saudi Arabia sometimes complied and sometimes did not. When Beijing wanted guaranteed supply, Riyadh negotiated terms that reflected its own interests, including pricing some sales in yuan rather than dollars.

The OPEC+ alliance, which coordinated production between OPEC members and Russia, gave Saudi Arabia additional leverage. The Kingdom's relationship with Russia, forged through oil market cooperation, had survived the Ukraine war, despite American pressure to distance from Moscow. Saudi Arabia had not condemned the invasion, had not joined the sanctions regime, and had maintained diplomatic and economic relations with Russia. This was not because Riyadh supported the invasion. It was because Saudi Arabia's interests required maintaining relationships on all sides of every conflict.

In the grand chessboard of Middle Eastern geopolitics, Saudi Arabia had positioned itself as the queen: the most powerful and most mobile piece on the board, capable of moving in any direction and threatening any square. The strategy carried risks. Playing all sides meant that no one fully trusted you, and in a moment of crisis, the absence of reliable allies could be fatal. But for Mohammed bin Salman, the greater risk was to commit, to choose one side definitively and lose the ability to maneuver.

The Abraham Accords remained possible. Saudi normalization with Israel remained possible. A Saudi-Chinese security partnership, a Saudi-Turkish regional alliance, a Saudi role as a mediator in the Iran crisis, all of these remained possible. The House of Saud had built its survival, over nearly a century of rule, on the ability to adapt, to shift, to find the balance point between competing pressures. In a region where choosing the wrong side could mean destruction, the Kingdom's greatest asset was its willingness to play both sides until the moment when the choice became unavoidable.

That moment had not yet arrived. And Mohammed bin Salman intended to delay it as long as possible.

CHAPTER 18: OPERATION: IRAN

The order was given at approximately 8:00 PM Eastern Standard Time on February 27, 2026. In the Situation Room of the White House, President Donald Trump, flanked by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, authorized the execution of what the Pentagon designated Operation Resolute Shield. In Tel Aviv, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gave the corresponding order to the Israel Defense Forces minutes later, following a secure video call with the American president that had lasted less than twenty minutes.

Twelve hours of diplomatic history had led to this moment. Twelve minutes of conversation had sealed it.

The operation had been planned for months, a contingency that had gradually become an intention as the intelligence picture crystallized. Iran's nuclear program, which had been constrained by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action before the Trump administration withdrew from the deal in 2018, had advanced significantly. Uranium enrichment had reached 84 percent purity, just below the 90 percent threshold considered weapons-grade. The breakout time, the period needed to produce enough fissile material for a single nuclear weapon, had shrunk to a matter of weeks. Tehran insisted its program was peaceful. No serious intelligence service believed that.

The Israeli position was that Iran's nuclear program represented an existential threat, not merely to Israel but to the regional order. A nuclear-armed Iran would be emboldened in its support for proxy forces, would destabilize the Gulf states, and would trigger a cascade of nuclear proliferation as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt sought their own arsenals. Israel had struck Iraqi and Syrian nuclear facilities in 1981 and 2007, respectively, establishing a doctrine of preemptive military action against nuclear threats. Iran was always understood to

be the ultimate test of that doctrine.

The American position was more nuanced but arrived at the same destination. The 2025 US intelligence community assessment judged that Iran was not actively constructing a nuclear weapon, that it had not made the political decision to build one. But the assessment also acknowledged that the technical capability was nearly complete, that the decision could be made at any time, and that the warning period would be too short for diplomatic intervention. The Trump administration, philosophically opposed to arms control agreements and politically aligned with Israel's hardline government, concluded that prevention was preferable to reaction.

The operation began at 10:00 PM local time in Iran on February 28, 2026. The Israeli Air Force launched approximately two hundred fighter jets from bases in the Negev Desert, the largest IAF combat sortie in history. The aircraft flew in waves, their approach covered by American electronic warfare planes that jammed Iranian air defense radars across a corridor hundreds of miles wide. Additional support came from US Navy assets in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, including Tomahawk cruise missile strikes launched from destroyers and submarines.

The target list encompassed approximately five hundred military installations across western and central Iran. The first wave struck Iran's integrated air defense system: radar sites, surface-to-air missile batteries, command and control nodes. The objective was to blind and deafen the Iranian military, to create windows of vulnerability through which subsequent waves could pass with reduced risk.

The second wave targeted Iran's ballistic missile force: launchers, storage facilities, and the underground bunkers where medium-range missiles capable of striking Israel were housed. The third wave went after command infrastructure: military headquarters, communications centers, and key government buildings.

The fourth wave targeted the nuclear facilities. Natanz, the

primary enrichment site, built deep underground and protected by layers of reinforced concrete. Fordow, a facility carved into a mountain near the city of Qom, designed to be impervious to conventional attack. Isfahan, home to uranium conversion facilities. And Arak, where a heavy water reactor capable of producing plutonium had been partially dismantled under the JCPOA but subsequently rebuilt.

The strikes on these facilities were the most technically demanding elements of the operation. American bunker-busting munitions, including the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, a 30,000-pound bomb designed to destroy deeply buried targets, were employed alongside precision-guided Israeli ordnance. The effectiveness of these strikes against facilities designed specifically to withstand them was uncertain, and the full damage assessment would take weeks to compile.

The scope of the operation extended beyond military targets. Tehran's state broadcaster was struck, silencing the regime's primary communication channel with its own population. Several sites that international observers later identified as having cultural or historical significance were damaged, drawing condemnation from UNESCO and human rights organizations. The strikes were described by critics as disproportionate and by supporters as necessary to eliminate every dimension of Iran's military capability.

Iran's response was immediate but limited by the devastation of its air defense and command systems. Ballistic missiles were launched at Israel and at American military facilities across the region: in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Some were intercepted by Israeli and American missile defense systems. Others found their targets. Casualties at American installations were reported but not immediately confirmed. In Israel, the Iron Dome and Arrow defense systems performed with the effectiveness that years of development and billions of dollars in investment had been designed to produce, though no missile defense is perfect and some projectiles

penetrated the shield.

The death toll in Iran exceeded seven hundred within the first seventy-two hours, a figure that included military personnel, government officials, and civilians. The most consequential death was that of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed when a strike hit a government compound in Tehran. The loss of the Supreme Leader, the figure who sat atop Iran's theocratic system and whose authority was both political and religious, created a succession crisis that added chaos to destruction.

The international response was immediate and divided. The United States and Israel defended the operation as a necessary act of self-defense against an imminent nuclear threat. The UK expressed support, carefully worded. France and Germany expressed concern, carefully worded. Russia and China condemned the strikes as a violation of international law and an act of aggression. The UN Security Council convened in emergency session but took no action, the usual outcome when the interests of permanent members were directly engaged.

In the region, the reactions reflected the complex web of alliances and enmities that defined the Middle East. Saudi Arabia issued a statement calling for "restraint and de-escalation," the diplomatic equivalent of saying nothing. The UAE, Bahrain, and other Gulf states, which hosted the American military facilities that Iran had targeted, were furious that their territories had been drawn into a conflict they had not chosen. Turkey condemned the strikes. Iraq, where Iranian-backed militias wielded significant political influence, saw protests that threatened to destabilize an already fragile government.

The question that consumed the region and the world in the days following the strikes was deceptively simple: what happens now?

The immediate military objective had been achieved. Iran's nuclear facilities were damaged, its air defenses destroyed, its missile force degraded, and its leadership decapitated. But the strikes had not

produced a new reality. They had produced a vacuum, and vacuums in the Middle East had a well-documented tendency to fill with something worse than what preceded them.

Iran was not Iraq. Its population of 88 million was large, educated, and nationalistic. The strikes, rather than turning the population against the regime, risked rallying them behind it, a pattern that military attacks on authoritarian states had repeatedly produced. The regime's security apparatus, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, remained largely intact, its ground forces dispersed and its organizational structure designed to function even after the loss of central leadership. Iran possessed the knowledge to rebuild its nuclear program, even if the physical infrastructure had been destroyed.

The regional consequences were unfolding in real time. The Houthis in Yemen, Iran's most aggressive proxy, threatened to resume attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. Hezbollah in Lebanon, though weakened by the 2024 Israeli campaign against it, remained a potent force. Iraqi militias mobilized. The carefully constructed network of Iranian influence across the Middle East, the so-called Axis of Resistance, was damaged but not dismantled.

In Washington, the debate about what came next was fierce. Hawks argued that the strikes should be followed by sustained pressure aimed at regime change, that the opportunity to reshape the Middle East could not be squandered. Pragmatists warned that regime change in Iran, a country three times the size and population of Iraq, was a fantasy that could produce a catastrophe dwarfing the 2003 invasion. Intelligence analysts cautioned that the Islamic Republic, for all its flaws, was a structured state, and that its collapse could produce a power vacuum that would make the Syrian and Libyan civil wars look like minor disturbances.

In Tel Aviv, the mood was triumphant but wary. The strikes had eliminated, at least temporarily, the nuclear threat that had preoccupied Israeli strategic thinking for two decades. But the long-term consequences were uncertain, and uncertainty was not

something Israel's security establishment handled comfortably.

The night of February 28, 2026, would be studied and debated for decades. It was a night that changed the map of the Middle East, that destroyed a generation of military infrastructure, that killed a Supreme Leader and upended the calculations of every government in the region. Whether it had made the world safer or more dangerous was a question that would take years to answer.

In the rubble of Natanz, where the centrifuges had spun and the scientists had worked and the world had worried, there was silence. The machines were still. The question was what would replace them.

CHAPTER 19: THE NUCLEAR QUESTION

The world came closest to nuclear midnight not during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, as the history books suggested, but in the decades-long twilight of ambiguity that surrounded Iran's nuclear program. What made it so dangerous was not a single dramatic moment but the accumulation of small steps, each one insufficient to trigger a crisis on its own but collectively moving the region toward a threshold from which there would be no return.

The story of Iran's nuclear program was a story of broken promises, failed diplomacy, and the inexorable logic of deterrence in a hostile neighborhood. It began in the 1950s, when the Shah of Iran, with American encouragement, launched a civilian nuclear energy program. It continued through the Islamic Revolution of 1979, was interrupted, then quietly resumed in the 1990s. By the early 2000s, Western intelligence agencies had confirmed what they had long suspected: Iran was pursuing nuclear capabilities that went well beyond civilian energy production.

The diplomatic response was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, negotiated over years of painstaking diplomacy and signed in 2015 by Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China. The JCPOA was, by any fair assessment, a remarkable achievement. It placed strict limits on Iran's uranium enrichment, reduced its stockpile of enriched material, disabled its plutonium pathway, and imposed an intrusive inspection regime that gave the International Atomic Energy Agency unprecedented access to Iranian facilities. In exchange, the international community lifted nuclear-related sanctions, releasing billions of dollars in frozen assets and reopening Iran to global trade.

The deal had its critics. Israel, under Netanyahu, opposed it vehemently, arguing that it merely delayed Iran's nuclear ambitions without eliminating them. Saudi Arabia was skeptical for similar

reasons. Hardliners in Tehran resented the concessions and the implied subordination to Western demands. But the deal worked. Iran's enrichment was capped. Its breakout time, the period needed to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb, was extended from a few weeks to over a year. The inspection regime provided early warning of any deviation.

Then, in May 2018, President Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA. The decision was driven by a combination of factors: Trump's hostility to any agreement associated with the Obama administration, lobbying by Israel and Saudi Arabia, and a genuine belief within the administration that the deal was insufficient because it did not address Iran's ballistic missile program or its support for regional proxy forces.

The consequences of the withdrawal were precisely what the deal's supporters had warned about. Iran, released from its commitments, began enriching uranium beyond the JCPOA limits. Enrichment levels climbed: from 3.67 percent, the cap under the deal, to 20 percent, then 60 percent, then 84 percent. Each step was a provocation and a signal: if you will not honor the deal, we will not honor it either. Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium grew. The IAEA's access was curtailed. The breakout time shrank from over a year to a matter of weeks.

The Biden administration attempted to revive the deal through negotiations in Vienna that dragged on for years without conclusion. The obstacles were numerous: Iran demanded guarantees that no future American president would withdraw again, a demand that the US constitutional system made impossible to meet. Iran also demanded the removal of all sanctions, including those imposed for non-nuclear reasons. The United States and its European allies demanded that Iran return to strict compliance with the original terms, which Iran viewed as a concession without reciprocity.

By the time Trump returned to office in January 2025, the JCPOA was dead. The diplomatic channel through which the nuclear

question might have been resolved was closed. What remained was the military option, the option that had always lurked in the background of every diplomatic negotiation, that Israeli officials had described as a "last resort" while simultaneously planning for it with meticulous care.

The four strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities during the February 2026 operation were the culmination of this trajectory. Each strike was designed to destroy a specific piece of the nuclear puzzle. Natanz, the centerpiece of Iran's enrichment program, housed thousands of centrifuges in underground halls that had been hardened against aerial attack. The strikes used a combination of bunker-busting munitions and, reportedly, specialized weapons designed to collapse tunnel entrances and contaminate underground spaces, making reconstruction difficult.

Fordow, the mountain facility near Qom, was an even harder target. Built deep inside a mountain, it was considered by some analysts to be virtually impervious to conventional attack. The strikes against Fordow reportedly involved repeated waves of heavy munitions aimed at collapsing the mountain's internal structure. Whether they succeeded in destroying the centrifuge halls was a matter of intense debate in the intelligence community.

Isfahan and Arak were softer targets, above-ground facilities that were more vulnerable to conventional strikes. The damage at these sites was assessed to be severe.

But the destruction of physical infrastructure did not destroy knowledge. Iran's nuclear scientists, many of whom had been trained in the world's best universities, survived the strikes. The intellectual capacity to rebuild the program existed. The question was whether the political will would follow.

The nuclear dimension of the Iran strikes raised profound questions that extended well beyond the Middle East. The most fundamental was this: did the strikes make nuclear proliferation more

or less likely?

The case for more likely was straightforward. If the lesson of the Iran strikes was that countries without nuclear weapons were vulnerable to attack by countries that had them, the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons was stronger than ever. North Korea, which possessed a small but growing nuclear arsenal, could point to Iran as proof that giving up or limiting nuclear capabilities was suicidal. Other nations, Saudi Arabia and Turkey foremost among them, might conclude that the only reliable deterrent against great power aggression was to have their own bomb.

The case for less likely was equally logical, if more optimistic. The strikes demonstrated that the international community, or at least the United States and Israel, would not tolerate nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The cost of pursuing nuclear weapons was not merely sanctions and diplomatic isolation but physical destruction. This might deter other countries from starting down the nuclear path.

The truth, as with most things in geopolitics, was that both arguments had merit and neither would be definitively validated for years. What was clear in the immediate aftermath of the strikes was that the nuclear question in the Middle East had not been resolved. It had been deferred. The centrifuges at Natanz were silent, but the equations that governed their operation were written in the minds of scientists who were still alive. The facilities could be rebuilt. The enrichment could resume. The breakout time could shrink again.

The only permanent solutions to nuclear proliferation were political, not military. A comprehensive security architecture that addressed the legitimate concerns of all parties, that offered Iran security guarantees in exchange for verifiable denuclearization, that prevented a regional arms race by creating a framework for collective security. Such an architecture had never existed in the Middle East, and nothing about the events of early 2026 suggested that it was any closer to being built.

In the rubble of the nuclear facilities, the fundamental paradox of proliferation remained intact: nuclear weapons were sought by states that felt insecure, and the actions taken to prevent proliferation often made those states feel more insecure, which increased their desire for the very weapons they were being prevented from obtaining.

It was a circle with no obvious exit. And in the Middle East, circles had a way of becoming spirals.

CHAPTER 20: THE HOUTHIS AND THE SHIPPING LANE

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is twenty miles wide. At its narrowest point, you can stand on the coast of Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa, and see the shores of Yemen across the water. Through this sliver of ocean passes roughly twelve percent of global trade: oil tankers from the Persian Gulf, container ships from Asia, bulk carriers loaded with grain and raw materials. It is one of the most important maritime chokepoints on Earth, connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and, beyond it, the Indian Ocean. Any disruption to traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb sends shockwaves through global supply chains, raising shipping costs, insurance premiums, and the price of goods on supermarket shelves from London to Lagos.

In November 2023, a group that most of the world had never heard of seized control of this chokepoint. The Houthis, officially known as Ansar Allah, were a Yemeni rebel movement that controlled much of northern Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa. They were aligned with Iran, equipped with Iranian weapons, and motivated by a mixture of Shia revolutionary ideology and Yemeni nationalism. And they had decided that the Gaza war was their war too.

Beginning in late 2023, the Houthis launched a campaign of attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea. The attacks used a combination of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and explosive-laden drones, weapons that had been smuggled into Yemen through networks that ran from Iran through Oman and along the Yemeni coast. The targets were ships with real or perceived connections to Israel, though the definition expanded rapidly to include any vessel transiting the area.

The effect on global shipping was immediate and dramatic. Major shipping lines, including Maersk, MSC, and Hapag-Lloyd, rerouted their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa, adding ten to fourteen days to the journey between Asia and

Europe. Insurance premiums for Red Sea transit skyrocketed. Fuel costs increased. Delivery times lengthened. The cost of a container shipment from Shanghai to Rotterdam rose by thousands of dollars.

The economic ripple effects were felt worldwide, but they hit hardest in the countries least equipped to absorb them. Egypt, which earned billions of dollars annually from Suez Canal transit fees, saw revenues plummet as ships avoided the waterway. East African nations that depended on Red Sea shipping for imports of food, fuel, and manufactured goods faced supply shortages and price spikes. European consumers saw the cost of goods increase at a time when inflation was already straining household budgets.

The United States responded with Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational naval task force assembled to protect commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Warships from the US, UK, France, and other nations patrolled the waterway, intercepting missiles and drones before they could reach their targets. The US and UK launched airstrikes against Houthi positions in Yemen, targeting missile launchers, drone storage facilities, and command centers.

The strikes degraded but did not eliminate the Houthi threat. The movement's weapons were dispersed, mobile, and often stored in civilian areas. The terrain of northern Yemen, rugged mountains and deep wadis, provided natural concealment. And the Houthis had something that no amount of airpower could destroy: motivation. They believed they were fighting for a cause, the defense of Palestinians in Gaza, and that belief made them willing to absorb punishment that would have deterred a more calculating adversary.

The Houthi campaign was, in strategic terms, a masterclass in asymmetric warfare. A rebel movement with no navy, no air force, and no significant economic base had managed to disrupt the global economy, tie down a multinational naval force, and project power far beyond its borders. The cost asymmetry was staggering: Houthi weapons, many of them reverse-engineered or modified versions of Iranian designs, cost a fraction of the missiles used to intercept them.

A single Houthi drone, costing perhaps ten to twenty thousand dollars, could force the expenditure of a multi-million-dollar interceptor missile.

The Gaza ceasefire in October 2025 provided a pause. The Houthis announced that they would halt their Red Sea operations as long as Israel honored the ceasefire terms. Shipping companies cautiously began returning to the Suez route. Insurance premiums declined. The global supply chain began to heal, slowly and tentatively.

Then came the Iran strikes.

On February 28, 2026, within hours of the US-Israeli attack on Iran, two senior Houthi officials told international media that the movement had decided to resume Red Sea operations. The logic was straightforward: the strikes on Iran, their patron and ally, represented an escalation that demanded a response. The Houthis did not have the military capability to strike Israel or the United States directly. But they had something nearly as valuable: the ability to turn a shipping lane into a war zone.

As of early March 2026, the resumption had not yet materialized at full scale. Internal debate within the Houthi leadership appeared to be delaying implementation. Some voices argued for immediate escalation. Others counseled patience, noting that a premature resumption could provide the United States with a pretext for a broader military campaign against Yemen. The Houthis were reckless in many ways, but they were not stupid. They understood that their power lay in the threat as much as the execution, and that calibrating the threat was as important as carrying it out.

The deeper lesson of the Houthi campaign was about the changing nature of power in the twenty-first century. Traditional metrics of military strength, GDP, population, industrial capacity, defense spending, told you almost nothing about the Houthis' ability to disrupt the global order. What mattered was geography,

asymmetry, and will. A narrow strait. Cheap weapons. And a willingness to use them in ways that imposed costs far exceeding the investment.

This was a pattern that was becoming increasingly common across the global security landscape. Non-state actors, empowered by technology and emboldened by ideology, could now threaten interests that were previously the exclusive domain of great powers. The Houthis controlled a chokepoint. Hezbollah had more rockets than most European armies. Drug cartels in Latin America wielded military capability that rivaled national armed forces. Cyber militias in Eastern Europe could shut down infrastructure in countries they had never visited.

The traditional response to these threats, the dispatch of aircraft carriers and the dropping of bombs, was necessary but insufficient. You could destroy a missile launcher, but you could not destroy the grievance that motivated the person who fired it. You could kill a militant, but you could not kill an idea. The Houthis were not fighting because they had missiles. They had missiles because they were fighting, and they were fighting because decades of war, poverty, and foreign intervention had created a population with nothing left to lose.

Yemen itself was a humanitarian catastrophe that made the Houthi question inseparable from the broader crisis. The UN estimated that 21 million Yemenis, roughly two-thirds of the population, needed humanitarian aid in 2026. Malnutrition was rampant. Healthcare was almost nonexistent in many areas. The country's infrastructure, battered by a decade of civil war between the Houthis and a Saudi-led coalition that had intervened in 2015, was in ruins. Yemen was, by many measures, the worst humanitarian crisis on Earth, and the international community's response was to fund aid programs at a fraction of the assessed need while conducting airstrikes against the very population it claimed to be helping.

The Red Sea crisis would not end until the Yemen crisis ended,

and the Yemen crisis would not end until someone addressed the underlying political grievances that had fueled a decade of war. That someone was nowhere in sight. The Saudi-led coalition had largely disengaged. The UN-brokered peace process was stalled. The Houthis controlled the north and showed no interest in power-sharing. The internationally recognized government controlled parts of the south and struggled to assert authority over its own territory.

In the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the shipping continued. The warships patrolled. The drones and missiles sat in their launchers, waiting for the order that might come at any moment. And the twenty miles of water that separated Africa from Arabia remained, as they had been for millennia, a passage between worlds, a place where the currents of global commerce and local desperation collided.

CHAPTER 21: AFTER THE AYATOLLAHS

In the hours following the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a silence fell over the Islamic Republic of Iran that was more terrifying than the explosions that preceded it. The state broadcasting system was off the air. The government's official communications channels were dark. The Supreme Leader's office, the nerve center of a political system designed around a single point of religious and political authority, was physically destroyed. And the eighty-six-year-old cleric who had ruled Iran for thirty-five years, who had navigated sanctions, protests, wars, and the constant threat of American and Israeli attack, was dead.

The Islamic Republic of Iran was not designed to function without a Supreme Leader. The entire constitutional architecture of the state, created after the 1979 revolution, revolved around the concept of Velayat-e Faqih, the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist. The Supreme Leader was not merely a head of state. He was the ultimate authority on all matters of governance, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the final arbiter of disputes between the branches of government, and the spiritual guide of the nation. His authority derived not from election but from the Assembly of Experts, a body of eighty-eight senior clerics who were nominally responsible for selecting and supervising the Supreme Leader.

The last time the Assembly had performed this function was in 1989, when Khamenei had been elevated to the position following the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. That transition, though not without internal tensions, had been orderly, planned in advance, and cushioned by the legitimacy of the revolutionary generation. The transition in 2026 had none of these advantages.

The Assembly of Experts itself was in disarray. Several of its members had been killed or injured in the strikes. Others were

scattered, unable to convene in the immediate aftermath of the attack. The communications infrastructure they depended on was damaged. And the question of who should succeed Khamenei had been a source of quiet but intense factional maneuvering for years, with no consensus candidate.

The most frequently mentioned potential successor was Mojtaba Khamenei, the late Supreme Leader's son, who had been quietly accumulating power behind the scenes for years. Mojtaba controlled extensive financial networks, had allies within the Revolutionary Guard, and was believed to enjoy the support of some senior clerics. But dynastic succession was a concept that sat uneasily within the revolutionary ideology of the Islamic Republic, which had been founded partly on the rejection of the monarchical principle. Elevating the son of the previous leader would look uncomfortably like the establishment of a new dynasty, precisely what the revolution had overthrown.

Other candidates included the head of the judiciary, senior members of the Guardian Council, and various influential ayatollahs in the religious establishment of Qom. Each had their supporters and detractors. The political landscape was further complicated by the Revolutionary Guard Corps, which had emerged as the most powerful institutional actor in Iran over the preceding decades. The IRGC controlled vast economic enterprises, commanded its own military forces, and had a political agenda that was not always aligned with the clerical establishment. In the post-Khamenei vacuum, the Guards were the faction best positioned to assert control.

The immediate aftermath of the strikes produced a dual crisis: external military devastation and internal political fragmentation. The civilian government, led by the president (a position that had been reduced to a largely ceremonial role under Khamenei), attempted to project normalcy. Statements were issued calling for national unity. The military declared readiness to defend the nation. But the system's decision-making architecture was broken, and everyone who

understood Iranian politics knew it.

The Iranian people, observing this drama with a mixture of grief, anger, and, in some quarters, cautious hope, were a variable that the regime's inner circle could not control. Iran had experienced repeated waves of popular protest over the preceding decades: the Green Movement of 2009, the economic protests of 2017-2018, the Women, Life, Freedom movement of 2022-2023. Each wave had been suppressed through a combination of force, surveillance, and the regime's ability to fracture opposition movements. But each wave had also demonstrated that a significant portion of the population, particularly the young, the urban, and the educated, rejected the theocratic system and desired fundamental change.

The strikes on Iran had not been designed to spark regime change, at least not in the stated objectives of the operation. But they had created conditions in which regime change was possible, perhaps even likely, depending on how the internal succession struggle resolved. The weakening of the military and intelligence apparatus, the destruction of communications infrastructure, and the death of the single most powerful figure in the state had opened a window that reformers, hardliners, military factions, and popular movements would all attempt to exploit.

The diaspora watched with an intensity that was difficult to overstate. Iran's diaspora, estimated at between four and five million people scattered across the United States, Europe, Canada, and Australia, was one of the most educated and politically engaged exile communities in the world. Many had fled the revolution or its aftermath. Many more had left during subsequent waves of repression. They carried with them memories of a different Iran, the cosmopolitan, modernizing nation that had existed before 1979, and hopes for a future Iran that might recapture some of that potential.

The international community faced a dilemma for which there was no historical precedent. The United States and Israel had destroyed the military capability of a major regional power. They had,

directly or indirectly, precipitated a leadership crisis in a country of 88 million people. What they had not done was prepare for what came next. There was no plan for post-strike Iran. No transitional framework. No reconstruction blueprint. No political roadmap.

This was not for lack of warning. Experts on Iran had argued for years that any military action against the Islamic Republic must be accompanied by a political strategy for the aftermath. The lesson of Iraq in 2003, where the destruction of Saddam Hussein's regime was followed by a decade of chaos, civil war, and the rise of ISIS, was seared into the institutional memory of the American foreign policy establishment. But the pace of events, the rapid escalation from intelligence warning to military action, had compressed the planning timeline to a point where post-strike strategy was an afterthought.

In the weeks following the strikes, the situation in Iran remained fluid. The Revolutionary Guard maintained order in most major cities, deploying forces to prevent the kind of popular uprising that the regime most feared. The clerical establishment began the process of selecting a new Supreme Leader, though the process was slow, contested, and conducted under conditions of extreme duress. The economy, already weakened by years of sanctions and mismanagement, suffered further as oil exports were disrupted and foreign exchange reserves dwindled.

The regional implications were being felt simultaneously. Hezbollah in Lebanon, which depended on Iranian financing and weapons supplies, faced an uncertain future. The Shia militias in Iraq, another key component of Iran's regional network, were recalibrating their positions. The Houthis in Yemen were debating whether to escalate or restrain. The entire architecture of Iranian influence in the Middle East, painstakingly constructed over four decades, was under stress.

For the people of Iran, the immediate reality was simpler and harder than the geopolitical calculations suggested. They were living in a country that had been attacked, whose leader was dead, whose

future was uncertain, and whose choices were being made by people with guns. They went to work, where work still existed. They fed their children. They checked on their elderly parents. They scrolled through the limited information available on messaging apps that still functioned. And they waited, as Iranians had waited through so many upheavals before, to see what kind of country they would wake up to.

The Islamic Republic, founded in 1979 on the promise of a new kind of society governed by divine law, had survived sanctions, war, protest, and internal contradiction for forty-seven years. Whether it would survive the loss of its Supreme Leader and the destruction of its military was the question that hung over the Middle East in March 2026. The ayatollahs' system was wounded, perhaps mortally. But wounded systems have a way of lashing out, and a cornered regime with nothing left to lose was among the most dangerous forces in international politics.

The world watched, and held its breath, and waited to see what Iran would become.

PART IV

THE SOUTH ASIAN CHESSBOARD

CHAPTER 22: THE SHAKSGAM TRIGGER

The Shaksgam Valley sits at the roof of the world, a remote, desolate expanse of rock and ice in the northern reaches of the Karakoram mountains. Few people have ever been there. Fewer still could find it on a map. The valley is roughly two thousand square miles of territory so inhospitable that it has never sustained a permanent human settlement. Temperatures in winter drop below minus forty degrees. The terrain is a maze of glaciers, moraines, and ridgelines that would challenge the most experienced mountaineers.

It is also one of the most dangerous places on Earth, because two nuclear-armed nations believe it belongs to them, and a third has been quietly building a road through it.

The Shaksgam Valley was ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963, as part of a border agreement between the two countries. India rejected the agreement at the time and has never recognized it since, arguing that the valley is part of the broader territory of Jammu and Kashmir, which India claims in its entirety. China accepted the territory, incorporated it into the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, and for decades did relatively little with it. The valley was too remote, too inaccessible, and too strategically marginal to justify significant investment.

That changed in the 2020s. Chinese engineers began constructing a road through the Shaksgam Valley, a 36-kilometer stretch of paved highway that connected to the broader network of military roads China had been building along its western frontiers. Satellite imagery revealed construction activity, widened tracks, and staging areas for heavy equipment. By January 2026, the road was largely complete, and China had reasserted its claim over the region with a directness that left no room for diplomatic ambiguity.

India's Ministry of External Affairs responded with a public statement condemning the road construction as a unilateral action

that undermined India's sovereignty claims. The language was sharper than usual. Indian officials accused China of using infrastructure development as a tool of territorial aggrandizement, a pattern they saw replicated across the Line of Actual Control, the poorly defined border between India and China that had been the site of periodic confrontations since the two countries fought a brief war in 1962.

The Shaksgam road was not, in isolation, a cause for war. Thirty-six kilometers of highway in a valley where nobody lived did not, by itself, alter the military balance between two nuclear powers. But in the context of the broader India-China rivalry, it was an escalation of a familiar pattern: China using infrastructure to establish facts on the ground in disputed territory, exactly as it had done in the South China Sea.

The India-China border stretches for approximately 2,100 miles, from the eastern extremity of Ladakh to the hills of Arunachal Pradesh. It is one of the longest and least defined borders in the world. No formal boundary line has ever been agreed. Instead, the two countries recognize a Line of Actual Control, a concept so vague that the two sides do not even agree on where, precisely, it runs. In some sectors, the claimed lines overlap by miles, creating zones of ambiguity where soldiers from both sides patrol, sometimes encountering each other in confrontations that have, on occasion, turned deadly.

The most serious of these confrontations occurred in June 2020, in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh. During a standoff between Indian and Chinese troops at a disputed ridge, a brawl erupted. No guns were fired, the two sides had long observed an informal agreement not to use firearms at the border, but soldiers fought with fists, rocks, and improvised weapons wrapped in barbed wire. Twenty Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops were killed. It was the deadliest clash between the two nations in forty-five years.

The Galwan incident transformed the India-China relationship. Before 2020, Indian and Chinese leaders had managed the border

dispute through a combination of diplomatic dialogue, military confidence-building measures, and a mutual understanding that the economic relationship was too valuable to jeopardize. After Galwan, that equilibrium collapsed. India banned dozens of Chinese apps, including TikTok. It restricted Chinese investment. It deepened its defense cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia through the Quad. It began an infrastructure buildup along the border that mirrored, in miniature, what China had been doing for years.

By 2026, the border area resembled an armed camp. Both sides had deployed tens of thousands of troops, along with artillery, tanks, and air defense systems, in terrain that was among the most challenging on Earth for military operations. Roads, bridges, and airfields were being built at a frenetic pace, each side seeking to ensure that it could reinforce its positions faster than the other in the event of a crisis. The infrastructure race was, in itself, a source of instability: every new road was a provocation as much as a defensive measure, a signal that the other side was preparing for something more than deterrence.

The Shaksgam Valley fit into this pattern. For India, China's road construction was evidence that Beijing was using its relationship with Pakistan to encircle India from the north and west. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which ran through the portion of Kashmir administered by Pakistan, was already a source of friction. The Shaksgam road extended that network into territory India claimed as its own. The strategic implication was that in any future conflict, China could use these routes to move forces and supplies into positions that threatened India's vulnerable northern borders.

For China, the road was a natural extension of its western development strategy, a piece of the infrastructure network that connected Xinjiang to the broader Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing dismissed Indian protests as hypocritical, pointing to India's own infrastructure projects in Arunachal Pradesh, which China called "Southern Tibet" and claimed as its own territory.

The Atlantic Council, a prominent Washington think tank, published an analysis in early 2026 warning that another India-China military flare-up was likely. The assessment pointed to several factors: the unresolved Galwan legacy, the infrastructure race along the LAC, domestic political pressures in both countries, and the broader strategic competition that made every border dispute a proxy for larger questions about Asian hegemony.

The nuclear dimension made the India-China border dispute uniquely dangerous. Both countries possessed substantial nuclear arsenals, and both maintained "no first use" policies that were, in the estimation of many analysts, increasingly hollow. India's nuclear doctrine was designed primarily to deter Pakistan, but its weapons were equally capable of striking Chinese targets. China's nuclear modernization, which included the construction of new missile silos and the development of multiple warhead systems, was driven partly by the perceived need to maintain a credible deterrent against both the United States and India.

A conventional military clash along the border, even one that began as a localized scuffle like Galwan, carried the risk of escalation to a level that neither side intended. In mountainous terrain where communications were difficult, where units operated at extreme altitudes with limited resupply, and where national prestige was at stake, the distance between a border incident and a national crisis was disturbingly short.

The Shaksgam Valley, empty and silent, sat at the intersection of all these pressures. A road through a valley that nobody lived in. A claim over territory that nobody could use. And two great powers, armed with nuclear weapons and driven by ambitions that could not be reconciled on a map that neither had agreed to.

In the Karakoram, the wind blew. The glaciers creaked. And thirty-six kilometers of asphalt waited to see whether it would become a footnote or a fuse.

CHAPTER 23: MODI'S INDIA

The monsoon rains hammered New Delhi in June 2024 as Narendra Modi settled into his third term as Prime Minister. His BJP had lost its absolute majority for the first time in a decade, falling to 240 seats in the 543-member Lok Sabha. The loss stung. The man who had promised to transform India into a superpower had instead been forced into a coalition with smaller parties, some of them regional kingmakers he'd spent years trying to marginalize. Yet Modi smiled through it all, appearing at rallies with the same theatrical flair that had powered his rise from Gujarat's provincial strongman to the leader of 1.4 billion people.

India was different now than it had been when Modi took office in 2014. The country had become something new. Not quite a superpower, but no longer a regional player either. India was the world's most populous nation, having surpassed China two years earlier. Its GDP had grown to over $3.7 trillion, the fifth largest on earth. Its missiles could reach Beijing. Its navy patrolled waters from the Arabian Sea to the Pacific. And its leader, whatever his domestic political troubles, commanded attention from Washington to Tokyo to Moscow.

The Modi project had always been ambitious, sometimes reckless, often brilliant. Make in India. Digital India. A nuclear arsenal. A blue-water navy. Manufacturing capacity to challenge Southeast Asia. Railways rebuilt. Highways poured across the subcontinent. In his election speeches, Modi spoke of Bharat, the ancient Hindu name for India, as though invoking a civilization awakening from centuries of slumber. This wasn't economic policy talk; it was something closer to a philosophy of national resurrection.

But the machinery of Modi's third term was already creaking. The coalition partners demanded concessions. Inflation had bitten hard through 2023 and 2024. Unemployment among youth reached levels

the government preferred not to discuss publicly. Communal tensions between Hindu and Muslim communities, simmering for years, occasionally boiled over into violence. Yet Modi understood something about Indian politics that outsiders often missed. India was big enough to hold contradictions. You could be rising and struggling simultaneously. You could be a great power and a developing country in the same breath. India always had been, always would be.

The defense spending told you what Modi actually believed. The budget allocated $72 billion for defense in 2024, up from $38 billion in 2014. The military modernization was real and accelerating. New fighter jets, new submarines, new missiles. India had tested an anti-satellite weapon in 2019, joining a club of only three nations. New coastal bases were being established on the Andaman Islands. Naval exercises with Japan, Australia, and the United States grew larger and more sophisticated each year. The message was unmistakable: India was preparing for great power competition in Asia.

The defense minister, Rajnath Singh, spoke regularly about India's "strategic autonomy." This was the careful language of a country that wanted to remain friends with everyone while committing to no one completely. Modi's government bought S-400 air defense systems from Russia, enraging some in Washington. But it also deepened defense ties with the United States, allowing American ships to refuel and resupply in Indian ports. It participated in the Quad, the four-nation partnership with the US, Japan, and Australia explicitly designed to counterbalance Chinese expansion in the Indo-Pacific. Yet it also maintained defense relationships with Russia and abstained from UN votes condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine. India was not choosing. India was hedging.

This was the paradox of Modi's India. It was building military capability at a pace unseen since Indira Gandhi's era. It was acquiring weapons systems and technical expertise that would allow it to project power far beyond its borders. Yet it was doing this while insisting it wasn't choosing sides in the emerging US-China competition. India

wanted to be treated as a great power. But it also wanted the benefits of remaining unaligned, of being courted by all sides, of selling to the highest bidder and buying from whoever offered the best terms.

The economic ambitions were equally grand. Make in India had evolved from a slogan into actual industrial policy. Tax breaks for manufacturers. Special economic zones. A push to move supply chains out of China and into Indian factories. Apple suppliers began shifting production to Tamil Nadu. Electronics manufacturing surged. Semiconductors. Pharmaceutical production. The government targeted 200 billion dollars in manufacturing exports by 2025. They would miss it, but only slightly. What had been purely agricultural and service-based was becoming industrial. Three hundred million new factory workers in the coming decades. That's where the real numbers game lay.

Digital India was already here. India had the world's largest smartphone-using population. Digital payments through the Unified Payments Interface had become ubiquitous in urban areas and were spreading into villages at stunning speed. Aadhaar, the biometric identity system, had enrolled over a billion people. The infrastructure was being built for a digital economy that would leapfrog decades of conventional banking. Young Indians were building tech startups at scale. Bangalore was becoming a genuine tech hub, not just an outsourcing destination. The startups were being financed by Indian venture capital, not just foreign money.

Modi's demographic advantage was something few countries possessed. India's median age was 28. China's was 39. The United States was 38. India was a young country entering its peak productive years. This was what economists called the "demographic dividend." If managed properly, if jobs could be created, if education could be improved, India had perhaps two decades to cash in on this advantage. Hundreds of millions of young people entering the workforce at a time when China was graying and the developed world was shrinking. It was the kind of advantage empires were built on.

Yet the social contradictions were deepening. The gap between the English-speaking tech elite of Bangalore and Delhi, living lives resembling Silicon Valley, and the hundreds of millions of farmers, factory workers, and rural poor seemed to grow wider each year. Caste discrimination persisted. Gender violence remained endemic. The education system produced vast numbers of degrees without corresponding job opportunities. Youth unemployment was not just a number; it was a political powder keg. And Modi's Hindu nationalist ideology, which had always been part of his appeal to his core supporters, seemed to be intensifying rather than moderating with time.

The Quad was Modi's diplomatic masterpiece. The idea of binding together the US, Japan, Australia, and India into a loose alliance without directly naming China as the opponent was elegant. It allowed each country to pretend it wasn't encircling anyone. Quad naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal and the Philippine Sea grew larger each year. Quad leaders' summits became regular fixtures. Japan's Prime Minister and India's were close. Australia saw India as a strategic counterweight to Chinese pressure. The United States wanted India as an ally against China more than it wanted anything else from South Asia.

But India's G20 presidency in 2023 had revealed something about Modi's ambitions. He used the platform to push for development issues and the concerns of the Global South. Not to gang up on China or Russia. India wanted influence but not as someone's subordinate. The G20 statement under India's presidency notably avoided language criticizing Russia, despite the Ukraine war. India was playing a deeper game. It wanted to use its rising power to become the voice of the developing world, the bridge between North and South, between the traditional great powers and the rising nations.

Modi visited the United States in 2023 and addressed Congress, an honor bestowed on close allies. He spoke of ancient Hindu-American connections, of spiritual ties, of shared democratic values.

The subtext was clear: India and America needed each other in the century ahead. But when he returned to India, his government continued purchasing Russian oil at discounted prices, continued buying Russian weapons, continued voting with Russia at the UN when it mattered. Modi was not hedging carelessly. He was playing a calculated game, keeping all the doors open, treating the world as a marketplace where India could shop for the best deals on defense systems, energy, technology, and diplomatic alignment.

The military modernization under Modi had a particular focus: naval power. India's navy, once primarily focused on defending the coastline against Pakistan, was now thinking ocean-wide. Aircraft carriers were being built and commissioned. New submarines were entering service. Coastal defense systems were being deployed. The Indian Navy was quietly becoming one of Asia's largest navies. This was deliberate. Control of the Indian Ocean meant power. India wanted that power.

The defense relationship with Russia was particularly complex. Despite American pressure, Modi's government had bought the S-400 air defense system from Russia, paying billions for a system that the Americans said would compromise the F-35s India hoped to buy. But India calculated that the S-400, for all its costs, was worth it. It was a world-class system, proven in combat, and it gave India leverage with both Russia and America. India could say to America: "I want to buy your systems, but I need Russia too." And India could say to Russia: "Our relationship matters." This was how a rising power operated, hedging its bets, keeping itself in demand.

By 2026, Modi's third term was settling into a new reality. The coalition partners were manageable. The economy, while not growing at the 8 and 9 percent rates of earlier years, was still expanding at a respectable 5 to 6 percent. Inflation had cooled. Foreign direct investment continued flowing in. The rupee, while weaker than before, remained stable. And India's place in the world was undeniably elevated from where it had been a decade earlier.

Yet Modi seemed anxious about something. Perhaps it was the domestic political constraints. Perhaps it was the rise of Pakistan's military leadership under new pressure from the Taliban. Perhaps it was the growing assertiveness of China along the border, where in 2020 and 2021, Indian and Chinese troops had clashed in Ladakh in the deadliest battle between the two nations in decades. The Line of Control remained heavily militarized. The border dispute remained unresolved. China was still India's greatest strategic concern, despite the importance of the American relationship.

Modi had come to power on a wave of national pride and economic ambition. A decade later, he had delivered on some promises and fallen short on others. But India itself had changed. It was no longer asking for permission to be a great power. It was claiming that status, acting as though it were already achieved, and daring the world to deny it. Whether the army of young, unemployed youth could be harnessed into productive economic power, whether the social tensions could be managed, whether the military capability could be translated into genuine strategic advantage, these were the questions that would define not just Modi's legacy but India's future.

For now, Modi smiled through his reduced majority. India was rising. That was what mattered. The details, the contradictions, the tensions between ambition and reality, those could be managed. They always were.

CHAPTER 24: THE HANDSHAKE IN DHAKA

The Grand Water Park in Dhaka was an odd place to broker peace between two nuclear powers locked in a 75-year rivalry. But that was where S. Jaishankar, India's Foreign Minister, found himself on a humid March afternoon in 2025, sitting across from Ayaz Sadiq, the Speaker of Pakistan's National Assembly, with nothing between them but a table and the weight of history. The delegates from both countries occupied separate rooms nearby. The media had been kept at arm's length. This was deniable diplomacy. Both governments could claim it hadn't happened if it went badly.

Jaishankar was a career diplomat, trained in the old school, fluent in Russian and French, someone who understood that geopolitics was a game played in the margins. Sadiq was a politician, powerful within Pakistan's complex power structure, but ultimately secondary to the military leadership that actually ran the country. They were not supposed to be talking. Not seriously. Pakistan and India had engaged in military brinkmanship just months earlier, and they were still on a knife's edge.

The year before had been the worst since 1971. In February 2024, a suicide bomber affiliated with JeM, a Pakistan-based terrorist organization, had killed forty Indian paramilitary personnel in Kashmir. India responded with aerial strikes deep into Pakistani territory. Pakistan retaliated with its own strikes. For several days in March, the two nations had seemed to be slipping toward open warfare. Fighter jets were scrambled. Ships moved into position. The world held its breath. And then, as before, both sides stepped back. The nuclear powers always did. They flirted with catastrophe, then retreated to the brink.

But the flirtation was getting more dangerous. The military buildups were real. The ideological hatred was genuine. The territorial disputes remained completely unresolved. Kashmir, which had been

the core issue since 1947, seemed no closer to settlement than it ever had. India controlled about two-thirds of it and called it the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan controlled about a fifth and called it Azad Kashmir. Both claimed the whole thing. It was an impossible knot.

The water border was equally toxic. Two major rivers, the Indus and the Sutlej, provided Pakistan with much of its irrigation water. India controlled the headwaters. In dry seasons, India could choke off water to Pakistan's heartland. Pakistan could barely survive without that water. It was not a metaphor. It was the lifeline of the economy. Every monsoon season, tensions rose over water sharing. Every drought season, they rose higher. Climate change was making droughts more frequent. The demographic pressure was growing. Pakistan's population was expected to reach 250 million by 2030. All of them needed water. India needed water too. The mathematics of the Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960, had never been revisited. Both sides knew it would have to be eventually. Both knew it would be a bloodbath negotiating it.

The nuclear question made everything worse. Both countries had nukes. India had somewhere between 150 and 200 nuclear warheads. Pakistan had somewhere between 170 and 190. The exact numbers were secret, but they were similar enough that neither had a decisive advantage. Pakistan had a doctrine of "first use," meaning it would consider using nuclear weapons if faced with military defeat in a conventional war. It was a doctrine born from conventional inferiority. Pakistan could never match India's military capability conventionally. So it had decided that if India ever tried to finish it militarily, Pakistan would go nuclear. It was a suicide pact. Mutual Assured Destruction applied to South Asia. And both countries had made repeated statements that they would use nuclear weapons if faced with existential threats.

Yet trade between them had been growing. In 2023, bilateral trade had reached nearly $3 billion, more than it had been in years.

Indian students studied in Pakistan. Pakistani business people invested in India. The Wagah border crossing, the only land crossing between the two countries at Punjab, saw thousands of traders, truckers, and travelers cross every week. There was life between them, even as militaries faced off. There was cricket. India and Pakistan played cricket, and the matches were watched by hundreds of millions across South Asia. Cricket had become something like a pressure valve. You could hate the other side intensely, but you also watched their cricket. You had favorites on their team. The identity was partially constructed around these matches.

Jaishankar had served as ambassador in Pakistan. He knew the dynamics. He understood that Pakistan's military, for all its belligerence, was not actually seeking war. It couldn't afford war. Pakistan was bankrupt. The IMF had bailed it out repeatedly. Its economy was in free fall. Its institutions were weak. War would destroy the country. And yet the military needed the image of India as a threat to justify its continued dominance of Pakistani politics. This was the trap Pakistan couldn't escape. The military needed India to be dangerous to remain powerful at home. So it kept tensions high. But it couldn't let them get so high that war actually started.

Sadiq, across the table, represented the civilian political leadership. Pakistan's government had recently changed hands, with a coalition of civilian parties governing for the first time in years. The military was still everywhere in the background, but for the moment, civilians held the top positions. Sadiq, as Speaker of the Assembly, was one of the most powerful civilians in Pakistan. He had political capital. He also had connections to the military. His understanding was that a quiet exploratory conversation with India might be worth attempting. No one expected a breakthrough. But a signal that both sides wanted to at least talk, rather than fight, might be enough.

The conversation lasted ninety minutes. Jaishankar did most of the talking, laying out India's position: terrorism had to stop. It was the precondition for anything else. Every attack on Indian territory

emanating from Pakistan-based groups had to be investigated and the perpetrators punished. India would not negotiate on this. It was non-negotiable. Pakistan had to control the groups operating from its territory. If Pakistan couldn't do it, India would have to do it for Pakistan.

Sadiq listened. He understood the message. It was not a threat delivered with warmth, but it was a threat. He responded carefully. Pakistan, he said, was also a victim of terrorism. The TTP, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, was conducting suicide bombings across Pakistan. Pakistan understood India's pain. Pakistan wanted peace. Pakistan wanted development, not war. But India had to understand Pakistan's security concerns too. Every time India made military moves on the border, Pakistan had to respond. It was the logic of deterrence.

They discussed the possibility of military-to-military dialogue. Both sides had hotlines between senior military commanders, but they were rarely used. The idea of making them more active, of creating mechanisms to prevent accidents and miscalculation, was discussed. It was not new. Both sides had tried this before. But each attempt had foundered on mutual suspicion or the inevitable incident that reignited tensions. This time would be no different. But the conversation itself mattered. The fact that two senior officials could sit down and talk without someone leaking it to the media, without one side using it as propaganda, suggested that there might be some adults in the room on both sides who understood that the current trajectory led nowhere good.

The Dhaka meeting leaked within hours, as such things always did. The Pakistani media reported it breathlessly. The Indian media followed. Both governments made careful statements. India said it was open to dialogue but wouldn't compromise on security. Pakistan said it wanted peace but also wanted India to recognize Pakistan as an equal. The diplomatic language was rote, predictable, and essentially meaningless. But the meeting had happened. Both sides could point to it and say they were trying. That was enough for now.

What Jaishankar understood, and what Sadiq understood, was that India-Pakistan relations had become a managed decline rather than a managed conflict. Neither side was willing or able to go to war. But neither was willing to make the concessions that would be necessary for a real peace. Kashmir would have to be dealt with somehow. The water issues would need new agreements. The terrorism had to stop. But all of these things required one side or the other to give up territory, or water, or strategic advantage. And no leader in either country could survive giving up territory to Pakistan or India respectively. Public opinion wouldn't allow it. The military wouldn't allow it. The opposition would destroy any leader who tried.

So the two countries existed in a state of permanent managed tension. They built weapons. They conducted military exercises. They made threatening statements. They refused to let trade agreements be finalized. They made official visits to each other's countries awkward. Yet they also didn't actually go to war. The 2019 crisis after the Balakot strikes had nearly started a shooting war. The 2024 crisis had gotten even closer. But both times, at the last moment, both sides had pulled back. And they would continue to pull back, because the alternative was unthinkable.

What made the 2025 conversation in Dhaka significant was simply that it happened. That two senior officials thought it was worth their time to fly to a third country and sit down. That somewhere in the Indian and Pakistani governments, people were still thinking about how to manage this relationship rather than how to destroy it. That cricket diplomacy and trade continued even as armies faced off. That 1.8 billion people lived in a state of perpetual hostility that never quite became war.

This was South Asia's defining feature. A region of rising economic power, where young people wanted jobs and education, where families wanted stability. Yet it was locked in rivalries that produced nothing but spending on weapons that could never actually be used. Both India and Pakistan would rather have spent that defense

budget on schools and hospitals and roads. But the mutual suspicion, the historical hatreds, the unresolved disputes, all made disarmament politically impossible.

Jaishankar returned to New Delhi and briefed Modi. Sadiq returned to Islamabad and briefed the military leadership. Both leaders approved of the meeting and decided that quiet diplomatic channels should remain open. It was not a breakthrough. Breakthroughs weren't possible in South Asia. But it was a signal that both sides preferred managed tension to managed conflict. And in a region where miscalculation could end civilization, that signal mattered.

The water levels in the Indus would rise and fall with the seasons. The monsoons would come. The heat would intensify. In the villages along the border, soldiers would continue to patrol. In Srinagar and Peshawar, young people would continue to die in militant attacks and counterinsurgency operations. In the cities, life would continue. Families would watch cricket together. Smugglers would move goods across the border. Musicians would perform in both countries. The subcontinent would pulse with life and conflict simultaneously.

And somewhere in the background, the nuclear arsenals would sit, waiting. Ready but never used. A guarantee that peace, however fragile, would never quite break. A guarantee that the hatred would never quite become hot war. The Dhaka handshake was not peace. It was just the acknowledgment that two nuclear powers had figured out how to live with each other, barely, day after day after day.

CHAPTER 25: BANGLADESH'S REVOLUTION

The streets of Dhaka erupted in flames in early August 2024. What had started as student protests against a government quota system for hiring in the civil service had metastasized into something far larger. The students carried signs. They chanted slogans. They demanded change. And the government, led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, responded with the only tool it had ever trusted: violence. Police fired on crowds. Soldiers were deployed. Bodies piled up. The death toll rose past one hundred, then two hundred, then higher still. The government claimed it was fighting terrorism. The people on the street knew it was fighting for its life.

Sheikh Hasina had ruled Bangladesh for most of the past fifteen years. She was the daughter of the nation's founding father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. When her father had been assassinated in 1975, a month after independence, the country had descended into chaos. Hasina had been a student in the Soviet Union at the time. She had returned to Bangladesh in the 1990s as a politician. She had been Prime Minister twice before. She was, by any measure, the dominant figure in Bangladeshi politics. The Awami League, her party, had won landslides in 2014 and 2019. She seemed untouchable.

But Bangladesh in 2024 was not the country she had ruled for the previous fifteen years. The youth had changed. The internet had changed. The memory of her government's failures and abuses was still fresh. There were stories of disappearances, of opposition figures held without trial, of newspapers shut down. There was the memory of elections that had been rigged. There was the sense that her government had become entrenched, corrupt, willing to use any method to hold onto power. And there was the unemployment. Youth unemployment in Bangladesh exceeded 20 percent. Young people with degrees were working as rickshaw drivers and street vendors. It was a generation with no future, and they knew whose fault it was.

The protests accelerated. The violence escalated. Students threw bricks at police. Police fired tear gas and bullets. The government declared internet shutdowns, trying to prevent the spread of images and information. It didn't work. The images spread anyway. Every phone had a camera. Every person was a correspondent. The Bangladeshi diaspora in London and New York and Toronto watched the videos and mobilized. The regional media picked it up. The story of students being shot in the streets of Dhaka was too big to suppress. The international media arrived. The pressure mounted.

Hasina, in her early seventies, seemed bewildered by the scale of the opposition. She had expected to weather the storm as she had weathered previous crises. She had the army. She had the security services. She had the machinery of the state. But the machinery was creaking. Soldiers refused to fire on the crowds, or fired but without conviction. Police deserted their posts. The state apparatus that had seemed so firmly in her grip began to slip away.

By August 5, 2024, it was over. Hasina fled the country on a military aircraft bound for India. She arrived in New Delhi humiliated, without a government, without a country. The Bangladesh that had been her life's work had rejected her. She had always believed she was indispensable to the nation's stability. The nation immediately proved her wrong. Within hours of her departure, the security forces that she thought were loyal to her were announcing that they were standing down. The military arranged for a caretaker government to take over. The opposition rallied. For a moment, Bangladesh hung in the balance.

What emerged from the chaos was a provisional government led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus, the Nobel Prize winning economist and founder of the Grameen Bank, a microfinance institution that had become a model for development around the world. Yunus was in his eighties, respected internationally, seen as uncorrupted by the brutal politics of the previous fifteen years. He was also a figurehead. The real power lay with the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the

BNP, and its acting chairman, Tarique Rahman, Hasina's bitter rival.

Elections were set for February 12, 2026. Everyone knew how they would turn out. The Awami League, Hasina's party, was shell-shocked and demoralized. The youth who had toppled the government wanted change. The BNP, which had been outside power for nearly two decades, was unified and energized. In the weeks before the vote, the BNP campaigned on a message of change, of national renewal, of turning away from the Hasina years and building something new.

The vote on February 12 was not close. The BNP won 212 seats in the 300-member parliament. The Awami League was reduced to a rump. Tarique Rahman, who had been living in exile in London to avoid arrest under Hasina's government, returned to Bangladesh as the de facto leader of the winning party. He did not formally become Prime Minister immediately, maintaining the caretaker government structure nominally. But everyone understood he was now the most powerful figure in Bangladesh politics.

The change in Bangladesh's foreign policy came swiftly and decisively. For the previous fifteen years, Bangladesh had been tilted heavily toward India. Hasina was an Indophile. She had sought Indian investment. Indian companies dominated the telecommunications and energy sectors. Indian culture was everywhere. Indians invested in Bangladeshi businesses. The relationship was complicated by water disputes and old resentments, but it was fundamentally aligned.

Tarique Rahman and the BNP saw India as an oppressor. The historical grievances ran deep. Partition in 1947 had divided the subcontinent, and many Bangladeshis believed that India had interfered in their affairs ever since. The BNP had made clear it would pursue a "paradigm shift" in foreign policy. Away from India. Toward China. Toward Pakistan. Toward a more balanced approach that didn't treat India as the default partner.

The signal came in the form of a defense agreement. China announced a deal to establish a drone manufacturing plant in

Bangladesh near the border with India. Drones. Weapons. Manufactured in Bangladesh, close to Indian territory. It was a statement. Bangladesh was no longer India's junior partner. Bangladesh was exploring other relationships. Bangladesh was open for business with powers that India considered rivals.

The relationship with Pakistan warmed almost overnight. Pakistan and Bangladesh had a bitter history. Bangladesh had been East Pakistan until 1971, when it had fought a brutal war of independence. Pakistan's military had conducted a genocidal campaign. Hundreds of thousands had died. The trauma had created a generation of anti-Pakistani sentiment. But decades had passed. The memory was fading, especially for young Bangladeshis who didn't have personal experience of the war. And there was geopolitics. Pakistan was not India. Pakistan was a potential counterweight to Indian dominance. Pakistan had no territorial claims on Bangladesh. Pakistan could be a useful partner.

The government began talks with Pakistan. Trade agreements were discussed. Military cooperation was proposed. Pakistan's military, which had been focused on India for the entire post-1971 period, began to see Bangladesh as a potential ally again. It was a slow-motion strategic realignment, subtle but real. Bangladesh was slipping out of India's orbit.

For India, this was a major loss. Bangladesh had been a consistent supporter of Indian positions in international forums. Bangladesh had looked to India for security. Bangladesh had valued the relationship with its giant neighbor. The Modi government had poured resources into the relationship. Indian companies had invested billions. The Bengali cultural connection had created a sense of brotherhood. And now it was slipping away.

The cause was simple: Hasina had been unpopular. She had looked to India too much. She had allowed Indian companies to dominate. She had not stood up for Bangladeshi interests. The youth wanted a government that was independent, that would stand up to

India, that would build relationships with other powers. The revolution of 2024 had been a generational rebellion against the old elite that had ruled since independence. Hasina had been part of that old elite. Yunus represented something new. The BNP represented an alternative.

What made it significant was the size of Bangladesh and its location. With 170 million people, it was larger than most countries. It straddled the Bay of Bengal. It controlled much of the Ganges Delta. Its territory was strategically located between India and Southeast Asia. For India, which had sought to dominate South Asia and position itself as the gateway to Southeast Asia, losing influence in Bangladesh was a real strategic loss.

The instability in Bangladesh in the months after Hasina's departure had been real. There had been revenge killings. Hindu minorities faced backlash. The interim government arrested opposition figures. The transition had not been peaceful or clean. But it had been decisive. The old order had been swept away. A new political elite was emerging. And that elite had different international alignments.

For China, the opportunity was obvious. A weakening of Indian influence in Bangladesh meant an opening. The drone manufacturing deal was a foot in the door. A Chinese presence in Bangladesh manufacturing weapons close to Indian territory was a strategic gain. China could use Bangladesh as a base for Belt and Road infrastructure projects. Chinese loans for highways and ports. Chinese companies building railways. Over time, China could deepen its presence in Bangladesh in ways that would make it hard for India to dislodge.

The geopolitical chess game in South Asia had shifted. India's eastern flank, which had seemed secure, was now contested. The Modi government had to think carefully about how to respond. It couldn't invade. It couldn't topple the government. It had to watch its influence disappear and try to manage the relationship as best it could. The new Bangladesh government, and its powerful military, were no longer going to be India's automatic ally.

By March 2026, when the dust had settled somewhat, the strategic reorientation of Bangladesh was undeniable. Trade with Pakistan was growing. Chinese investment was flowing in. The drone deal was moving forward. Bangladesh was becoming a point of great power competition between India and China, with Pakistan hovering in the background. A nation of 170 million people, strategically located, increasingly courted by multiple powers. It was a microcosm of the larger global competition for influence in Asia. And Bangladesh, having thrown off one dominant power, was discovering that the attention of multiple great powers could be just as constraining. The freedom was real but limited. The choices were real but constrained. Bangladesh had agency, but it remained a small power in a region where the great powers wrote the rules.

CHAPTER 26: THE TALIBAN'S EMIRATE

Kabul in February 2026 was a city of ghosts and ruins. The Taliban had ruled Afghanistan for five years now, ever since the chaotic American withdrawal in August 2021. The city still functioned, after a fashion. Markets operated. Government buildings stood. But something had died in Afghanistan when the Americans left and the Taliban returned. The memory of the women who had gone to university, the girls who had gone to school, the young people who had spent twenty years thinking the future would be different. All of that was gone.

Women were banned from universities. Girls could not attend school past sixth grade. Women could not work in most professions. They had to wear burqas in public. They had to have male guardians to travel. The Taliban called it Islamic law. The women called it a return to the Middle Ages. International organizations condemned it. Nothing changed. The Taliban said they didn't care what the West thought. They were implementing Islamic law as they understood it. That was what mattered.

Yet the brutality was not reserved for women. The Taliban, when not occupied with enforcing Islamic law, faced an enemy that was equally brutal, equally determined, equally Islamic. The TTP, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, had used Afghanistan as a base for two decades. They conducted suicide bombings across Pakistan. They killed soldiers and police and civilians. They were a franchise of the Taliban but answerable to no one. The Taliban tolerated them because they were useful, because they put pressure on Pakistan, because they were fellow jihadists. But they also made Afghanistan chaotic, made Kabul unsafe, made the country unstable even for the Taliban government.

In February 2026, Pakistan had enough. The military, under pressure from the security establishment and the government,

launched airstrikes into Afghanistan. Not small strikes. Not warning strikes. Real strikes targeting TTP bases in Nangarhar and Paktika provinces, close to the Pakistani border. The strikes killed dozens. The TTP responded by stepping up attacks in Pakistan. The cycle of attack and counterattack accelerated. For the first time since the Taliban came to power, Afghanistan was being used as a launching pad for a direct military attack by Pakistan. It was open war, or at least as close to open war as Pakistan was willing to get.

The Taliban protested weakly. They said Pakistan was violating Afghan sovereignty. They said they would target Pakistani interests in Afghanistan. But what could they do? They couldn't stop Pakistan's air force. They didn't have an air force themselves. They had inherited a broken country and a broken military. Their strength came from their ability to hold territory and fight with weapons in hand, not from aircraft and missiles. Pakistan was a modern military power with a navy and an air force and a space program. Afghanistan was a country in ruins.

The wider tragedy of Afghanistan was that no one knew quite what to do with it. The international community had poured roughly two trillion dollars into Afghanistan over twenty years. Hospitals had been built. Schools had been opened. Roads had been poured. The military and police had been trained. Women had gained opportunities. An entire generation of Afghans had grown up with the possibility of a different future. And then the Americans had left and it all collapsed within weeks.

The Taliban, even though they had fought the Americans for twenty years, were somewhat shocked by how quickly the American-backed government fell. They had expected a long campaign. Instead, they had just walked into Kabul. The Afghan military, which the Americans had trained at tremendous expense, had simply ceased to exist. Soldiers walked away. Officers surrendered. The whole apparatus of the modern military state that America had tried to build crumbled. It turned out that a military couldn't be bought. It couldn't

be imported. It had to believe in what it was fighting for. And the Afghan military didn't. They didn't believe in the government. They didn't believe in democracy. They didn't believe in the project America had started. So when the crunch came, they walked away.

The human catastrophe was immense and ongoing. Millions of Afghans had fled the country. Refugee camps stretched across Pakistan and Iran. Nearly 2.7 million Afghans were in Pakistan. Another 3.5 million were in Iran. There were smaller communities scattered across the world. These were not just refugees. These were the most educated Afghans, the ones with skills, the ones who had worked with the international community, the ones who had most benefited from the American intervention. They had the most to lose under Taliban rule and the most ability to leave. So they left. Afghanistan lost its human capital. The educated fled. The ambitious left. Those who stayed were those who couldn't leave.

Some Afghans began trickling back. The economy was ruined, but Afghans had survived ruin before. They began to rebuild, however slowly. Trade routes began to reopen. Pakistan remained the main connection to the outside world. Iran provided another connection. But Afghanistan was essentially cut off from the international economy. The money from international aid stopped. The investment stopped. The Taliban had to run the country on customs revenue from the Kabul airport and border trade. It was not enough. The country was broke.

The international isolation was near complete, with one exception. Pakistan had to maintain relations with Afghanistan because of geography and because of the tens of millions of Pashtuns who lived on both sides of the Durand Line, the border between the two countries. Iran had to maintain relations because of the refugees. But the West had essentially written Afghanistan off. Embassies remained closed. Diplomatic relationships were frozen. International aid, which had propped up the previous government, stopped flowing. The world had moved on. Afghanistan was yesterday's war.

But Afghanistan's location meant it couldn't completely escape geopolitics. Russia was interested in Afghanistan as a potential market for Central Asian resources. China was interested in Afghanistan for several reasons. One was the rare earth minerals in the country. Another was the fact that a stable Afghanistan could become part of the Belt and Road Initiative, connecting China to Central Asia and beyond. Another was the simple fact that a chaotic Afghanistan on China's doorstep was not in China's interest. So China sent diplomats to Kabul. Russia sent diplomats to Kabul. Both countries maintained contact with the Taliban, trying to figure out what kind of stable arrangement could be reached.

The Regional Contact Group, a loose collection of countries including Pakistan, Iran, Russia, China, and others, met periodically in Astana to discuss Afghanistan. The purpose was to try to coordinate policy, to try to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a launching pad for regional terrorism, to try to stabilize the country without directly intervening. The meetings usually produced bland communiques that everyone ignored. But they signaled that the international community, while not recognizing the Taliban government formally, was willing to work with it on a practical level.

The TTP problem was the most immediate threat to stability. The Pakistani airstrikes in February 2026 marked an escalation of an old problem. Pakistan had spent two decades fighting the TTP. The TTP had used Afghanistan as a base. When America was there, America had theoretically helped Pakistan contain the TTP. But America was now gone. The Taliban didn't care about Pakistan's security needs. The Taliban cared about Islamic law and survival. Containing the TTP was not their problem.

So Pakistan had to act. The airstrikes were the military's response. But airstrikes couldn't destroy the TTP permanently. They could disrupt operations. They could kill leaders. They could degrade capability. But as long as the TTP had sanctuaries in Afghanistan, as long as it had a base of operations, it would continue to conduct

attacks. Pakistan faced a choice: either tolerate the TTP attacks indefinitely, or conduct a ground invasion of Afghanistan to clear the sanctuaries. Ground invasion was not politically feasible. Pakistan's military was already overstretched. It couldn't sustain another major conflict. So it would try airstrikes, and it would live with the attacks.

The women of Afghanistan lived with their own version of that same trap. They couldn't escape. They couldn't fight back effectively. They could only endure. Schools were closed to them. Jobs were denied to them. The future was denied to them. Resistance was dangerous. Cooperation was humiliating. So they waited. They hoped that something would change. They told their stories to journalists when they could. They organized clandestine schools in some cities. They resisted in small ways. But they could not escape the Taliban's grip.

Afghanistan in 2026 was neither at war nor at peace. It was in limbo. The Taliban controlled the country but didn't have the resources or the capability to develop it. The international community had abandoned it but couldn't afford to have it destabilize the region. Afghans wanted to rebuild but didn't have the resources or security to do it. The country was trapped between its past and its future, unable to move effectively in either direction. The Taliban ruled but didn't govern. The country existed but didn't function. It was a tragedy playing out in slow motion, a whole nation suspended in a kind of permanent pause, waiting for something to change while knowing that nothing would.

CHAPTER 27: PAKISTAN ON THE BRINK

The checkpoints on the road from Islamabad to Rawalpindi were more numerous than usual in early 2026. The soldiers manning them were alert, tense, watching for anything unusual. Imran Khan, the former Prime Minister and cricket star, was in prison. He had been arrested in August 2023 on charges related to weapons violations and corruption. He remained in custody, his political party banned, his movement suppressed. Yet the possibility of unrest remained. The soldiers knew it. The government knew it. Everyone in Pakistan knew it.

Pakistan in 2026 was a state under pressure from multiple directions simultaneously. The economy was in crisis. The IMF had bailed Pakistan out repeatedly. The most recent agreement, signed in 2023, had come with strict conditions. Taxes had to increase. Subsidies had to be cut. The currency had to be allowed to float. All of this meant inflation and pain for ordinary Pakistanis. The rupee had fallen from 190 to the dollar in 2023 to 275 to the dollar by early 2026. Wages hadn't kept up. Everyone was poorer. The middle class was shrinking. The poor were getting poorer.

The energy crisis was chronic and debilitating. Pakistan's power plants were aging. Investment in new capacity had been inadequate. Load shedding, rolling blackouts, had become a way of life. Factories closed down for hours every day. Hospitals had to run on generators. Schools shut down in the heat when electricity couldn't power the fans and lights. The planned electricity cuts could last twelve hours or more. The entire country operated on a schedule of blackouts. This was not rare or temporary. This was normal.

The military had failed to either manage or defeat the TTP. The Pakistani military, which had once seemed invincible, had been humbled by American drones, had lost thousands of soldiers to insurgencies, had failed to stabilize the areas it controlled. The TTP

had used the Afghan border as a sanctuary. The Pakistani airstrikes in February 2026 showed frustration more than progress. The military knew it couldn't solve the TTP problem militarily. It could only manage it. That meant accepting a certain level of suicide bombings, a certain level of loss. The military had gotten used to managing catastrophe rather than preventing it.

The political situation was a mess of coalitions and compromises and mutual recriminations. The government was led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and a coalition called the PDM, the Pakistan Democratic Movement, an assemblage of smaller parties united mainly by opposition to Imran Khan. Sharif was a businessman-turned-politician, competent in some ways, lacking the charisma or the vision to inspire confidence. The coalition was fractious. Every party wanted something. Nothing was agreed upon. Governance in Pakistan meant constant negotiation and compromise. It meant that nothing moved quickly. Nothing moved decisively. Everything moved in fits and starts, with constant backpedaling and side deals.

The military, of course, remained the true power. It always had been. The military had staged multiple coups in Pakistani history. The military had run the country directly for chunks of years. The military had its own economy, its own real estate empire, its own business interests. The military answered to no one. Officers retired with wealth accumulated from business dealings that would have been investigated in any normal country. The military was essentially a state within the state. Civilians ruled when the military allowed it. The military could remove civilians whenever it chose.

Imran Khan had challenged this arrangement. He had promised a new kind of politics, a break with the old elite and the corrupt networks that had ruled Pakistan for decades. He had been elected in 2018 with genuine enthusiasm from young voters and the poor. He had promised change. What he had delivered was inconsistent governance, poor economic planning, and a style that alienated the military. By 2022, the military had decided he had to go. They had

pushed him out through a combination of pressure on coalition partners and street protests. Khan had refused to go quietly. He had remained a political figure, a rallying point for opposition to the military and the old elite.

The arrest in 2023 had been meant to settle matters once and for all. Instead, it had turned Khan into a symbol. His supporters, primarily young people and the urban poor, continued to organize. Protests were regular. The government had to maintain a heavy security presence. The military was worried that Khan's movement could threaten stability. But banning him had only made him more powerful as a symbol.

The demographic pressures were immense and getting worse. Pakistan's population was projected to reach 250 million by 2030. It was one of the highest population growth rates in South Asia. Most of the population was young. The youth unemployment rate exceeded 20 percent. Millions of young Pakistanis had no prospects, no jobs, no future. They couldn't all go abroad. Even the ones who wanted to escape couldn't all manage it. So they remained in a country with inadequate jobs, inadequate education, inadequate services. It was a recipe for radicalization. It was a recipe for instability.

The radicalization was evident everywhere. Religious conservatism was strengthening, not weakening. Hard-line Islamic groups had a presence in major cities. They ran schools. They recruited from the poor and unemployed. They offered meaning, purpose, community. The government was secular or tried to be, but it couldn't effectively counter the appeal of Islamic groups that offered something more than just economic survival. They offered spiritual purpose. They offered community. They offered an explanation for Pakistan's problems that blamed the West and blamed India and blamed secular elites.

The relationship with the United States was complicated and strained. Pakistan had been an American ally for the entirety of its existence. Pakistan had hosted American military bases. Pakistan had

cooperated with American intelligence agencies. Yet Pakistan also maintained its relationship with China and Russia. Pakistan had to maintain multiple relationships because it couldn't survive on American support alone. The American military aid had been reduced in 2019 by the Trump administration over concerns about Pakistan's cooperation with the Afghan Taliban. The aid had been partially restored under Biden, but the relationship remained cool. Pakistan felt that America had abandoned it, particularly after the Afghan withdrawal.

China, however, was a different story. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the CPEC, had become the centerpiece of Pakistani development strategy. China was investing tens of billions of dollars in Pakistan. Highways were being built from China through the Karakoram mountains and down to the Pakistani coast. Ports were being developed. Power plants were being constructed. This was Belt and Road infrastructure, but it was also real investment and real opportunity for Pakistan. If it worked, if the projects could be completed, if Pakistan could become a transit hub between China and the Arabian Sea, the economic benefits could be enormous.

But the CPEC also came with its own problems. The debt was mounting. Pakistan was obligated to repay the Chinese loans. The projects were often poorly designed and managed. The benefits were not reaching ordinary Pakistanis. The security situation along the CPEC routes was dire. Militants were targeting the roads and the projects. The Baloch Liberation Army and other groups were conducting attacks on the infrastructure. Chinese engineers were being targeted. The corridor was becoming a target rather than a development success.

The military's relationship with China was deepening as the relationship with America became more distant. Defense purchases from China had increased. The JF-17 fighter, a joint Chinese-Pakistani aircraft, was becoming a centerpiece of the Pakistani air force. Training in China was becoming more common. Joint military

exercises were increasing. Pakistan was becoming more aligned with China, even as it tried to maintain the American relationship. The military understood that in the long term, China was going to be more important to Pakistan than the United States. Geography determined this. China was Pakistan's western neighbor. America was across the world.

By 2026, Pakistan was a state under pressure, managing multiple crises simultaneously, unable to resolve any of them completely, doing the minimum necessary to maintain stability. The democracy was real in the sense that elections were held and people could vote. But the military maintained ultimate control. Corruption was endemic. The economy was stagnating. The energy crisis persisted. The TTP continued its attacks. The social pressures were mounting. Young people had no hope. The educated were leaving the country. Brain drain was a constant problem.

Yet Pakistan endured. It always had. It had survived military coups, wars with India, financial crises, terrorism, political violence. Pakistan was not easy to kill. It had institutional resilience, however corrupt those institutions might be. It had a strong military, however limited its success against insurgencies. It had a population that was adaptable, resilient, resourceful. Pakistanis had a dark humor about their country's problems. They could joke about the blackouts and the inflation and the corruption. That humor was sometimes the only thing that kept them sane.

The handshake in Dhaka had given Pakistan reason to think that perhaps the military rivalries with India could be managed. But that was only one problem. Pakistan had many problems, and managing them all was beyond the capacity of any government or military. Pakistan was not about to collapse. But it was not about to soar either. It was going to muddle through, managing crisis after crisis, trying to prevent complete catastrophe, hoping that someday the economy would improve and the energy crisis would be solved and the TTP would be defeated. Hope was about all that remained.

CHAPTER 28: SRI LANKA: AFTER THE COLLAPSE

The line wrapped around the bank in Colombo in July 2022. Thousands of people, desperate, angry, scared. They came with suitcases to withdraw their savings. The suitcases filled up in minutes. The money was worthless. The exchange rate was collapsing. What had been worth thousands last month was worth hundreds this month. The banks had limits on withdrawals. You could get only a small amount per day. People camped outside overnight to get to the front of the line. The system was breaking down in real time.

Sri Lanka had defaulted on its debt. It was the first time in the nation's history. The government announced it could not pay its obligations. The international markets responded with shock. Here was a country that had seemed stable, that had tourism, that had a diversified economy, that was supposed to be "the jewel of South Asia." And it had collapsed. The collapse had come with shocking speed. A few years of drought, a few years of bad policy, a sudden shock to tourism from the COVID pandemic, and the whole structure had fallen apart.

The government blamed the pandemic. But it was deeper than that. The previous government, led by President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, had pursued a populist agenda of tax cuts. The same government had also subsidized fuel heavily. These two policies together were devastating to the fiscal balance. When the pandemic hit and tourism stopped and foreign exchange reserves drained away, the government couldn't pay for the fuel imports. The vehicles that ran on fuel. The buses. The tuktuk taxis. The trucks that carried goods. The economy needed fuel. But the money was gone.

The currency collapsed. The inflation was catastrophic. Prices doubled within months. Rice, which was a staple, became expensive. People couldn't afford food. Hospitals ran out of medicines. The country was in the grip of the kind of inflation that destroys societies.

The government's approval rating fell below 10 percent. The President tried to hold on, but the pressure was too great. In July 2022, Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled the country, boarding a military aircraft and flying to the Maldives and then to Singapore. The Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, took over.

The years that followed were years of slow, painful recovery. The IMF was involved. Debt restructuring began. Foreign creditors were negotiated with. China, which had lent billions for infrastructure projects, had to decide whether to refinance or take losses. Japan and India, which had also lent money, had to work out terms with the IMF and with each other. It was complicated geopolitical finance, with the interests of creditor nations pulling in different directions. China wanted refinancing and long-term repayment. The IMF pushed for hard restructuring and privatization. India and Japan wanted terms that supported stability in Sri Lanka.

By 2026, Sri Lanka had clawed its way back from the brink. The World Bank was projecting 4.6 percent growth in 2025 and 3.3 percent in 2026. It wasn't the boom years, but it was growth. The country was recovering. The currency had stabilized. Inflation was coming down. Tourism had returned. The ports that had been empty of ships were busy again. The government had managed not to fall apart, which was an achievement in itself. Many countries facing default fell into political chaos. Sri Lanka had remained stable, if not exactly peaceful.

Yet poverty remained high. The Poverty rate was higher in 2026 than it had been in 2019, before the collapse. Two years of devastating inflation had wiped out savings. Two years of unemployment had destroyed careers. People had lost everything. The recovery meant that the country was no longer in freefall. It did not mean that people had recovered their losses. Many families had lost homes. Many had lost businesses. The psychological damage was permanent. The memory of how quickly society could unravel, how the government could fail, how the currency could become worthless,

that memory stayed with people.

The political situation had stabilized around Wickremesinghe. He was not popular, but he was competent. He understood what had to be done. He worked with the IMF. He negotiated with creditors. He made difficult decisions about subsidies and spending. He was politically vulnerable because his party had been the party in power when the defaults happened, but he had become the necessary person to manage the recovery. Elections were held, and a new President, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, had been elected in September 2024. Dissanayake was from a leftist party and had campaigned on fighting corruption and inequality. Yet the fundamental policies of IMF cooperation and debt restructuring had to continue. Dissanayake understood this. He couldn't change course dramatically without risking another collapse.

The geopolitical dimensions of Sri Lanka's recovery were complex. The Chinese had lent billions for infrastructure that didn't generate the revenue that had been promised. The Hambantota Port, on the southern coast, had been built with Chinese money but couldn't generate enough profit to service the debt. Chinese creditors had ended up taking control of the port as partial repayment. It was a symbol of how China's Belt and Road Initiative could become a source of dependency. For Sri Lanka, it meant that China had a controlling interest in one of the nation's most important pieces of infrastructure.

India was deeply concerned about this. India saw Sri Lanka as being in its sphere of influence, or at least as a neighbor where it should have significant influence. China controlling a major port in Sri Lanka was a strategic loss for India. It meant Chinese naval vessels could potentially use the port. It meant Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean. It meant that one of India's key strategic interests, the Indian Ocean, was becoming more contested.

The creditor negotiations had also revealed tensions between the different powers. The IMF wanted debt restructuring and privatization. China wanted refinancing and long repayment terms.

India and Japan wanted terms that would support stability. The result was a complex arrangement where some of the debt was restructured, some was refinanced, some was taken as partial ownership of assets. It was messy and unsatisfying for everyone, but it prevented total collapse. That was the best that could be done in a world of multiple competing creditor interests.

Cyclone Ditwah in January 2026 had threatened to derail the recovery. The cyclone had been severe, bringing heavy rains and wind. But the damage had been less than feared. The reconstruction needs were manageable. The government had the capacity to respond without another default. It was a sign that Sri Lanka had regained some resilience. It was no longer on the edge of total collapse. It was recovering, slowly, painfully, but genuinely.

Tourism had returned as the main driver of growth. Tourists came from India, from China, from Europe. They came for the beaches, the temples, the mountains. They came for the tea plantations. They brought foreign currency. The hotels and airlines and restaurants depended on tourism. It was vulnerable. Another pandemic or another global recession could devastate it. But for now, tourists were coming and spending money, and that was allowing the economy to grow.

The social impact of the crisis was ongoing. Mental health problems increased. Suicide rates rose during the crisis. Families had been torn apart. Many young people had emigrated, taking their skills and education elsewhere. The diaspora was significant and permanent. The brain drain was real. The country had lost human capital that it would not recover. But the ones who remained were rebuilding. They were patient but also determined. They wanted their country to succeed, not for glory or prestige, but simply so that their families could have stable lives.

Sri Lanka's recovery was genuinely remarkable in some ways. A country that had defaulted on its debt, that had experienced catastrophic inflation, that had faced the prospect of total systemic

failure, had clawed its way back to growth. The government hadn't fallen. The military hadn't staged a coup. The country hadn't descended into civil war or breakdown. It had managed the crisis, however imperfectly. It had negotiated with creditors. It had accepted IMF conditions. It had stabilized the currency. It had brought inflation down. It had resumed growth. It was not an inspiring story or a triumph. But it was a survival story. And in South Asia, where governments often failed or fell into instability, survival itself was sometimes an achievement.

But the geopolitical message was clear: Sri Lanka remained vulnerable. Its economy was still small. Its debt levels were still high. Its exposure to global shocks remained severe. And its strategic location in the Indian Ocean meant it would continue to be contested. China would try to deepen its influence. India would try to maintain its. The United States would try to play a role. Sri Lanka would continue to exist in this space where great powers competed, trying to maintain independence while accepting dependence. It was the reality of being a small, strategically located nation in a region of great power competition.

CHAPTER 29: THE INDIAN OCEAN: EVERYONE'S BACKYARD

The USS George Washington cut through the waters of the Indian Ocean in February 2026, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier displacing nearly a hundred thousand tons, carrying eighty aircraft, with five thousand sailors and marines aboard. The ship represented the physical manifestation of American power in the region. It was a symbol that could not be ignored. The carrier had left the Persian Gulf after conducting operations against maritime threats in the Red Sea. Now it was transiting toward Southeast Asia, passing through the waters between India and Africa, the heart of the Indian Ocean where more than half the world's maritime trade moved.

The Indian Ocean was the most contested waterway on Earth. It carried eighty percent of the world's oil trade. The choke points were critical. The Strait of Malacca, between Malaysia and Indonesia, was a narrow passage where the oil tankers funneled through in steady convoys. The Strait of Hormuz, controlling access from the Persian Gulf, was even more critical. Sixty percent of the world's liquid natural gas passed through it. The Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean east of there were the arteries of global commerce. If those waterways were disrupted, the global economy would convulse.

This was why the Indian Ocean had become the center of great power competition. The United States had assumed it was the dominant power in the region for decades. American carrier groups roamed freely. American naval bases in Diego Garcia, in Qatar, in Bahrain, all gave the US the ability to project power. The US Navy was larger than the next ten navies combined. It operated across all the world's oceans. But the Indian Ocean was no longer an American lake.

China had been systematically building a presence in the region over the past twenty years. The "string of pearls" strategy was never

officially named by the Chinese government, but the concept was widely understood. China wanted naval bases and port facilities around the Indian Ocean, each one a "pearl" on a string. The first and most significant was in Djibouti, at the mouth of the Red Sea. China had built a naval base there, its first overseas military base. It was a massive facility. Chinese submarines and warships operated out of it. Chinese marines were stationed there. It was a permanent Chinese military presence in one of the world's most strategic locations.

From Djibouti, the string of pearls extended around the ocean. There was Gwadar Port in Pakistan, developed with Chinese investment, where Chinese military vessels could dock. There was the proposed port facility in Sri Lanka. There were agreements with Oman, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique. Each one represented an opportunity for China to extend its military reach into the Indian Ocean. Each one represented a challenge to the established American dominance.

India's response had been to build its own network of relationships and capabilities. India had invested heavily in naval development. New aircraft carriers were being built in Indian shipyards. New submarines were in production. The Indian Navy's size was growing. Indian naval bases were being expanded. India had invested in surveillance networks across the Indian Ocean. Underwater cables collected signals. Satellites monitored shipping. Radar stations on island bases tracked every vessel. India was building a comprehensive picture of what moved through its ocean.

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands were crucial to this strategy. These Indian territories sat at the eastern entrance to the Indian Ocean, the chokepoint where shipping had to pass into Southeast Asian waters. The islands were also where many of the surveillance facilities were located. If India could control the flow of information about what moved through those waters, India would have leverage. Not military leverage necessarily, but strategic leverage. India could monitor. India could warn. India could coordinate with other navies.

India would be the keeper of the ocean's secrets.

The intelligence implications were staggering. Every ship, every submarine, every aircraft movement in the Indian Ocean could be monitored. The Americans knew this. The Chinese knew this. India knew this. The question was how that information would be used. In peacetime, it was used to ensure freedom of navigation, to prevent piracy, to maintain the rules-based order. In conflict, it could be weaponized. A nation that could track every enemy ship, every enemy submarine, every enemy aircraft, had a tremendous advantage. Control of the Indian Ocean in any hypothetical future conflict would depend significantly on the ability to see and understand the battlefield. India wanted that capability.

The competitive dimension extended beyond military power. American, Chinese, Japanese, and Indian naval vessels conducted "freedom of navigation" operations in the region. The US would sail ships close to Chinese island bases in the South China Sea, asserting the right to free passage. China would harass American ships, coming close, threatening collision. Japan conducted operations to ensure freedom of navigation. India conducted operations to ensure that Indian waters remained under Indian control while maintaining international passage rights in international waters.

The Quad, discussed in Chapter 23, was the diplomatic expression of this competition. The Quad brought together the US, Japan, Australia, and India in a loose alliance ostensibly aimed at ensuring free and open Indo-Pacific, a euphemism for keeping China contained. Quad exercises in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea grew larger and more sophisticated. The message was clear: the established powers wanted to maintain the existing rules. China wanted to change them.

The smaller nations of the Indian Ocean region were courted by all sides. The Maldives, a string of atolls in the middle of the Indian Ocean, was sought by all the great powers. Its location was strategic. Its government was always at the edge of bankruptcy and desperately

needed foreign aid. China had invested heavily in the Maldives, building infrastructure, making loans. India considered the Maldives part of its sphere of influence and was trying to maintain influence. The United States had a small presence. The Maldives could play the great powers against each other to extract maximum aid, but it remained vulnerable to pressure from any of them. A change in the Indian government's relations with the Maldives could be devastating to the Maldivian economy.

Seychelles, Mauritius, other island nations of the Indian Ocean, all faced similar pressures. They were small nations with small economies dependent on tourism and fishing. They were valuable for their location and their exclusive economic zones, which extended hundreds of kilometers into the ocean. A nation that could secure friendly relationships with these islands could monitor the ocean's traffic, could coordinate naval operations, could project power.

The Indian Ocean was becoming like the Atlantic had been during the Cold War. It was a space where great powers competed for influence, where military capabilities were displayed, where small nations were courted and pressured. But there was one key difference. The Indian Ocean was far more economically vital. The world's oil and natural gas flowed through it. The world's shipping moved through it. Disrupting the Indian Ocean would disrupt the entire global economy far more severely than disruption of the Atlantic ever could.

The climate change dimension added another layer of complexity. Rising sea levels threatened island nations. Cyclones seemed to be getting stronger. Droughts in the Horn of Africa were driving conflict. These environmental pressures were creating refugee flows and instability that the great powers had to manage. India would be affected by climate change in multiple ways. Rising sea levels threatened coastal cities. Monsoon patterns were changing, affecting agriculture. But so would China, would the United States, would the entire world. The Indian Ocean would be a space where these climate pressures manifested and where the consequences would

be managed, or mismanaged.

The balance of power in the Indian Ocean in 2026 was in flux. The Americans retained significant military advantages. The carriers remained the most powerful naval platforms. The submarines were technologically superior. The command and control systems were more sophisticated. Yet the Americans were stretched. The Navy was committed to the Pacific, to the Mediterranean, to the Persian Gulf, to the Atlantic. It couldn't be everywhere. The Indian Ocean was one of several regions where the US maintained a presence.

China was rapidly building capability. The bases were being fortified. The ships were being modernized. The Navy was growing. The submarines were becoming more capable. China could not yet match the US in the Indian Ocean, but it was creating the capability to contest American dominance. The trajectory was clear. Within a decade or two, China would have a capable naval force in the Indian Ocean that could impose real costs on American operations.

India was building up its own capability as a kind of hedge. India didn't want to be dependent on the US or on China. India wanted to have sufficient naval capability that it could defend its own interests and enforce its claims in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy was not yet a match for either the US or China, but it was rapidly improving.

The smaller nations were trying to navigate this great power competition. They wanted access to the markets and the aid that all the powers offered. They wanted to maintain independence while accepting dependence. They wanted to benefit from the great power competition without being crushed by it. Some were managing better than others. Some were being drawn too far into dependence on one power. Most were trying to hedge and maintain relationships with multiple powers.

The possibility of conflict in the Indian Ocean, while not imminent, was real. A dispute over navigation rights, a clash between Chinese and American vessels, an accident involving Indian and

Pakistani navies, any of these could escalate. The naval forces operated closely to each other. Miscalculation was possible. And once violence started, the dynamics could spiral out of control.

Yet the constraints on conflict were also real. The commercial interests in maintaining peaceful trade routes were enormous. No nation could afford disruption of the Indian Ocean's commerce. The consequences would be global. The oil would stop flowing. The goods would stop shipping. Prices would explode. Economies would contract. War would be ruinously expensive for everyone. The same nuclear constraints that kept India and Pakistan from going to full-scale war applied here. The costs would be unaffordable.

So the Indian Ocean in 2026 was a space of competition rather than conflict. Naval maneuvers, base development, technological advancement, diplomatic positioning, none of it was leading to shooting. But the military capabilities were being built. The forces were being positioned. The strategies were being developed. The assumption was that this could change. That competition could become conflict. That the peaceful Indian Ocean could become a battleground. This was the underlying reality. The great powers had turned the Indian Ocean into a stage for their competition. They would keep it peaceful only as long as it served their interests. If it didn't, if someone decided that the potential gains from war exceeded the costs, then the Indian Ocean would become a war zone. And the consequences would ripple around the world. The ocean that carried eighty percent of the world's oil trade would become the place where the future of global power was decided. This was why the Indian Ocean mattered. This was why everyone's eyes were on it. This was the ocean that would define the century.

PART V

THE GLOBAL SOUTH RISES

CHAPTER 30: BRICS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

The conference hall in Kazan was sweltering in late October 2024. Air conditioning struggled against the body heat of delegates from two dozen nations, the weight of their collective economic power hanging thick in the air like humidity. Vladimir Putin sat at the head of the horseshoe table, his posture unchanged for four hours. To his left, India's foreign minister kept checking her watch. To his right, Brazil's trade negotiator scribbled notes with the intensity of a man writing a ransom note. Around the table, fifty leaders and senior officials had gathered to expand BRICS, the bloc that had gone from punchline to powerbroker in fifteen years.

Most Western analysts had missed it. The transformation had happened in plain sight.

BRICS began as a marketing concept. Jim O'Neill, a Goldman Sachs economist, coined the term in 2001 to describe a new category of emerging markets: Brazil, Russia, India, China. It was descriptive, not prescriptive. A way to signal that these countries were growing fast, attracting investment, reshaping global trade flows. The acronym stuck because it was catchy and because the underlying thesis was sound: these nations would become richer and more powerful, and when they did, they might start thinking collectively.

For over a decade, nothing happened. BRICS existed as an idea more than an institution. The founding members held summits starting in 2009, but the results were anemic. They had little in common except rapid growth. China and Russia were rivals in Central Asia. Brazil and China competed in agricultural markets. India and China had a contested border. Russia and Brazil barely traded. The bloc was what academics called a "coalition of convenience," held together by a simple shared interest: constraining Western dominance in global governance.

Then something shifted.

The shift had two drivers. First, Western hubris. After the 2008 financial crisis, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank were slow to grant developing nations greater voice. The United States controlled the IMF through its voting share; Europe controlled the World Bank's presidency. The IMF's governance structure hadn't meaningfully changed since 1945. Developing nations represented seventy percent of global GDP growth in the 2010s but still held less than forty percent of IMF votes. The message was clear: you may be rich, but we still make the rules.

Second, China's Belt and Road Initiative demonstrated that an alternative infrastructure financing model was possible. By 2015, the New Development Bank, BRICS's answer to the World Bank, was operational. It lent without the strings. No democracy requirements, no anti-corruption mandates, no environmental impact assessments. You wanted a dam? BRICS would finance it. You wanted a port? A highway? A coal plant? Money would appear, quickly, with minimal bureaucracy. Western banks wrung their hands; developing nations lined up.

By 2024, the model had proved wildly successful. The bloc's founding members controlled roughly thirty percent of global GDP and represented three billion people. Then came the expansion.

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates joined in 2024. The significance lay not in the individual additions but in the pattern they revealed. Saudi Arabia gave BRICS a foothold in the world's most strategically important oil-producing region, right next door to the Strait of Hormuz. Egypt gave access to the Suez Canal, one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints. Ethiopia was Africa's population center and industrial hub. The UAE was the nexus of Middle Eastern finance and logistics.

Kazan was meant to consolidate this expansion and chart the bloc's future. And on the morning of October 23rd, Putin gaveled the summit open with a simple statement: "We are not building a replica of the West. We are building something new."

The Western press treated this as chest-thumping rhetoric. It was, but it was also true.

The expansion reflected a broader reality: the Western-dominated international system was fracturing. The fracture was not dramatic. There were no tanks rolling. No dramatic confrontations. Instead, a slow, grinding shift away from institutions that had governed global affairs since 1945. The shift was strongest in the Global South, which had grown wealthy enough to resist patronization but remained excluded from meaningful decision-making in the institutions that governed global commerce and security.

India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi had put it plainly six months earlier: the Global South no longer wanted to be managed; it wanted to be consulted. BRICS was the mechanism for consultation without Western gatekeepers.

The bloc's scale was now undeniable. BRICS+ members represented forty-five percent of world population and thirty-five percent of global GDP. Even accounting for the fact that per capita income remained lower than the West, the sheer mass was reshaping global politics. When India or Brazil or Indonesia moved, it rippled through commodity markets, energy flows, technology chains. The West could no longer ignore these nations; they had become too large to ignore.

At Kazan, the critical expansion was less about adding members than about operationalizing the BRICS+ model. The original BRICS had been five countries attempting to function as a bloc. BRICS+ was more ambitious: a network of partners that could coordinate on specific issues without requiring unanimous agreement. It was less a club than an ecosystem.

The New Development Bank had become the physical manifestation of this shift. Founded in 2014, it had approved over one hundred billion dollars in loans by 2024. Unlike the World Bank, it had no voice-weighted voting system. Unlike the IMF, it had no

conditionality. A project either made economic sense or it didn't. The institution deployed capital at the speed of the Chinese state and with the governance structure of a non-aligned state development bank. It was not corrupt, precisely, but it was not bound by the anti-corruption frameworks that tied up Western lending for months or years.

The BRICS Currency Initiative was another matter entirely.

In Kazan, the governors of the central banks presented a pilot program that had been quietly developed over the previous three years. The BRICS Unit, they announced, would launch at year-end. The unit was a synthetic currency, backed forty percent by gold held in BRICS+ central banks and sixty percent by a basket of BRICS currencies: the Chinese yuan, the Indian rupee, the Brazilian real, the Russian ruble, the South African rand.

The move was not a challenge to the dollar's hegemony, not yet. The unit would begin with limited use in settlements between BRICS nations, primarily in commodity and energy trades. But the direction was unmistakable. For the first time in centuries, there was a credible alternative to dollar-denominated settlement of international transactions.

Simultaneously, BRICS announced a new payments system called BRICS Pay. It was designed to process intra-bloc transactions without reference to the SWIFT system, the global financial messaging network that the United States could weaponize. SWIFT had been crucial to American power; it allowed Washington to cut nations like Russia and Iran out of global finance with surgical precision. BRICS Pay would operate on blockchain-like principles, creating a parallel payments infrastructure.

In actual terms, BRICS Pay reduced dollar usage in intra-bloc trade from near-universal to roughly thirty percent. Eighty-five to ninety percent of BRICS+ internal commerce was now conducted in local currencies or the BRICS Unit. It was a revolution in global finance, happening quietly, with technical discussions about

settlement procedures instead of dramatic proclamations.

The Western press largely ignored it. The financial press took note but treated it as a curiosity, a symbolic gesture that wouldn't alter the structural role of the dollar. The assumption was that the dollar's dominance rested on hard fundamentals: the size of the US economy, the depth of US capital markets, the liquidity of US Treasury bonds. No rival currency could match these advantages. The euro had tried; it remained limited to Europe and the Middle East. The yuan was strong, but China imposed capital controls that made it unsuitable as a universal store of value. The ruble was too small. The rupee was too volatile. No single currency could replace the dollar.

But that analysis missed the point of what BRICS was doing. They weren't trying to replace the dollar with a single rival. They were building a parallel system for settlements among themselves, reducing their need for dollars, eroding the network effects that gave the dollar its value. The strategy was not knockout blow; it was a slow extraction from dollar dependence.

At Kazan, the political implications were equally significant, though they received even less attention in the West. Here were five nations with radically different political systems, security interests, and values finding common cause. South Africa's ANC, a liberation movement turned government, had interests aligned with Russia and China on anti-imperialism. Brazil's left-leaning government under Luiz Inácio Lula, who had just returned to the presidency in 2023, wanted commodity prices to remain high and Western nations to reduce protectionism. India's Hindu nationalist government under Modi wanted strategic autonomy from Washington and a higher position in global governance. China's Communist Party wanted recognition of its rise and constraints on US hegemony. Russia, isolated by Western sanctions, wanted an alternative network of economic and political partnerships.

These nations disagreed on nearly everything domestically. China's Xi Jinping was an authoritarian maximalist. India's Modi was a

Hindu nationalist with democratic constraints. Brazil's Lula was a democratic socialist. South Africa's government was a coalition of the ANC and smaller parties. Russia was a personalist regime with the trappings of democracy. Yet on the global stage, they found alignment.

The alignment was not ideological. It was tactical. All five benefited from the existing international order's weaknesses, from the fact that the Security Council was paralyzed, from the fact that the IMF and World Bank remained controlled by institutions that predated their rise, from the fact that the West treated them as rule-takers rather than rule-makers.

BRICS was the vehicle for rule-making.

The challenge to Western-dominated institutions was the core of the matter. The BRICS Five wanted permanent representation on an expanded UN Security Council. They wanted voting reform at the IMF that reflected current economic realities. They wanted authority over global trade rules that weren't written by the United States and its allies. They wanted climate finance that wasn't conditioned on policy changes in their own governments. The New Development Bank was a direct answer to the World Bank's lending with strings attached.

What concerned Western strategists, though they were slow to articulate it publicly, was that BRICS had discovered something powerful: unity not through ideology but through interest. It was the kind of coalition that could persist precisely because it didn't require alignment on questions of internal governance or values. It only required agreement on challenging the Western-dominated status quo.

By the end of Kazan, the expansion had been formalized. Nineteen nations had formal applications to join. The bloc had gone from five to nine full members to an ecosystem of dozens of willing participants. The New Development Bank had committed to doubling its lending capacity over five years. The BRICS Unit was set for launch. BRICS Pay was rolling out. A new investment bank, the New

Investment Bank for Development, was under discussion.

More important than any of these institutional developments was the simple fact that a quarter of humanity had now organized itself into a parallel architecture. The Western institutions still existed. The IMF still controlled rescue funds. The World Bank still financed development. But they no longer had a monopoly on those functions. Alternatives existed. Alternatives that were growing faster, lending more freely, with less bureaucracy and less conditionality.

This was the new world order that Putin had referenced. Not a replacement for the old one, not yet. But a parallel system growing in the spaces where the old system had failed to adapt.

For Western policymakers, the implications were slow to sink in. The assumption that had governed international relations for three-quarters of a century, the assumption that the institutions erected after World War II were permanent features of global governance, was quietly evaporating. The question was no longer whether alternatives would emerge. They had. The question was whether the West would adapt or whether it would wake up one day to find the global system it had built had quietly become irrelevant to those it had tried to govern.

The answer was still being written. But Kazan had added a chapter, one that assumed Western decline was not a coming threat but an ongoing reality that required navigation.

CHAPTER 31: THE DOLLAR'S CHALLENGERS

Sergei Glazyev sat in his office at the Russian Federation's Institute of Economic Policy in Moscow, staring at a spreadsheet that would have seemed incomprehensible five years earlier. The numbers showed trade flows between India and Russia. The currency composition startled him still, even after months of reviewing the data: rupees for half the transaction, rubles for the other half. Not a dollar anywhere.

In 2019, ninety percent of Russian-Indian bilateral trade had been settled in dollars. By October 2024, that figure had inverted. The transformation was not inevitable. It was the result of a quiet, deliberate campaign to unwind dollar dominance in international commerce. The tools were obscure: currency swaps, real-time gross settlement systems, bilateral trade agreements denominated in local currencies. The purpose was explicit: reduce vulnerability to Western sanctions and accelerate the multipolar transition.

Glazyev was one of the architects. He had pushed for this shift years before it became fashionable in Chinese economic circles or Brazilian development ministries. The logic was simple: if you need dollars to trade internationally, you are hostage to the dollar system. If you can trade in your own currencies, you are free.

The de-dollarization movement had accelerated after 2022, when Western nations froze Russian central bank reserves and cut Russian banks from SWIFT. The shock was profound but clarifying. Russia had $600 billion in foreign exchange reserves; half of them were locked. The message was unavoidable: holding dollars was holding a liability to a hostile power. The response was to reduce dollar exposure.

But Russia alone could not sustain an alternative system. Russia's GDP was smaller than Texas. Russia could not be a hub of global commerce; it lacked the economic mass. What Russia could do was pioneer the mechanism. Currency swaps with China, India, Iran,

Turkey, Central Asian republics. Bilateral agreements to settle in rubles and local currencies. An intellectual infrastructure for conducting commerce without dollars.

Then China got serious.

By 2024, China had displaced the United States as the world's leading trading nation. Chinese commerce touched every corner of the globe. More goods, more services, more capital flowed through Chinese networks than through American ones. But nearly all of it was still settled in dollars. A Chinese exporter shipped goods to Mexico for a dollar price. A Chinese investor put money into an African port in dollars. A Chinese bank financed a European acquisition with dollar-denominated loans.

It was a peculiarity of post-war capitalism: the dollar was the default. Not because of Chinese preference but because of habit and network effects. Dollar liquidity was global. You could exchange dollars for any currency at any time. Try that with the yuan and you hit capital controls. Try that with the rupee and you faced volatility. The dollar's dominance rested on its liquidity, which rested on its dominance. It was a virtuous circle from the perspective of American finance; a cage for everyone else.

Starting in 2023, China began to actively challenge this. The government directed state-owned enterprises to settle trade in yuan. It offered incentives: slightly better exchange rates, faster processing, lower transaction costs. It developed technology infrastructure: real-time gross settlement systems, blockchain-based clearing mechanisms, digital wallet systems that made yuan payments as easy as dollar payments.

By mid-2024, the shift was visible. China-Brazil bilateral trade, worth over $150 billion annually, increasingly flowed in yuan and real. China-ASEAN trade was heavy in yuan. China's imports from the Middle East, from Africa, from Latin America were increasingly settled in renminbi. Not exclusively, not yet, but in proportions that would

have been impossible five years earlier.

The BRICS Unit represented an escalation. The unit was announced in Kazan with gold backing and a basket of currencies, but the real significance lay in its architecture. The unit created a store of value that was not dollar denominated. For the first time since Bretton Woods, nations had an alternative asset in which to hold reserves. The unit's gold backing, with over 6,000 tonnes of gold held by BRICS central banks, gave it an anchor to reality. It couldn't be printed endlessly like fiat currency. It had scarcity.

The structure was elegant. Forty percent gold meant that if global price levels rose, the unit would maintain purchasing power. Sixty percent BRICS currencies meant that the unit reflected the economic vitality of the bloc's actual commerce. It was not a threat to replace the dollar globally, not in 2024. But it was a credible alternative for BRICS+ settlements, and it demonstrated that the bloc could create institutions independent of Western control.

BRICS Pay was the operational mechanism. Launched in the weeks after Kazan, it was a messaging and settlement system designed to mirror SWIFT but without the American chokepoint. Transaction volumes were initially modest: a few hundred million dollars per day in initial testing. But the system was designed to scale. By October 2025, settlement volumes had grown to three billion dollars per day. By early 2026, five billion.

The volumes were still dwarfed by global daily dollar settlements, which exceeded ten trillion dollars. But the trajectory was unmistakable. Every transaction settled in local currencies, every payment made through BRICS Pay instead of SWIFT, was a reduction in dollar dependence, a brick removed from the edifice of dollar hegemony.

The technical challenges were not trivial. Currency volatility meant that bilateral settlements in local currencies required real-time foreign exchange adjustments. The BRICS Unit reduced this problem

by providing a common denomination, but only for transactions among BRICS members. Trade between India and Southeast Asia, between Russia and Central Asia, between China and the Middle East was more complex.

But the mechanisms were developing. A network of agreements, bilateral and multilateral, was quietly establishing alternative pathways. Russia and Iran had settled in rubles and rials since 2023. Russia and Turkey had established ruble-lira payment corridors. China-Pakistan trade moved increasingly in yuan. The structure was not unified; it was messy, bilateral, ad hoc. But it was real.

The digital infrastructure made the difference. Central bank digital currencies, which had seemed like sci-fi concepts five years earlier, became operational realities. China's digital yuan, launched to select partners starting in 2020, was in use in cross-border transactions. Russia's digital ruble was operable by 2025. India's digital rupee was being piloted in BRICS+ settlements. A parallel digital payment network was emerging alongside the traditional banking system, faster, cheaper, and outside Western control.

What made the de-dollarization movement tactically powerful was that it was not monolithic. No single nation was driving it uniformly. Instead, a hundred different shifts were happening simultaneously. Russia reduced dollar holdings because it had no choice; sanctions had forced the issue. China promoted yuan use because it served China's strategic interests; a global yuan was leverage. India wanted rupee internationalization to support its development finance initiatives. Brazil wanted local currency settlements to reduce the drag of currency conversion on its export competitiveness. Each nation had different motivations, but all were moving in the same direction.

By 2024, the impact on dollar dominance was quantifiable but limited. The dollar still accounted for ninety percent of global foreign exchange reserves. Eighty-five percent of international trade was still ultimately settled in dollars. The dollar's network effects were

formidable. Liquidity bred liquidity. The deeper the dollar markets, the more natural it was to use them for every international transaction.

But the edge was fraying.

Within BRICS+, the shift was decisive. Eighty-five to ninety percent of intra-bloc trade was now settled in local currencies or the BRICS Unit. The bloc accounted for over thirty percent of global trade. For those members, the dollar was becoming optional rather than mandatory. Brazil no longer needed dollars to trade with Argentina and Mexico; those markets were increasingly linked through regional arrangements. Russia didn't need dollars for trade with Iran or Turkey. India didn't need dollars for commerce with Southeast Asia.

The implications extended beyond trade. Foreign direct investment patterns were shifting. A Chinese firm investing in Southeast Asia no longer had to finance in dollars; it could use yuan-denominated bonds issued in Shanghai. An Indian firm investing in Africa could use rupee financing. The machinery of commerce was slowly rewiring to minimize dollar dependence.

This was where Western analysts made their critical mistake. They assumed de-dollarization was either happening or not, a binary question. In reality, it was happening in certain sectors and geographies while the dollar remained dominant elsewhere. Within BRICS and its extended network, alternatives were rapidly becoming the default. Outside this network, the dollar remained supreme. But the network was expanding. The Global South was joining in increasing numbers. The question was not whether the dollar would disappear but whether it would cease to be the universal medium of exchange, would become instead one major currency among several.

The structural challenges to complete de-dollarization were real and substantial. The dollar benefited from American military might; the US Navy guaranteed the security of global shipping lanes, which incentivized dollar use in maritime commerce. The dollar benefited

from American capital market depth; US Treasury markets were larger and more liquid than any alternative. The dollar benefited from American economic size; roughly twenty percent of global GDP was generated in dollar terms, which created constant demand for dollars.

But these advantages were not immutable. American capital market dominance was being eroded as China developed its own capital markets and Europe consolidated financial integration. The dollar's military backing was less relevant if commerce could flow outside lanes that required military protection. And American economic dominance, while substantial, was shrinking as a proportion of global output.

More fundamentally, the de-dollarization movement was not trying to replace the dollar with a single rival. That had failed with the euro. Instead, it was fragmenting global settlement into regional and bilateral systems. The dollar would remain dominant in the Americas and much of Western Europe. The yuan would become dominant in East and Southeast Asia. The euro would persist in its zone. The rupee, the real, the ruble, the ringgit would develop regional currencies and regional settlement systems. Global commerce would become multi-currency rather than dollar-centric.

This was not what would occur in 2026 or 2027. The transition would take a decade, perhaps longer. But the direction was clear. The structural shift away from dollar monopoly had begun, driven not by Western abandonment but by the rise of sufficient economic power in the Global South to sustain alternatives.

The 300-basis-point "dollar trap" risk premium that economists discussed was the real phenomenon. A small premium that borrowers in non-dollar countries had to pay, reflecting the cost of using a foreign currency when the dollar was dominant. As alternatives emerged, this premium would compress. Borrowing in rupees or yuan or rials would become cheaper relative to dollar borrowing, which would accelerate the shift. The feedback loops ran both directions.

What concerned Western strategists, though few articulated it publicly, was that none of this required dramatic confrontation or deliberate strategy to undermine the dollar. It simply required that alternative systems work better for their participants. That they settle transactions faster. That they reduce costs. That they eliminate the risk of sanctions and economic warfare. That they give nations agency over their own commerce rather than subjugating them to the preferences of Washington.

By that logic, de-dollarization was not a choice the West could prevent. It was a consequence of its own success in developing the dollar system so effectively that it was now worth challenging. When you can weaponize finance, others will work to escape the weapon.

The question was not whether but when and how quickly. The pilot programs in Kazan suggested the answer: faster than anyone expected.

CHAPTER 32: AFRICA'S MOMENT

The Nigerian tanker sat anchored off Port Harcourt, waiting for clearance that never came. The crew had been at sea for three weeks. The hold contained two million barrels of crude from the Niger Delta. The clock was running on payment timelines, insurance, demurrage charges. The buyer, a Chinese refinery, was ready. The terms had been negotiated. Only one thing was missing: a middleman.

Thirty years earlier, that middleman would have been an American trading house. Vitol, Glencore, one of the petroleum majors. They financed transactions, took delivery risks, arbitraged price spreads. The whole international oil market moved through their networks. In 2024, the Chinese buyer was dealing directly with the Nigerian exporter. The Chinese company financed the purchase, managed delivery logistics, sold into Asian refinery networks. No American intermediary. No Western trading house. The transaction was happening in a parallel financial system, with neither dollar nor Western entity taking a cut.

This was the Africa story compressed into a single transaction. Not collapse or chaos. Not a dramatic geopolitical realignment. Simply a shift in who had leverage, who captured value, who set terms.

Africa in 2024 was a civilization in transition. Six hundred twenty trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves. Oil reserves approaching thirty billion barrels. Cobalt, rare earths, lithium. Copper and gold in quantities that would supply the world for centuries. Agricultural capacity to feed two billion people. Ports strategically positioned on global sea-lanes. And a demographic wave: four hundred fifty million people under age fifteen, a median age of nineteen and a half years. The youngest continent on earth, by a wide margin.

For centuries, Africa had been a resource extraction zone. Colonial powers extracted minerals, timber, crops. Post-colonial

governments did the same, selling to Western buyers, financing with Western loans, building infrastructure that extracted resources with minimal domestic value creation. The continent was rich in resources but poor in wealth. The minerals were gone but little remained. The peasants worked the land but kept little of the surplus. The oil revenue flowed out; the local populations saw little benefit.

By 2024, that asymmetry was breaking down, not everywhere but in critical nodes.

The pivot was not toward independence. African nations were too small, too poor, too invested in global commerce to withdraw. The pivot was toward leverage. Africa had what the world needed: energy, minerals, agricultural capacity, strategic position. For the first time, African leaders were in a position to refuse being pawns. They could negotiate from strength.

The manifestation was strategic hedging. African nations, particularly the larger ones, stopped betting everything on Western partnership. They maintained ties to the West but deepened partnerships with China, India, Japan, Turkey, Gulf states. They bid out infrastructure projects to multiple competitors. They refused to choose sides in great power competition. In diplomatic forums, they asserted African interests independent of Western preferences.

South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Angola, Egypt. Twelve nations held fifty percent of Africa's GDP. Their leaders understood that Western leverage had peaked. The West needed African resources more than African nations needed Western technology at this point; Chinese technology was available, at lower cost, with fewer strings. Western military support was useful but not essential; African armies could function on Chinese and Russian equipment. Western capital was helpful but not indispensable; China, the Gulf, India, Japan provided alternatives.

The infrastructure gap was where this leverage showed most clearly. Africa needed $170 billion in annual infrastructure investment

just to maintain current growth rates. Building roads, ports, power plants, rail networks. Fiber optic cables. Water systems. The G7 nations had committed to match Chinese Belt and Road initiative investments, particularly through the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, formally launched in 2022. By 2024, Western pledges had reached $600 billion over the decade.

China had deployed $1.4 trillion over the previous two decades and was committing another $50 billion to $100 billion annually.

The math was clear. Western commitments were pledges; Chinese deployment was actual money in the ground. Western infrastructure came with governance conditions: anti-corruption provisions, environmental impact assessments, labor standards, competitive bidding. Chinese infrastructure came with one condition: that the country use Chinese contractors, Chinese equipment, finance repayment in whatever currency it could.

African leaders understood the trade-off. The Chinese roads were sometimes built faster and with less regard for local environmental concerns. But they were built. The Western roads were sometimes environmentally superior but took twice as long to construct and cost thirty percent more. African voters did not care about environmental impact assessments; they cared that it took an hour to drive what should have been a fifteen-minute journey.

BRICS infrastructure finance accelerated the trend. The New Development Bank, with its mandate to finance emerging market infrastructure, had committed $170 billion to African projects by 2024. The bank's lending procedures were swift, paperwork-light, outcome focused. A project either made economic sense or it didn't. The environmental and governance reviews that the World Bank required were absent. The anti-corruption conditions were minimal. Money could flow.

The choice that African nations were making was not romantic or ideological. It was practical. They wanted infrastructure, and the West

was slow to provide it. They wanted capital, and the East provided it freely. They wanted autonomy, and China did not demand it surrender sovereignty. The Chinese model was clear: we give you money; we take back our profits. The Western model was cloudier: we give you money, but you have to restructure your governance, and if you fail to meet our conditions, we withhold funding.

The African Continental Free Trade Area, operational since 2021, was beginning to reshape continental trade flows. By 2024, twenty-seven percent of African trade was intra-continental, up from six percent in 2010. This seemed modest, but the trajectory was steep. As the ACFTA matured, African nations would increasingly trade with each other rather than serving as raw material suppliers to external powers. The infrastructure race was partly about positioning to capture this trade. A port that handled continental trade was more valuable than a port that extracted minerals for export.

The Rovuma Basin in Mozambique was emblematic. The basin held proven natural gas reserves exceeding 100 trillion cubic feet. Portuguese colonial powers had surveyed it; it seemed too deep for economic extraction. By the 2010s, technology had advanced. American and European majors developed the resource. Then China arrived with cheaper methods and state backing. The competition drove costs down and timelines forward. By 2024, Mozambique was moving toward $50 billion in liquefied natural gas facilities, with Chinese, Indian, and Western firms competing for position.

Nigeria's Niger Delta was more developed but equally contested. The delta had produced oil for sixty years. It was depleted relative to Middle Eastern fields but still held reserves. The political economy was more complex. Major international firms had already sunk capital. But as these firms divested in response to Western climate pressure, the question of who would replace them became crucial. Chinese and Indian firms filled the gap. They had no Western environmental lobby demanding they leave. They would produce the oil as long as it was economically viable.

The demographic dividend could have been Africa's most transformative asset. Four hundred fifty million young people entering the workforce over two decades. If they received education and training, if jobs were available, if infrastructure allowed them to relocate to where opportunities lay, Africa could experience growth matching China's in the 1990s. The population surge could become an economic surge.

But only if institutions developed in parallel. And here the challenge lay. Western institutions were constrained by political economy and democratic pressure. Western firms wanted to invest but faced pressure to avoid developing-world operations due to labor or environmental concerns. Western governments wanted to help but were constrained by budget politics and taxpayer resistance. Western multilateral institutions were constrained by governance structures designed in 1945.

Chinese and Indian investment faced no such constraints. Labor was cheap; environmental concerns were secondary. Capital could be deployed rapidly without parliamentary approval. Millions of workers could be shifted across borders to build infrastructure. Loans could be massive without democratic veto.

For a ten-year window, roughly 2024 to 2034, this mismatch meant that China and India would capture disproportionate returns on African growth. The infrastructure built with Chinese finance would be leveraged for Chinese commercial advantage. The mines developed with Chinese backing would export to Chinese processors. The ports would handle Chinese trade. The telecommunications infrastructure would run on Chinese equipment and Chinese standards.

But this was not permanent subordination. It was sequencing. Early on, China captures returns. But as African institutions develop, as African nations accumulate capital and technical expertise, as intra-continental trade grows, the asymmetry should compress. Africa would gradually move from being a resource extraction zone to being an integrated continental economy.

The catch was the institutional foundation. Roads without governance meant banditry. Ports without rule of law meant corruption. Trade without property rights meant instability. Africa's institutional challenges were real: weak judiciaries, frequent coups, dysfunctional tax systems, endemic corruption. Yet over the previous decade, meaningful institutions had developed in numerous African states. Rwanda had built a functioning bureaucracy. Botswana had remained stable and relatively transparent. Kenya and Nigeria, despite challenges, had developed sophisticated financial sectors. Ethiopia, despite its civil war, had moved toward institutional development before the conflict.

The 2024-2026 period was when the trajectory would become clear. If Africa's institutions developed in parallel with infrastructure investment, the continent could begin a genuine development takeoff. If institutions lagged, infrastructure would degrade, invested capital would be wasted, and Africa would remain peripheral to global commerce.

The external powers understood the stakes. The Western narrative was that Chinese investment created debt traps; that African nations would lose sovereignty as they could not service debts. The evidence was mixed. Some nations had borrowed unsustainably; others managed debt effectively. Countries that diversified their investment sources and maintained fiscal discipline could service Chinese loans while building wealth.

The Chinese narrative was that the West had colonized Africa politically after losing it formally; that Western interference in African governance was neo-colonialism. The evidence was also mixed. Western pressure on governance issues was often paternalistic and ineffective. But it also sometimes prevented catastrophic policy choices.

What was clear was that African nations wanted neither domination. They wanted partnership. They wanted investors who would take risks on African projects. They wanted partners who would

not lecture them about values. They wanted trade relationships that benefited African producers. They wanted infrastructure that their citizens could use. They wanted jobs.

If Chinese investment delivered these and Western investment did not, African leaders would choose Chinese investment. It was not ideological; it was pragmatic. Africa was not choosing authoritarianism or rejecting democracy; it was choosing development.

The resource wealth was not infinite. Fossil fuels would eventually be depleted. But the demographic dividend was generation-spanning. Four hundred fifty million young people entering prime working years offered a moment. The decade from 2024 to 2034 was when Africa could move from demographic liability to demographic asset. Infrastructure built now would serve a generation. Institutions built now would compound for decades.

The great powers understood this. The competition to shape Africa's trajectory was heating. It was not Cold War competition; there were no proxy wars, no spheres of influence carved into stone. It was competition through investment, through partnership, through demonstrating which model could deliver development faster.

Africa, for the first time in five centuries, had leverage. The question was whether its leaders could wield it wisely.

CHAPTER 33: LATIN AMERICA: CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE

The arrest came at dawn. Nicolás Maduro, president of Venezuela, was pulled from his residence in Caracas by a task force that did not identify itself. Within hours, he was on a military transport to a detention facility on the outskirts of the city. The operation, called Operation Absolute Resolve by those who planned it, had taken three years of CIA coordination, negotiations with Venezuelan military defectors, and careful diplomacy with neighboring states to ensure they would not intervene.

By afternoon, the mainstream media in the United States was calling it the most significant regime change operation since the Iraq War. By evening, it was clear that the comparison was misleading. There was no invasion, no foreign boots on the ground. The operation was executed by Venezuelan actors, primarily military elements that had been slowly turned. The US role was providing intelligence, training, financial incentives, and diplomatic cover.

The optics were important. American interventionism in Latin America had become politically toxic. Overt military action was impossible. But covert action, plausibly deniable, coordinated with internal actors, was feasible. The Maduro regime had isolated itself. Its military had fractured. The economy had collapsed. Significant chunks of the armed forces were willing to move if given the right incentives and assurances.

The move was coordinated at the highest levels. The National Security Council, the CIA, the State Department, and the Pentagon had worked the problem for years. The assumption was that a successful regime change in Venezuela would reshape Latin American geopolitics. Venezuela controlled the world's largest proven oil reserves. A stable, US-aligned government could return Venezuelan oil to markets, reducing prices globally and constraining Russia and Iran.

It would demonstrate that US power in the Western Hemisphere remained decisive. It would signal to other left-wing governments in the region that alignment with China and Russia carried risks.

The operation succeeded tactically. Within forty-eight hours, a transitional government was installed, comprising military figures, technocrats, and representatives of the opposition that had coalesced around Juan Guaidó years earlier. International recognition was rapid. The US immediately restored diplomatic relations. The EU followed. By the end of the first week, the new government was a member of the Inter-American Development Bank and was receiving technical support from US agencies.

But the larger geopolitical story was more complicated.

Latin America in 2024 was a region fundamentally divided on whether to align with the United States or hedge toward China. The division did not map cleanly onto left-wing versus right-wing governments. It was messier than that.

Argentina under Javier Milei represented the Western alignment camp. Milei was a libertarian economist who had campaigned on dollarizing the Argentine economy, slashing government spending, and tightening ties to the United States. He had won the 2023 election on a wave of frustration with inflation and economic stagnation. His cabinet was populated with economists educated at Chicago and Stanford. His foreign policy was aggressively pro-American. He moved to strengthen ties with Israel, improved relations with the IMF, and signaled openness to enhanced military and intelligence cooperation with the US.

Milei's government received positive coverage in Western media and material support from the US and international lending institutions. An IMF deal brought $15 billion in financing. Private investment increased. Western financial firms returned to Argentina.

But the economic model was brutal. The peso crashed. Inflation reached two hundred percent. Poverty surged to fifty percent. The

government implemented austerity that reduced government spending by nearly a quarter, cutting welfare, health, and education spending dramatically. Unemployment rose above twenty percent. By late 2024, Milei's approval rating had collapsed below thirty percent.

The political economy was self-defeating. Milei was implementing a model that might have worked in the 1990s, when Argentina was entering the decade with stable institutions and credibility. But in 2024, the starting point was different. The economy had already been through multiple crises. Trust in institutions was shattered. Dollarization required massive external capital that was not forthcoming. Argentina could not simply decide to adopt dollars; it required either a massive capital inflow or a run of trade surpluses to accumulate dollars.

Without the capital inflow, Milei's model was recessive. The economy was shrinking. Unemployment was rising. The middle class was being destroyed. And the poor were suffering catastrophically. By 2025, major strikes were convulsing the economy. The government responded with repression, but repression could not solve the underlying problem: the economic model was not delivering growth.

Brazil, by contrast, had embraced hedging. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the leftist ex-convict turned former president turned re-elected president in 2022, had engineered a middle position. Brazil would maintain strong ties to the West, particularly Europe and the United States. But it would also deepen partnerships with China. BRICS membership was central to Brazilian foreign policy. Lula had personally promoted South-South cooperation and had positioned Brazil as a leader of the Global South.

The strategy was to maximize value from both relationships. Brazil would sell soybeans to China, oil to Europe, coffee to the US, technology services to all. It would join BRICS institutions, participate in de-dollarization initiatives, but maintain the dollar as its secondary reference currency. It would refuse to choose sides in the US-China competition. It would host both American and Chinese investment.

The approach was coherent and pragmatic. It assumed that full alignment with the US was declining in value, that full alignment with China was risky but that hedging between the two was optimal. The assumption proved largely correct. Brazilian growth accelerated in 2024. FDI from both US and China firms increased. The government was able to increase social spending while maintaining fiscal responsibility. The contrast with Argentina was stark.

Mexico was a different case. Mexico was trapped by geography. Two-thirds of Mexican exports went to the United States. There was no hedging; there was only alignment. The Mexican government understood this and managed the relationship carefully. It maintained professional military and intelligence ties with the US while asserting autonomy on certain issues, particularly immigration. It resisted pressure to take sides in the US-China competition by pleading economic interest.

The 2026 electoral calendar was crowded. Fifteen major Latin American elections were scheduled between late 2024 and the end of 2026. Colombia, Peru, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and half a dozen others. The pattern was clear: right-wing governments were gaining traction in some places, consolidating losses in others. Left-wing governments that had dominated the early 2020s were fragmenting. The macro pattern was neither simple rightward shift nor simple leftward shift; it was regional divergence.

Colombia under Gustavo Petro was moving leftward and toward closer relations with China and BRICS. Peru was unstable, cycling through multiple governments and unclear alignments. Chile was moving right, particularly on security issues, and strengthening ties with the US. Bolivia was managing a tricky middle ground, maintaining ties to China while slowly repairing relations with the US.

The ideological dimension was less important than geopolitical positioning. A right-wing government in Chile could choose de-dollarization if it served Chilean interests. A left-wing government in Colombia could choose US alignment if it maximized Colombian

leverage. The pattern showed that alignment choices were driven by economic interest and strategic positioning, not ideology.

One issue dominated regional geopolitics: critical minerals. Lithium, cobalt, copper, nickel. The energy transition was driving demand for these materials. The Battery revolution was creating shortages. The Lithium Triangle, comprising Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, held a quarter of the world's lithium reserves. The Democratic Republic of Congo held two-thirds of cobalt reserves. Peru held significant copper reserves. These nations suddenly had leverage they had never possessed.

China had secured long-term supply agreements with Bolivia and was heavily invested in Chilean and Argentine mines. The US was working to redirect supply toward democratic allies, but the economics were difficult. American investors were not willing to pay the premium that nationalizing-inclined governments wanted. Chinese investors would pay it, knowing they could absorb losses through state backing.

Venezuela's oil was potentially crucial. If the new government could stabilize the country and restart production, Venezuelan crude could flow into global markets. This would depress prices globally, helping the US. It would particularly hurt Russia and Iran. But it would also hurt other OPEC producers, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iraq, who benefited from higher prices.

The regime change in Venezuela thus had ripple effects that extended across the hemisphere and beyond. A stable Venezuela under American alignment would shift the balance of great power competition. A new Venezuelan government could cooperate with Colombia on security issues, constraining leftist groups and narcotics trafficking. It could take a different stance in the Organization of American States. It could allow US military presence, providing strategic advantage in the Caribbean.

But the operation also came with risks. The new Venezuelan

government was fragile. It consisted of military figures and technocrats who lacked democratic legitimacy. The military units that had carried out the coup controlled ultimate power. The risk of instability was high. The new government could fracture, could face resistance from elements of the military or society that felt excluded. Rebuilding the Venezuelan state, which had been systematically destroyed under Maduro, would take years.

Moreover, the operation demonstrated that the US was willing to undertake covert regime change operations in the Western Hemisphere. It strengthened the narrative, popular in Latin America, that the US could not be trusted, that American promises of non-interference were contingent, that small nations that made choices Washington disapproved of would face consequences. The operation succeeded, but it may have undermined the broader objective of strengthening American influence through soft power and economic partnership.

China had noted the operation carefully. The message was clear: the US viewed Latin America as its sphere of influence and would act to maintain control. China's strategy had been to cooperate with Latin American governments, to provide capital and markets without demanding political alignment. The Venezuelan operation showed that this strategy had limits; the US would ultimately make the question of alignment binary if necessary.

The result was that Latin American governments, seeing that Washington was willing to carry out regime change, would either accelerate alignment with the US or would intensify hedging strategies. Complete non-alignment became more difficult. But that made both China and the US more willing to offer incentives. The competition would intensify.

By 2026, the electoral cycle would resolve some of these questions. The leftward tide that had dominated the early 2020s had broken. But the rightward trend was uneven. Some nations would choose closer alignment with the US. Others would pursue hedging. A

few might double down on China partnerships. The region would fragment further, but not into neat camps; into a complex matrix of bilateral relationships, varying alignments, and shifting coalitions.

What had become clear was that Latin America's post-Cold War position, in which it could take the US for granted and maintain positive relations with Washington while gradually shifting toward multiple partnerships, was ending. The US was reasserting hegemonic claims in its hemisphere. It remained to be seen whether it could maintain that hegemony in a multipolar world where alternatives existed for the first time in Latin America's modern history.

CHAPTER 34: THE INFRASTRUCTURE WARS

The signing ceremony at the Port of Gwadar was orchestrated with precision. Pakistani military officers, Chinese officials, Gulf state investors, and attending diplomats stood on the dock as the cargo container was ceremonially loaded onto a ship bound for Shanghai. The port, built with Chinese capital and Chinese contractors, sat on the Arabian Sea, positioned to control access to the Strait of Hormuz and to offer China a shortcut to the Indian Ocean.

Gwadar represented a decade of Belt and Road Initiative investment. The original port capacity was twenty million containers annually. By 2024, after multiple expansions, it could handle fifty million. But the facility was underutilized. Perhaps ten percent of current capacity was actually used. The problem was not infrastructure; it was economics. To move cargo through Gwadar made sense only if Pakistan's internal infrastructure connected to it, which it did not, and only if shipping rates were competitive, which they were not.

This was the paradox of the Belt and Road Initiative. China had deployed $1.4 trillion in infrastructure investment over two decades. The scale was staggering. Ports in fifty nations. Rail lines spanning continents. Power plants in dozens of countries. Highways, airports, pipelines. The physical infrastructure was real and often impressive. But the underlying economics were often shaky.

The Western narrative was that Belt and Road was a debt trap. Developing nations borrowed in dollars from the China Development Bank to finance infrastructure projects, found the projects did not generate the revenue to service the debt, and ended up losing sovereignty as debt servicing required either asset seizures or political concessions. The Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka became the symbol: China financed it, it did not generate sufficient returns, and China took control of the port as compensation for the debt. Sovereignty

went with it.

The evidence was mixed. Some BRI projects had indeed become debt traps. Others had generated excellent returns and transformed regional trade flows. The distinction usually came down to project selection. Projects in good locations, with solid underlying economics, even if executed at inefficient cost levels, eventually paid for themselves. Projects in terrible locations, with no underlying economic rationale, financed primarily for political reasons, became deadweights.

The more fundamental issue was that infrastructure competition was reshaping global geopolitics. The West had assumed for three decades that it could compete on quality and values. Build good infrastructure with good governance and good labor standards. The market would choose superiority. That assumption had proved naive.

The Chinese model was different. Build infrastructure fast. Use state capital rather than market capital. Deploy tens of thousands of your own workers. Accept political risk by working with difficult governments. Maximize throughput over profit margins. Accept that some projects will lose money; others will make it up. The scale of state backing meant that losing money on individual projects was acceptable as long as the portfolio worked.

The Western Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, announced by the G7 in 2022, was designed as an explicit counter to Belt and Road. The pledge was $600 billion in infrastructure financing over a decade. By 2024, roughly seventy billion had been committed. The projects were selected carefully, with environmental and governance screening. They moved slowly, with lengthy approval timelines. They were more expensive, reflecting higher labor costs and environmental safeguards.

The comparison was straightforward. The West pledged $600 billion over ten years, roughly sixty billion per year, with roughly thirty percent actually deployed. China was deploying one hundred to

one hundred fifty billion per year, had been doing so for two decades, and showed no sign of slowing. The mathematics was not close.

More important than the absolute numbers was the model. Chinese infrastructure was financed through Chinese development banks. The money came from China's state budget and state enterprises. It was not constrained by the politics of US taxpayers or European electorates. There was no requirement for competitive bidding. Chinese contractors were preferred. Chinese equipment was standard. The supply chains were integrated into the Chinese economy. Every dollar of Chinese capital deployed in infrastructure also flowed back to Chinese firms.

Western infrastructure was different. It was financed through multilateral development banks, through export credit agencies, through private markets. Each layer brought bureaucracy, each approval layer took time, each political constituency had to be satisfied. The World Bank required environmental impact assessments. The IMF required governance conditions. The US Export-Import Bank required Buy American provisions. The complexity meant that Western projects moved slowly.

The technological dimension was increasingly important. Digital infrastructure, in particular, was becoming as critical as physical infrastructure. Fiber optic cable networks, telecommunications standards, digital payment systems, e-commerce platforms. The competition here was more open, with American and Western technology companies competing with Chinese and Indian alternatives.

Huawei had become the symbol of this competition. The Chinese telecommunications firm had become a global leader in 5G deployment, fiber optic networks, and telecommunications equipment. It was cheaper and faster than Western competitors. But it raised security concerns: was the equipment built with backdoors that allowed Chinese intelligence access?

The question was partly legitimate and partly overblown. All networks could theoretically be compromised. All governments could theoretically demand access from their own firms. The difference was that Western governments typically worked through legal channels and with some political cost. Chinese government demands were implicitly framed as national security imperatives that could not be refused. The risk profile was different.

But the risk calculus was different for different countries. A small nation in Southeast Asia could reasonably decide that Chinese espionage was less threatening than American espionage, or that the cost savings from Chinese equipment exceeded the security risk. A NATO member had different calculations. The differentiation allowed for parallel technology ecosystems. Some nations would choose Western ecosystems, some Chinese, some a mix.

The real game was not individual projects but network effects. Control the dominant infrastructure and you control the game. China wanted to build a network of ports, rail lines, and digital connections that would bind African, Asian, and South American nations into a Chinese-centric trading system. The US wanted to prevent that by offering alternative infrastructure partnerships, by constraining Chinese access to critical minerals, by maintaining dominance in digital technology standards.

The African Case Study was particularly stark. In 2010, perhaps two percent of major African port investment had come from China. By 2024, it was over sixty percent. The ports were physical infrastructure, but they carried implications. A port built with Chinese capital, financed by Chinese banks, operated using Chinese standards, equipped with Chinese machinery, would naturally tend to process trade that flowed through Chinese networks. African nations could theoretically use those ports for commerce with India, Brazil, or Europe. And some did. But the natural gravitational pull was toward China.

The same pattern appeared in rail and highway infrastructure.

The Chinese-financed Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya connected Mombasa to Nairobi. The revenue streams were not sufficient to service the debt at reasonable rates. But the railway moved Chinese goods efficiently. The rent extraction occurred not through freight revenue but through the general economic integration that the railway enabled.

The bandwidth competition was broader. Every nation needed to choose which infrastructure networks to connect to: American-led ones, Chinese-led ones, or hybrids. The choice had political implications. Infrastructure was not neutral technology. It encoded political relationships. A fiber optic network using American standards connected you to the American technological ecosystem. It meant reliance on American technology companies, American supply chains, American technical standards. A Chinese network meant reliance on Chinese standards, Chinese firms, Chinese supply chains.

Most nations wanted to avoid total dependence on either. They wanted to participate in both ecosystems, to use American and Chinese technology, to access both markets. But the mathematical reality was that the costs of maintaining dual systems were high. At some point, critical infrastructure had to choose a dominant standard.

The speed differential was perhaps the most important asymmetry. Chinese state capitalism could make infrastructure decisions and execute them in months. American bureaucracy, even when theoretically devoted to the same objective, took years. A Chinese development bank could commit capital to a port project and have construction underway within six months. An American EXIM bank could finalize the decision in three years, with another year to actually disburse the capital.

The environmental and labor conditions dimension was more complex than Western propaganda suggested. Western-financed infrastructure typically meant higher labor costs and environmental standards. These were good from a humanitarian perspective. But they increased project costs by thirty to fifty percent. For a poor country,

the choice was not obvious: do you want a road built with Western labor standards that costs twice as much, or a road built faster and cheaper with fewer environmental safeguards?

The answer depended on the country's values, its environmental situation, and its timeline. A drought-stricken nation might reasonably prefer rapid water infrastructure to environmentally optimal water infrastructure. A nation with bad roads and functioning environmental systems might reasonably prefer cheaper, faster road building to expensive, slow construction. The Western assumption that poor countries would prefer Western standards if given the choice was sometimes wrong.

By 2024, the infrastructure competition had stratified. In regions of Western strategic priority, Western nations were accelerating infrastructure investment. The Indo-Pacific saw accelerated investment from Australia, Japan, and the US. In Africa and Central Asia, Chinese investment had become the default. In Latin America, it was mixed, with different nations making different choices. In Southeast Asia and South Asia, the two systems were competing head to head.

What was clear was that the old assumption of Western technological and institutional superiority was no longer sufficient to sustain Western dominance. Infrastructure competition required both speed and capital, neither of which the West was providing at Chinese scale. The democratic requirement for legislative approval, for environmental review, for taxpayer accountability, for competitive bidding was creating inefficiency that authoritarian state capitalism could exploit.

The geopolitical implications were profound. Control of infrastructure meant control of economic flows. Control of economic flows meant leverage. The nation that could move goods most efficiently, whose ports received most cargo, whose roads connected most commerce, whose cables carried most data, would have outsized influence. China was building that dominance systematically, project

by project, while the West debated budget allocations and environmental impact assessments.

The question by 2024 was whether the West could maintain competitiveness in a competition defined by speed and scale. Or whether infrastructure competition would become another arena in which Western decline was visible and measurable. The infrastructure wars would be decided not by drama but by concrete and steel, by projects completed and projects delayed, by the unglamorous accumulation of physical and digital capacity. By that metric, the competition was not close.

CHAPTER 35: DE-DOLLARIZATION: DREAM OR DESTINY?

The Federal Reserve chairman sat in the secure videoconference chamber deep beneath the Treasury Building. On the screen before him were the governors of the central banks of the emerging market world. The subject was de-dollarization. The tone was defensive. The American central banker was explaining, again, why concerns about the dollar's dominance were overblown. The emerging market governors were listening politely, believing nothing.

The conversation encapsulated the intellectual gap that had opened. American officials still thought the question was whether de-dollarization was possible. The central bankers of emerging markets had already accepted it was happening. The question was how fast and whether managed transition was preferable to chaotic collapse.

The dollar's role had been absolute for eighty years. Since Bretton Woods in 1944, the dollar had been the world's reserve currency. After the gold standard ended in 1971, the dollar became the default reference currency not because of law but because of network effects and American power. Global commerce moved in dollars. Central banks held reserves in dollars. Contracts were denominated in dollars. The network effects created a virtuous cycle: everyone used dollars because everyone used dollars.

The advantages were immense. For the United States, the dollar was exorbitant privilege. American banks could raise capital cheaply because dollar funding was ubiquitous. American firms could finance investment in dollars because dollar credit was abundant. American government could borrow in its own currency at low rates because dollar bonds were safe assets coveted globally. The advantage was worth hundreds of billions annually.

The system rested on a simple foundation: the dollar was good as gold, or even better. It was backed by American economic might, by American capital markets, by American military power, by the fact

that you could ultimately convert dollars into anything the American economy produced. The basis for confidence eroded over time, but slowly. American GDP was still roughly twenty percent of global GDP. American capital markets were still the deepest in the world. American military power was still the strongest.

Yet the foundation was cracking.

The United States had weaponized the dollar system. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western nations froze Russian central bank reserves and cut Russian banks from SWIFT. The move was extraordinarily effective. Russia could not access its own reserves. Russian firms could not settle international transactions. Russia was partially removed from global finance.

The success was also a warning to everyone else. If you held dollars, if your banks were connected to SWIFT, if your central bank kept reserves in dollars, you were hostage to American decisions. When your interests diverged from American interests, that hostage-taking could be weaponized.

The effect was to accelerate de-dollarization initiatives. Central banks that had been comfortable holding dollars now wanted alternatives. Nations that had been content to settle in dollars now looked for options. The message from Washington had been unambiguous: dollar dominance was conditional. Align with us or lose access.

The motivation for de-dollarization was strongest among nations in fundamental conflict with the United States: Russia, Iran, China. But it extended to nations simply seeking autonomy: India, Brazil, Indonesia. And it was beginning to extend to allies uncertain of American commitment: parts of Europe, some Middle Eastern partners.

From a purely economic standpoint, de-dollarization faced formidable obstacles. The dollar's network effects were extraordinarily powerful. The volume of transactions denominated in dollars exceeded

ten trillion per day. The stock of dollars held globally exceeded thirty trillion. The amount of international debt denominated in dollars exceeded ten trillion. The depth of US capital markets had no rival. You could raise a billion dollars in the US capital markets on a Monday and have the money by Thursday. Try that in any other currency and you hit limits.

The historical precedent was not encouraging. The pound sterling had been the global reserve currency from 1850 to 1944. Its decline took nearly a century. Even after World War II, when American economic dominance was overwhelming, the sterling was used in trade settlements for decades. Network effects, once established, were sticky.

The structural advantage of the dollar was the American economy itself. As long as America remained the world's largest economy, as long as American capital markets remained the deepest, as long as American assets remained highly liquid, the dollar would have fundamental advantages. Rivals had to match not just currency performance but underlying economic strength. The yuan could not replace the dollar until China's capital markets had the depth and liquidity of US capital markets, which meant China would have to liberalize capital accounts, which China was unwilling to do.

Yet the direction of change was unmistakable. The dollar's share of global reserves, which had peaked at seventy percent in the 1970s, had declined to roughly sixty percent by 2024. The dollar's share of international trade settlements had declined from roughly ninety-five percent in 2010 to roughly ninety percent in 2024. The declines seemed modest, but the trajectory was consistent, moving in one direction.

The BRICS initiatives were accelerating the trend. The BRICS Unit, backed by gold and currencies, represented a credible alternative for settlements among the bloc members. It would not replace the dollar globally; it did not need to. It only needed to replace the dollar for fifteen to twenty percent of global commerce, the commerce

within the BRICS bloc and its extended network. That was mathematically achievable.

The mechanism for displacement was not dramatic. It was not that nations would collectively abandon the dollar in some epochal moment. It was that each individual transaction would gradually shift to alternative currency. A Chinese importer would invoice in yuan instead of dollars. An Indian investor would finance in rupees. A Brazilian commodity exporter would accept real instead of dollars. Each shift was tiny. The accumulation would be transformative.

The 300-basis-point dollar risk premium was the real measure. That was the extra cost a non-dollar nation had to pay to borrow money relative to the US. A Brazilian company borrowing for fifty years in reals paid roughly three hundred basis points more than the US government borrowing for the same duration in dollars. The premium reflected the risk of currency depreciation and the cost of maintaining dollar liquidity. As alternatives to the dollar became more viable, as the risk of dollar collapse became less salient, that premium would compress. Borrowing in reals and rupees would become cheaper relative to borrowing in dollars, accelerating the shift.

The central bank digital currencies were potentially more important than recognized. A digital yuan could be transmitted as easily as a digital dollar. The barriers to using alternative currencies were primarily technical and informational. Technology was solving the technical barriers. Information was spreading. The time required to send money in rupees or yuan was falling, matching the speed of dollar transfers. The cost of the transfer was falling. The complexity was falling.

Within five years, moving money in Chinese yuan would be as easy as moving money in dollars. Within ten, probably easier, because the Chinese would have built technology designed for Chinese capabilities while the American system would still be burdened with legacy infrastructure. The question would not be whether alternatives were possible, but whether they were superior. At that point, the

network effects would start to shift.

But the timeframe was crucial. De-dollarization was a generational shift, not an event. Even if every nation began moving away from the dollar tomorrow, the process would take a decade to fully play out. The existing stock of dollar assets, the existing infrastructure, the existing habits, would not evaporate. The process would be glacially slow at first, then accelerate.

The real question was what would replace the dollar. Would it be a single rival currency? Unlikely. The yuan faced structural limitations. Capital controls meant the yuan could not become a freely tradeable currency without major reforms that would threaten Communist Party control. The system worked as long as the yuan was tightly managed; liberalization would make it unmanageable.

Would it be a currency basket, like the BRICS Unit? Possibly. A basket had the advantage of diversification. It was not hostage to any single nation's policies. But baskets had the disadvantage of complexity. You could not easily price things in a basket. The transaction costs of constantly rebalancing across multiple currencies were higher.

More likely was fragmentation. Different regions would develop regional dominance currencies. The yuan would be dominant in East Asia. The euro would persist in Europe. The rupee might dominate South Asia. The real would dominate South America. The ruble might hold sway in its traditional sphere. The dollar would persist in the Americas and remain a secondary currency everywhere. Global trade would be conducted in multiple currencies, with different currency pairs dominant in different regions.

This outcome would not mean the end of the dollar's privileged position. The United States would remain wealthy. American capital markets would remain deep. American military power would remain strong. But the dollar would go from universal to regional, from dominant to one-among-many. The exorbitant privilege would shrink.

American policy latitude would narrow. The ability to weaponize finance would diminish because alternatives would exist.

The timeframe was perhaps fifteen to twenty-five years for the fundamental shift. By 2040 to 2050, the dollar's share of global reserves might drop to forty percent. Its share of trade settlements might fall to seventy percent. The network effects would have weakened sufficiently that alternatives were seamlessly available. American financial advantage would persist, but it would no longer be overwhelming.

The implications for American power were profound but not catastrophic. The ability to wage economic warfare would diminish. The ability to impose financial sanctions would become harder and costlier. The ability to project power through financial mechanisms would weaken. But American military power would remain. American technological leadership might persist. American diplomatic weight would not disappear.

What would change was the assumption that American power was a permanent feature. The multipolar world that was emerging would require American engagement, not American command. The freedom of action that American power had guaranteed would narrow. The capacity to determine global outcomes through financial dominance would decline.

The question for American strategists was whether to accept this outcome or to resist it. Resistance seemed futile. The forces driving de-dollarization were structural: the rise of economic power in the Global South, the desire for autonomy from American power, the development of alternative technologies, the shift in where global growth occurred.

Acceptance meant preparing for a world in which American power was important but not dominant, in which American interests were pursued through diplomacy and alliance rather than through unilateral assertion, in which multiple powers had to be

accommodated rather than simply commanded. It meant a rebalancing from hegemony to great-power competition. It meant accepting that the unipolar moment, the three decades of American dominance after the Cold War's end, was history.

By 2026, this realization was beginning to penetrate. The financial press had gone from dismissing de-dollarization as impossibility to treating it as long-term possibility. Academic economists were beginning to model multipolar currency scenarios. Central bankers were quietly building up gold reserves and diversifying currency holdings. The consensus was shifting from "the dollar is eternal" to "the dollar will eventually decline but probably not for decades."

What no one quite wanted to articulate was the possibility that the timeline might be shorter than expected. That the 300-basis-point premium might compress faster if a genuine crisis shook confidence. That network effects, once they began shifting, could shift more rapidly than the slow linear extrapolations suggested. That a single event, a major Western financial crisis, a significant US policy blunder, a recession, could accelerate the transition by years.

The dollar would not disappear. But its dominance would. And when it did, a fundamental pillar of American power would have eroded. The era of exorbitant privilege would end. The unipolar moment would close. History would have moved on.

The only question was how quickly, and whether America would manage the transition gracefully or fight it bitterly. By 2026, that question was still undecided, though the trajectory was clear. De-dollarization was not a dream. It was destiny, arriving faster than most assumed.

PART VI

THE INVISIBLE BATTLEFIELDS

CHAPTER 36: CYBER WARS

The power went out at 2:47 a.m. on a Tuesday in March, and nobody noticed for six minutes.

The grid operators in the Midwestern control room were staring at screens that suddenly went dark. Not all of them. Just enough to create a blind spot. In those six minutes, a sophisticated adversary moved through the electrical system like water finding cracks in concrete. The intrusion had already been there for months. Patient. Dormant. Waiting.

This didn't happen. Not exactly. But it could. That's what keeps the people in the energy sector awake at night now.

The attack bears the fingerprints of Volt Typhoon, a Chinese hacking group that specializes in a new kind of warfare: not the swift strike, but the long occupation. Beginning in 2015, Volt Typhoon infiltrated American critical infrastructure. Not to attack. Not yet. To wait. To watch. To prepare.

The group compromised routers in at least forty-two American utilities, water treatment facilities, and other critical systems. They moved so slowly, so carefully, that it took the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) until 2023 to even detect them. By then, years had passed. Volt Typhoon's people were already inside the walls, like an occupying army that never announces its presence until the moment it decides to strike.

This is the new face of cyber warfare. Not ransomware. Not stealing data for espionage, though that happens too. It's about access. About the ability to break things when it matters most.

APT41, another Chinese group, operates in the commercial space, hitting gaming companies and software vendors. But APT41 also targets critical infrastructure. Their methodology is different: speed

over stealth. Aggressive. Aimed at immediate return. They find a weakness and exploit it before anyone can patch it. Zero days. The kind of vulnerabilities that kill network administrators' dreams.

Then there are the Russians. The FSB. SVR. GRU. They've been waging cyberwar against Ukraine since before the 2022 invasion. Destructive malware targeting power grids. Attacks on communication systems. The goal: sow chaos, disrupt life, demonstrate that Kyiv cannot protect its people.

In late 2022, a Russian hacking group called Sandworm (connected to GRU, Russia's military intelligence) deployed wiper malware across the Ukrainian electrical grid. Whole regions went dark. Hospitals switched to backup generators. The dark lasted for days in some places. Russian cyber commanders in Moscow watched the chaos unfold in real time, seeing the tactical effect of their code.

The calculus was simple: destroy infrastructure, demoralize the population, make the government's job harder.

Since then, the attacks have only accelerated. NATO's eastern European members, particularly Poland and the Baltic states, have been hit repeatedly. The aim is the same: disrupt, demoralize, demonstrate vulnerability. Each attack is a message. We can reach into your country and break things. We can turn off your power. We can silence your communications.

Iran and North Korea operate in a different register. Iran's cyber units, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, have conducted espionage and intellectual property theft. But they've also conducted destructive attacks. The 2021 attack on water treatment facilities was a reminder that Iran is willing to target infrastructure that could harm civilians. North Korea, meanwhile, has focused on financial theft and espionage. But the North Korean regime is not afraid of destruction. It has already demonstrated willingness to launch attacks on systems in ways that maximize chaos and harm.

The statistics tell a stark story. According to research released in

2024, 64 percent of organizations worldwide reported accounting for geopolitically motivated cyberattacks in their security planning. Two years earlier, that number was 39 percent. The spike is not coincidence. It's a reflection of a world in which cyber warfare has become normalized.

The SolarWinds attack in 2020 was the gateway. A Russian hacking group compromised the software company's build system and inserted a backdoor into millions of installations of SolarWinds Orion, a widely used network monitoring tool. For months, Russian operatives moved through the networks of the US Treasury Department, the Department of Homeland Security, the Pentagon, and dozens of other federal agencies. They stole emails. They moved deeper into classified networks. The scope of the breach was breathtaking. The response was slow.

Then came Colonial Pipeline. In May 2021, DarkSide, a Russian affiliate ransomware group, encrypted the computer systems of Colonial Pipeline, which operates the largest fuel pipeline in the United States. The pipeline runs from Houston to New Jersey. Colonial Pipeline shut it down. Voluntarily. The company could not negotiate with the intruders because the intruders had complete control of their systems.

For days, the pipeline stayed dark. Gas shortages appeared in North Carolina and Georgia. Prices spiked. Panic buying emptied pumps. Grocery stores ran low on certain goods. The economic damage mounted in hours.

In the end, Colonial Pipeline paid the ransom: $4.4 million in Bitcoin. They recovered the decryption key from their attackers. The pipeline came back online.

The lesson was unambiguous: cyber attacks could now produce physical effects that harmed the American public. And the attacker was thousands of miles away.

The shift in cyber strategy over the past five years has been

fundamental. In the 2010s, the goal was often to steal data, conduct espionage, gather intelligence. The 2020s have introduced a new priority: establish long-term, undetected access to critical systems. Not to exploit them immediately. But to have the option to exploit them in the future.

Volt Typhoon's approach exemplifies this. They move through networks using "living off the land" techniques. They use the operating systems' built-in tools to navigate, avoiding the detection signatures that security software looks for. They move slowly. They hide in plain sight.

This approach assumes that cyber deterrence, like nuclear deterrence, will eventually become about the credible threat of catastrophic retaliation. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea all maintain strategic cyber capabilities aimed at the West. The West maintains them too. The doctrine is developing in real time, and it is unstable.

What happens when Volt Typhoon finally decides to strike?

The answer is unknowable, which makes it frightening. The scenarios are not difficult to imagine. An attack on the power grid that cascades across multiple states. A coordinated strike that takes down the financial system. An intrusion into hospital networks that disrupts patient care systems. Any of these could happen in theory. Some of these could happen at scale.

The timeline matters. During a major crisis between the United States and China. During a moment of miscalculation. During a period when political leaders feel cornered and desperate. That's when Volt Typhoon could transition from occupier to attacker.

But the more immediate threat might be something else: connectivity disruption. A new report from the State Department notes that as of 2026, the primary coercion tool available to hostile actors is no longer data theft or destructive malware. It's the ability to disrupt connectivity. To cut the cables that carry data around the world. To

sever the fiber optic lines that run under the oceans.

A few ships towing anchors could do it. Intentionally.

There are approximately 300 undersea cable systems that carry 99 percent of transcontinental data traffic. They are concentrated. They are vulnerable. They are also mostly outside the jurisdiction of any single country.

A sophisticated nation-state could cut these cables. Not all of them. Just enough to create severe disruption. Just enough to cripple communications between continents for days or weeks while repair ships mobilize.

This is the new frontier of cyber warfare: not hacking, but hardware destruction.

The democratization of cyber capabilities adds another layer of risk. As of 2026, artificial intelligence is beginning to enable sophisticated cyberattacks that previously required large teams of skilled engineers. An AI trained on common vulnerabilities and attack patterns can probe networks, test defenses, and exploit weaknesses with minimal human direction.

This means that capability is spreading. Organizations that cannot afford large cyber units can now employ AI systems that can conduct reconnaissance and initial intrusion. The cost of entry is dropping. The sophistication is not declining in proportion.

For the first time in the history of warfare, a relatively small group of talented people, armed with AI and computing power, can wage war against nation-states. Can disrupt the systems that millions of people depend on. Can kill people indirectly by shutting down hospitals or water systems.

The traditional tools of deterrence are not obviously effective here. You cannot deter an adversary you cannot identify. You cannot credibly threaten retaliation if you do not know who attacked you.

You cannot defend everywhere.

The United States has not suffered a catastrophic cyberattack on critical infrastructure in peacetime. The closest was Colonial Pipeline, and that was ransomware, not a nation-state attempting maximum destruction.

But everyone in the security community knows it's coming. Not today. Not next week. But in the course of a future conflict, in a moment when deterrence has failed, someone will give the order to open Volt Typhoon's access and see what breaks.

That moment is being prepared for right now.

The power grid operators continue their watches. The network defenders continue their scans. The people in the intelligence agencies continue their surveillance of Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean hacking groups.

And the hackers continue their work. Patient. Methodical. Waiting for the signal.

In a basement somewhere in Beijing or Moscow, someone is still typing. Still probing. Still preparing for a future that nobody wants but everybody is preparing for.

That's the current state of cyber warfare. Not the dramatic explosion on the news. But the quiet, patient, terrifying work of building the capacity to destroy in the moment when it matters most.

The power might go out. But next time, you might notice too late to do anything about it.

CHAPTER 37: THE RACE TO THE MOON

The shuttle sits on the launch pad at Kennedy Space Center, waiting. Artemis II has been waiting for years. The vehicle itself was stacked in 2022. NASA's most powerful rocket ever built. The Space Launch System reaches toward the Florida sky, 322 feet of engineering that represents one of the most expensive government projects in history.

And it is about to lift off. March 2026 is the target. The same month this book is being read. The rocket will carry four astronauts on a loop around the moon. Not landing. Not yet. Just going there and coming back. A rehearsal for the real mission: Artemis III, which will put humans on the lunar surface for the first time since 1972.

Fifty-four years. That's how long it has been since an American walked on the moon. Fifty-four years of talk about returning. Fifty-four years of budgets and delays and redesigns.

Now it is really happening. Or appears to be.

But the race to the moon is not the competition it was in the 1960s, when the Soviet Union and the United States were locked in a literal race. The current race is something more subtle and more consequential. It is a race to establish a presence, to claim zones, to control resources, to construct the infrastructure of a new frontier.

And China is moving faster than most people realize.

Chang'e 7 is scheduled to launch in mid-to-late 2026. The name references the Chinese moon goddess. The mission will land in the moon's south polar region, where radar and spectroscopy suggest there is water ice locked in the regolith. If confirmed, water ice at the south pole would be transformative. Water means oxygen. Water means fuel. Water means that humans can actually stay on the moon for extended periods without constantly resupplying from Earth.

Chang'e 8 will follow in 2028, further consolidating China's presence on the lunar surface.

And then comes the grand prize: a crewed lunar landing by 2030.

This is the date that matters. 2030. Not a rehearsal. Not an uncrewed mission. Humans from China standing on the moon. The prestige of that moment, the symbolism, the technological demonstration would be monumental.

The United States hopes to land Artemis III astronauts on the moon by 2025 or 2026. But the timeline has slipped repeatedly. The question now is whether Artemis III will land before or after Chang'e's crewed mission.

If China lands humans on the moon first, the impact on global perception of technological capability and national power would be severe. It would signal that the era of American space dominance has ended. That the United States is no longer the technological leader in the most visible frontier.

The competition extends beyond prestige. The Artemis Accords, signed by dozens of nations, attempt to establish rules for lunar activity. The accords declare that the moon is not subject to national sovereignty. But they also allow for "safety zones" around areas where nations are actively conducting operations. These safety zones, in practice, function as exclusive zones of control.

The first nation to establish a real presence in the moon's south pole region will have practical control over that area, even if the accords say no one can claim sovereignty.

This is why both programs are focused on the south pole. The water ice there is the prize. Whoever gets there first establishes a presence that will be extremely difficult for competitors to displace.

China has proposed something that looks like an alternative to the Artemis Accords: the International Lunar Research Station, a

facility on the moon's surface that is being designed as an explicitly multipolar project. Nations from the Global South are invited to participate. It is framed as an alternative to the Western space establishment, which many developing nations view as exclusionary.

The pitch is working. Nations from the Global South are finding the Chinese proposal more attractive than the American one because it appears more inclusive and because Chinese financial and technical support is often more generous than Western alternatives.

This is soft power of the subtlest kind. China is not beating the United States in a race to plant a flag. China is building relationships that will shape the future of lunar development. When the International Lunar Research Station is operational, it will have participants from dozens of countries. And China will be the host and the lead builder.

But the real story of space competition in 2026 is not about governments. It is about connectivity.

Starlink, the satellite internet constellation operated by Elon Musk's SpaceX, has deployed approximately 9,500 satellites in low Earth orbit. The network is providing internet access to 9.2 million users, including in rural areas and developing countries where traditional internet infrastructure is absent or prohibitively expensive.

This is a geopolitical fact of the first order. A private company has built an infrastructure that is not subject to any government's direct control. The United States government can pressure SpaceX, and has, but the network itself is resilient and distributed. It is difficult to shut down.

The geopolitical implications are enormous. Ukraine has used Starlink to maintain communications when Russian attacks destroyed traditional infrastructure. The system has become integral to the functioning of a nation-state during wartime.

China views this as a massive problem. The United States has

built a space-based communications network that operates globally. China cannot easily interdict it. China cannot control it. It exists beyond China's borders and beyond the reach of Chinese military power.

Amazon is addressing this in its own way. The company is deploying Leo, a constellation of 700 satellites, beginning in mid-2026. Leo is designed to compete with Starlink and to provide another option for nations and companies that want an alternative to the SpaceX network.

The European Space Agency is working on similar projects. India is considering its own constellation. The idea that space-based internet access will be monopolized by a single company or nation is being actively challenged.

What this means in practice is that connectivity is becoming a competition between networks, between nations, between companies. Control of the infrastructure that connects people is becoming the most valuable real estate. The fact that this infrastructure orbits above Earth and cannot be subject to any single nation's direct control makes it more important, not less.

Governments are starting to realize that they need to ensure they have access to multiple networks, that they are not dependent on a single provider or a single nation.

The only moment of cooperation in this competitive space sector is the SMILE mission. SMILE stands for Solar wind Magnetosphere Ionosphere Coupling Exploration. It is a joint mission between the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the European Space Agency. The satellite is designed to study how the sun's particles interact with Earth's magnetic field.

This is basic science. It has no obvious military application. It is the kind of collaboration that would have been routine during the Cold War, a safe space for scientists from different nations to work together on questions that transcend borders.

The SMILE mission launched in May 2023. It is working as designed. Chinese and European scientists are analyzing data together. They are publishing papers together. They are not in competition. They are advancing human knowledge about a phenomenon that affects everyone on Earth.

But SMILE is an exception. The rule is competition. Nations are racing to develop space capabilities. They are racing to establish presence on the moon. They are racing to build satellite networks that will form the nervous system of global communications.

The interesting thing about space is that it amplifies national power in unusual ways. A technologically advanced nation with robust space capabilities looks far more formidable than a nation without them. Space capability becomes visible evidence of a nation's scientific and engineering prowess.

This is why China is pushing so hard on the lunar program. This is why the United States is pushing back. This is why India's space successes, demonstrated through their lunar and Mars missions, have elevated India's global standing.

The moon itself represents something deeper: the frontier. The idea that there is still a new frontier, still unexplored territory, still room for competition and discovery. This appeals to something fundamental in human nature and in national identity.

The Americans of the 1960s believed in frontiers. The space program expressed that belief. The landing on the moon was presented not as a military victory, but as a triumph of human aspiration.

Now, fifty-four years later, that frontier is opening again. But this time, it is multipolar. Not two nations racing. Many nations, each with their own ambitions, their own capabilities, their own vision of what the moon should be.

The Artemis II launch in March 2026 will be a moment worth

watching. If it goes cleanly, NASA will be demonstrating that despite delays and challenges, American engineering still works. American space capability is still real.

But everyone knows that what really matters is what happens when the lunar landing attempt comes. Who lands first. Who establishes the presence. Who claims the high ground, literally and figuratively.

The race to the moon is entering its most crucial phase. And no one knows how it will end.

What is certain is that the future of the moon will not be determined by a single nation. It will be determined by whoever moves fastest, builds the best, maintains the longest presence.

The shuttle sits on the launch pad. The countdown continues. In the next hours or days, it will lift off. Four astronauts will go to the moon and back. It will be a success.

But somewhere in Beijing, in the offices of the China National Space Administration, they are already planning for 2030. Already preparing for the moment when Chinese astronauts will step onto the lunar surface.

The race continues. The frontier awaits. The future of space exploration will be written in the next few years, and it will not be written by a single nation. It will be written by all of them, each striving for advantage, each seeking to establish their place on the moon.

CHAPTER 38: AI GOVERNANCE: WHO WRITES THE RULES?

In a conference room overlooking the East River in New York, diplomats from 120 countries are arguing about what should be illegal.

The question is simple, the answer is not. What happens when artificial intelligence systems make decisions that affect millions of people. Who should regulate it. What rules should apply.

Three competing visions are emerging. And none of them are compatible.

The European Union has chosen a path of comprehensive regulation. The AI Act, finalized in 2023, imposes strict requirements on high-risk AI applications. Facial recognition in public spaces. Algorithms that make decisions about credit, hiring, or criminal justice. These systems must be transparent. They must be auditable. They must respect human rights.

This is a rights-based framework. It assumes that AI development, however beneficial, cannot come at the cost of fundamental human protections. It assumes that Europeans have a right to know when they are being subject to algorithmic decision-making. It assumes that certain applications of AI are categorically forbidden because they violate human dignity.

The enforcement mechanism is teeth. Fines. Restrictions on doing business in Europe. The EU has enormous economic weight. Companies that want to operate in Europe have to comply with the AI Act. Full stop.

The United States has chosen a different path. The approach is voluntary, innovation-first, and decentralized. The U.S. government has issued guidance, not mandates. Industry is invited to adopt

standards, not forced. Certain sectors, like defense and health care, have specific rules. But there is no comprehensive AI regulation.

The logic is that AI is moving too fast for regulation to keep up. That heavy-handed rules will slow innovation. That the United States needs to move faster than competitors, particularly China, to maintain leadership. That market forces and industry self-regulation are sufficient to manage risks.

This is a pragmatism-based framework. It assumes that innovation comes before regulation. That the benefits of rapid AI development outweigh the risks of inadequate safeguards. That Americans trust their companies more than they trust their government to make good decisions.

The enforcement mechanism is light. Companies that misbehave might face lawsuits. The Federal Trade Commission might investigate. But there is no comprehensive legal framework that forbids entire categories of AI application.

China has chosen a third path. State control. The Communist Party views AI as both an opportunity and a threat. An opportunity to enhance state capacity, economic growth, and military power. A threat to political stability if the technology enables surveillance that the state cannot control, or if AI systems make decisions the Party does not like.

The Chinese approach is comprehensive but not about rights. It is about control. AI systems must serve state interests. They must be aligned with what Beijing calls "socialist core values." They must not undermine Party authority.

This is a power-based framework. It assumes that the state has the right and the obligation to guide AI development in directions that serve national interests. It assumes that individual rights are secondary to collective stability and national strength.

The enforcement mechanism is the state apparatus. Censorship

boards. Security reviews. Restrictions on research. The state decides which AI applications are permitted and which are forbidden.

These three frameworks cannot coexist peacefully. They are fundamentally incompatible.

A facial recognition system that is illegal in Europe because it violates privacy rights might be required in China to enhance public security. An AI system that is encouraged in the United States as a business innovation might be banned in Europe as a threat to human dignity.

This creates enormous practical problems for companies operating globally. Facebook cannot run the same AI recommendation algorithm in Europe that it runs in the United States. Apple cannot implement facial recognition the same way everywhere. Chinese AI companies cannot operate freely outside China because their systems are designed for state surveillance, not individual privacy.

The question becomes: Who sets the standard that the rest of the world follows?

The United Nations has launched a Global Dialogue on AI Governance. The idea is to develop a multilateral framework that countries can agree on. But the talks have made little progress. The fundamental disagreement about what AI should be regulated for, and why, is too deep.

An Independent International Scientific Panel on AI has been convened. Leading researchers from around the world. The goal is to provide technical advice on what is actually possible, what risks are real, what risks are overstated.

But science cannot solve a political problem. The question of AI governance is not a technical question. It is a question about power. About whose values will shape the technology that shapes billions of lives.

Here is where the real tension sits. The Global South, which includes most of the world's population, has essentially no seat at the table. AI governance is being written by the United States, the European Union, and China. Everyone else is being told to either conform to American standards, European standards, or Chinese standards.

This is resented. Deeply. The countries of Africa, South Asia, Latin America, and Southeast Asia have their own views about what AI should be allowed to do. They have their own concerns about privacy, autonomy, and dignity. They have their own hopes that AI could solve local problems like healthcare, agriculture, and education.

But they have almost no influence on the global governance frameworks being created. The discussions in Geneva and Brussels and Beijing are not including voices from Lagos, Delhi, or São Paulo in meaningful ways.

One ambassador from an African nation put it bluntly in a closed-door session. "You are writing the rules without us. And then you will complain when we do not follow them."

This is likely to be the defining pattern of AI governance for the next decade. The wealthy nations will write rules. The Global South will resent those rules. The Global South will often ignore those rules because they do not see themselves reflected in them. And there will be no enforcement mechanism that is actually effective globally.

The gap between regulation and technology is already enormous and growing. AI systems are being deployed faster than rules are being written. The technology is advancing in directions that no one foresaw. Large language models have surprised even their creators with their capabilities. Generative AI is spreading into every sector. Deepfakes are becoming indistinguishable from reality.

By the time regulations are written, the technology has evolved beyond what the regulations were designed to address.

The European AI Act is comprehensive. But it was written before the explosion of generative AI. The rules, while thoughtful, may already be somewhat obsolete. The United States government is trying to issue guidance on AI governance even as the technology is changing monthly.

China is trying to control AI development, but control is difficult when the most powerful AI research is happening globally and the most capable AI models are open source, available to anyone with the computational resources to use them.

There is also the question of who actually gets to decide. The companies building AI systems are, for the most part, headquartered in the United States. OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Meta, Microsoft. These are the companies at the frontier of AI capability. Their decisions about how to build and deploy AI systems have more impact than government regulations, at least in the near term.

These companies have their own incentives. Some are genuinely trying to build AI safely. Some are trying to move as fast as possible to capture market share. Some are trying to achieve regulatory capture, which means shaping the rules in ways that benefit themselves.

The honest answer is that no one is in control of AI governance. The technology is moving too fast. The interests are too divided. The international consensus is too fragile. The stakes are too high.

But the pretense is that governance is happening. Conferences are being held. Panels are being convened. Rules are being written. Statements are being issued about the importance of responsible AI development.

The gap between these governance efforts and the actual reality of AI development is not closing. It is widening.

This might be the most consequential policy question of the century. The technology being governed will shape how humans relate to information, to each other, to work, to truth itself. The decisions

being made now will ripple across decades.

And yet the governance is fragmented, incomplete, and increasingly ineffective.

In the long run, this situation is unstable. Either the world will develop a common framework for AI governance, or it will split into regional blocs with incompatible rules. Either governments will find a way to actually regulate AI, or they will watch the technology evolve in directions no one wants but no one can stop.

Either way, the current moment is transitional. The frameworks being built now are not final. They will fail or adapt. Probably both.

The question is not whether AI will be governed. It will be. The question is whether the governance will be effective, just, and broadly accepted. Or whether it will be fragmented, contested, and increasingly undermined.

The answer will shape the world for generations.

In the conference room overlooking the East River, the diplomats continue their arguments. They will continue tomorrow. And the day after. Meanwhile, somewhere in a lab in California or Beijing or London, someone is training a new AI model that none of them understand yet.

The race between technology and governance continues. And technology is winning.

CHAPTER 39: THE ENERGY TRILEMMA

The data center sits in a remote corner of rural Oregon, humming with the sound of millions of computations happening every second. The facility covers 60,000 square feet. The cooling systems alone consume more energy than a small town.

This is where artificial intelligence lives. Or more precisely, this is where the infrastructure lives that powers the AI systems that are reshaping the world.

The data center operator knows exactly how much electricity this building consumes. 16 megawatts. Constant. Running 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Enough electricity to power 12,000 homes.

And it is about to get worse.

Data centers globally consumed 1.5 percent of all electricity generated in 2024. The percentage sounds small until you do the math. That is 690 terawatt hours per year. More electricity than the entire country of Germany consumes.

S&P Global, the research firm, projects that data center electricity consumption will rise 17 percent in 2026 alone. Not over five years. In one year. The growth is driven by AI. Training language models. Running inference. Powering the services that billions of people are now using.

And here is the problem that keeps energy policymakers awake at night. The clean energy transition, which is supposed to move the world away from fossil fuels to renewable energy, is now colliding headlong with the AI revolution. The computing power demanded by AI is so vast that it requires energy in quantities that most renewable energy sources simply cannot provide, at least not yet.

This creates what energy researchers call the energy trilemma. The impossible triangle. Three constraints that cannot all be satisfied

simultaneously.

Security. Affordability. Sustainability.

Pick two. You cannot have all three.

Security means that the energy system is reliable. Electricity flows when it is needed. Hospitals have power. Factories can operate. Cities can function. The grid does not fail.

Affordability means that electricity is cheap enough that ordinary people can afford it. Industry can compete globally. Growth is not constrained by energy costs.

Sustainability means that the energy is generated without destroying the climate, without depleting resources, without creating environmental damage.

For the past twenty years, the dream has been that technology would solve this. Solar panels would become cheap. Wind turbines would become efficient. Battery storage would become abundant and affordable. The world would transition to renewable energy and have security, affordability, and sustainability all at once.

This dream is colliding with reality.

Solar and wind are cheap now. They are. The price of a megawatt of solar capacity has dropped by 90 percent in the last fifteen years. Wind turbines have become more efficient and cheaper. The transition to renewable energy is happening, and faster than many analysts predicted.

But renewable energy has a fundamental problem. It is intermittent. The sun does not always shine. The wind does not always blow. At night, solar produces nothing. On calm days, wind produces little.

The grid needs energy all the time. Data centers need power all the time. Hospitals need electricity at 2 a.m.

The solution is battery storage. Store energy when the sun is shining or the wind is blowing. Release it when it is needed.

Battery technology has improved dramatically. The cost of battery storage has dropped. The efficiency of storage and retrieval has improved. But the amount of battery storage needed to power a grid entirely on renewable energy, while also powering artificial intelligence, is enormous.

And here is where the real constraint sits. The batteries need minerals. Lithium. Cobalt. Nickel. These minerals are not abundant everywhere. The mining of these minerals creates environmental damage. The supply chains are concentrated, meaning that a few countries have enormous leverage.

China has consolidated leadership in the clean energy supply chain. Not because Chinese companies are necessarily the best at what they do, but because China committed to dominating this sector years ago. Chinese companies now manufacture more solar panels than the rest of the world combined. Chinese companies control the processing of rare earth elements. Chinese companies own interests in mines across Africa and Latin America.

The irony is profound. The clean energy transition, which is supposed to reduce dependence on petrostates and reduce geopolitical vulnerability, is creating dependence on China for the physical infrastructure of renewable energy.

This is viewed with alarm in the United States and Europe. Biden administration policies and EU policies are explicitly designed to reduce dependence on Chinese renewable energy supply chains. Industrial policy. Subsidies for domestic manufacturing. Tariffs on Chinese goods. The aim is to build redundant capacity and reduce vulnerability.

This is expensive. It is slower than simply buying the cheapest panels from China. It is a deliberate choice to sacrifice efficiency for security.

But the push for security and reduced dependence on China is competing with the push for affordability and rapid climate action. If the United States decides that it will only use domestically manufactured solar panels, the cost of the energy transition rises. The deployment becomes slower. The timeline for decarbonizing the electricity system extends.

In developing countries, the trade-off is even more acute. A country in Sub-Saharan Africa wants to build renewable energy capacity. The cheapest way to do this is to buy Chinese solar panels. But buying Chinese panels means becoming dependent on Chinese companies and Chinese supply chains. The country faces pressure from the United States and others to build indigenous capacity or to diversify supply chains. But this means paying more and building slower.

The developing countries see this as unfair. They want to grow their economies. They need cheap energy. They are being told that they have to pay premium prices for renewable energy in the name of security and geopolitical diversification. This is a burden that wealthy countries did not face when they were developing.

Grid modernization is the other piece of this puzzle. The electrical grids that most countries use were designed for a different era. They were designed for centralized power generation. A few large power plants feeding electricity through transmission lines to cities and towns.

Renewable energy is distributed. Solar panels are on rooftops. Wind turbines are scattered across regions. The electricity flows in different directions. The grid has to be smarter. It has to be able to balance supply and demand in real time across thousands of nodes.

This modernization is technically possible. But it is expensive. It is also slow. Updating electricity infrastructure is not fast work. It involves physical construction. It involves political negotiation about where power lines go. It involves regulatory approval.

In the United States, permitting for new power lines can take five to ten years. In Europe, the timelines are sometimes longer. In developing countries, the infrastructure often does not exist at all.

Meanwhile, AI demand for electricity is growing monthly. New data centers are being built. New models are being trained. New services are being deployed.

One wild card in this equation is nuclear power. Nuclear energy produces no carbon. It is reliable. It can provide baseload power that renewable energy cannot. A nuclear plant can run 24/7.

This has led to a renaissance in nuclear thinking. Conservatives and climate hawks have found common ground on nuclear power. More nuclear plants could help solve the trilemma. Nuclear energy is secure, affordable (over time), and sustainable.

But nuclear power has its own problems. It is slow to build. A modern nuclear plant takes five to fifteen years from design to operation. It is capital-intensive. It is politically difficult. Public opposition to nuclear power remains strong in many countries.

The hope is that small modular reactors (SMRs) could change this. Smaller plants that are faster to build and less capital-intensive. Several countries are betting heavily on SMRs. But the technology is not yet commercial at scale. The first commercial SMR projects are just getting underway.

Here is what is likely to happen. The world will muddle through the energy trilemma. Some countries will prioritize security and build more nuclear capacity and indigenous renewable energy capacity, even if it is expensive. Some countries will prioritize affordability and build whatever is cheapest, which is usually more Chinese renewable energy. Some countries will prioritize sustainability and try to move as fast as possible to renewable energy, accepting some trade-offs on security and affordability.

The grid will become more stressed in some regions. Blackouts

will happen. Energy prices will rise in some places. But there will not be a complete collapse. The system will adapt, slowly and painfully.

And AI will continue to demand more electricity. Data centers will continue to be built. The computational power available to train and run AI systems will continue to increase. The question is not whether AI will grow. The question is whether the energy system can keep up.

The facility in rural Oregon continues to hum. The electricity comes from a mix of hydropower and solar energy. It is cheaper and cleaner than many alternatives. But it is not enough. More capacity will be built. More data centers will be constructed. More electricity will be consumed.

The grid that delivers this electricity is aging. The renewable energy infrastructure is new but scattered and intermittent. The battery storage is growing but not yet sufficient. The grid modernization is underway but slower than the demand growth.

This is the real constraint. Not money. Not technology. But time. Time to build infrastructure. Time to transition energy systems. Time to solve problems that do not have obvious solutions.

The energy trilemma will define global affairs for the next decade. The competition for secure energy supplies. The pressure to maintain affordability. The imperative of climate action. These three forces are locked in tension. They cannot all be satisfied. They will not be satisfied. But they will shape policy, shape investment, shape international relations.

Somewhere, another data center is being proposed. Another AI model is being trained. Another portion of the world's electricity will be devoted to artificial intelligence.

The question is not whether it will happen. The question is whether the energy system can support it without breaking.

CHAPTER 40: THE CRITICAL MINERALS SCRAMBLE

The mine is in the southern Democratic Republic of Congo, deep in Kasai region. The ore is streaked with a blue-grey mineral that looks almost beautiful in the sunlight. This is cobalt. The mineral is worth more per ton than gold.

A Chinese company owns the mine. A Chinese company operates it. The profits flow to China. The workers are paid by the Chinese company. They are paid enough to survive, not enough to build a future.

This is the new extractive economy. Not European colonialism of the nineteenth century. But something that resembles it. Resource extraction by wealthy nations, with minimal benefit to the countries where the resources are located.

Lithium. Cobalt. Copper. Tin. Gallium. Rare earth elements. The periodic table suddenly matters again. These minerals that nobody thought about thirty years ago are now more valuable than oil.

Lithium is used in batteries. Not just car batteries. The batteries in your phone. The batteries in your laptop. The batteries that store renewable energy. As electric vehicles proliferate and as renewable energy expands, the demand for lithium is growing exponentially.

Cobalt is used in batteries and in electronics. More critically for geopolitics, the cobalt mines of the DRC produce more than half of the world's cobalt. Not a third. Half. One country dominates the global supply of a mineral that is essential for the energy transition.

Copper is used in solar panels, in wind turbines, in electrical systems. More copper will be needed in the next decade than was extracted in the entire twentieth century.

Tin is used in semiconductors. Gallium is used in semiconductors. Rare earth elements are used in everything from smartphones to

military weapons systems.

The companies that make electric vehicles need these minerals. The companies that make semiconductors need them. The countries that want to transition to renewable energy need them. And the countries that have these minerals have leverage.

China understood this years ago. While Western companies were focused on efficiency and cost, Chinese companies were securing supply contracts in Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Australia. Long-term contracts. Majority ownership of mines. Refineries and processing facilities under Chinese control.

Today, China controls more than 60 percent of global critical mineral processing. Not just mining. Processing. Taking the raw ore and turning it into usable material. This is where the real profit margin is.

If you want to build electric vehicles, you need batteries. If you want batteries, you need processed lithium and cobalt. If you want processed lithium and cobalt, you probably need to buy from a company in China.

The European Union has realized this and is panicking. The EU wants to transition to renewable energy and electric vehicles. But the minerals that make this transition possible are being controlled by a competitor.

The Biden administration has realized this. The Inflation Reduction Act, while framed as climate policy, is really a critical minerals policy. Subsidies for domestic mining. Subsidies for domestic processing. Restrictions on sourcing minerals from China.

The goal is to build redundancy in the supply chain. To ensure that the United States and Europe are not entirely dependent on China for the minerals they need.

This is inefficient. This is expensive. Domestic mining in the

United States is slower and more expensive than Chinese-controlled mining in Africa. Processing minerals in the United States costs more than processing them in China.

But security is more expensive than efficiency. The choice is deliberate.

Australia has lithium. Australia has also been asserting itself as an independent actor rather than a follower of American policy. This makes Australia important to multiple powers. China wants Australian lithium. The United States wants to ensure it does not lose access to Australian lithium. The result is competition and diplomatic maneuvering.

Chile has huge lithium reserves, but Chile is also asserting control over its own resources. For decades, Chilean lithium was extracted by foreign companies that took most of the profits. Chile is now moving to increase state control and ensure that more of the benefits stay in Chile. This is resource nationalism, and it is spreading.

All of this is creating a competitive environment for critical minerals. Whoever can secure long-term supply contracts will have a strategic advantage. Whoever controls processing will have leverage.

The geopolitical implications are enormous. A country that cannot secure access to critical minerals cannot build an energy transition. It cannot build a modern military. It cannot build modern technologies.

This is a constraint that the Global South has always faced. Dependence on extraction of raw resources. Low value-added activities. Limited industrial capacity. The dream was that technology would change this. That countries could skip directly to modern economies without going through the industrial age.

But the reality is that the mineral-intensive nature of the clean energy transition is actually making the old resource curse more relevant, not less.

The competition for critical minerals is manifesting in several ways. Export controls. China has restricted exports of rare earth elements, especially to countries that have angered the Chinese government. This is a proven tactic. Restrict supply, raise prices, demonstrate leverage.

Defensive trade measures. Countries are imposing tariffs on mineral imports and processed minerals to protect domestic producers. This is technically against the rules of the World Trade Organization, but enforcement is weak.

Foreign direct investment screening. The United States has been rejecting or conditioning investment by Chinese companies in American mineral mines and processing facilities. The stated rationale is national security. The practical effect is to prevent China from securing American mineral supply.

The CRITICAL MINERALS ACT and other legislation is creating legal frameworks for protecting strategic supply chains.

In response, China is offering better deals. Higher prices to countries that will sell to China. Investment in infrastructure. Access to Chinese markets. The soft power of generosity with some partners while threatening others.

The result is a complex web of alliances and dependencies. Countries cannot simply act in their own interest. They have to consider how the major powers will respond.

For a mid-sized country like Indonesia, which has large nickel reserves, the calculation is fraught. The United States wants to ensure access to Indonesian nickel. China has already invested heavily in Indonesian nickel processing. Indonesia wants to maximize the value it gets from its own resources and minimize dependence on any outside power.

This is nearly impossible. If Indonesia says yes to American investment, China responds by limiting market access for other

Indonesian goods. If Indonesia favors China, it risks alienating the United States.

The critical minerals scramble is particularly acute because demand is growing while supply is constrained. Every year, more electric vehicles are sold. Every year, more solar panels are installed. Every year, more semiconductors are manufactured. Every year, the demand for critical minerals grows.

The supply response is slow. New mines take years to develop. New processing facilities take years to build. The ore body has to be discovered, mapped, the mining rights secured, the environmental impact assessed, the permits approved, the equipment installed, the workforce trained.

By the time a new mine is operational, demand has often increased beyond what was anticipated.

This is why prices for critical minerals are volatile and rising. This is why companies are scrambling to secure supply contracts. This is why countries are competing for access.

The long-term view is that demand for critical minerals will continue to grow. The short-term reality is that supply is constrained and unevenly distributed. During this transition period, leverage shifts to whoever controls the supply.

That is currently China. But the United States and Europe are working hard to change this. India is developing its own critical mineral capacity. Australia is becoming more important. New mining projects are being developed in Greenland, Canada, and other developed countries.

In the next five years, there will likely be some diversification of supply. China's dominance will probably diminish somewhat. But China will still be a major player. The minerals will still be unevenly distributed. The scramble will continue.

The geopolitical implication is clear. Whoever controls the critical minerals controls the energy transition. Whoever controls the energy transition controls the future economic and military power of nations.

This is why the scramble is so intense. This is why so much money is being invested in mining and processing. This is why countries are willing to bend rules and compromise principles to secure supply.

The mine in the DRC continues to operate. The cobalt continues to flow. Much of it ends up in batteries that power electric vehicles in the United States and Europe. The vehicles that are supposed to be powered by clean energy are powered partly by minerals extracted from one of the poorest countries in the world, with minimal benefit to that country.

This is the distribution of gains in the critical minerals economy. The technology companies benefit. The countries with minerals benefit, but usually not as much as they should. The people who work the mines benefit least of all.

Until this changes, the energy transition will be a story of transfers of wealth and power from the Global South to the wealthy countries and to China. Which means that the energy transition, while necessary for climate stability, will likely increase global inequality.

This is the trap that resource-rich but poor countries face. They have something the world needs. But they have limited power to extract maximum benefit. The scramble continues. The minerals flow. The leverage shifts. But the fundamental inequality remains.

PART VII

THE WORLD AHEAD

CHAPTER 41: THE MULTIPOLAR MOMENT

The G7 meeting used to mean something. When the seven largest economies gathered, their decisions rippled around the world. The United States, Europe, Japan, Canada speaking with collective voice. The rest of the world listened and complied.

Now the G7 meets and announces something. And nobody is quite sure if it matters.

This is the essential fact of the multipolar moment. Power is distributed. No single actor is dominant. The United States is still the strongest single nation, but it is no longer capable of imposing its will globally. It has to negotiate. It has to compromise. It has to find allies, and it cannot always find them.

China is a peer competitor. Not in every dimension. China's military is still second to America's. China's economy is large, but America's is larger. But in the domains where China has chosen to compete, it is at parity or ahead. Artificial intelligence. Semiconductors. Space. Cyberspace. Hypersonic missiles. Advanced weaponry.

More fundamentally, China has the political will to compete globally. America is tired. American voters are skeptical about foreign engagement. American politicians are divided about whether America should maintain its global role or retreat from it.

Russia is diminished. The Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that Russia's military is weaker than most analysts believed. The Russian economy is smaller than the United Kingdom's. Russia cannot match America or China in most measures of power.

But Russia is a nuclear power with more warheads than anyone except America. Russia has 11 time zones. Russia is culturally part of Europe and Asia. Russia has leverage in energy supplies and grain

supplies. Russia is not a superpower, but Russia cannot be ignored.

India is rising. Not yet a peer competitor with the United States or China, but rising fast. India's population is now larger than China's. India's growth rate is higher. India's technological capabilities are advancing. India has not yet chosen to fully align with the West or with China. India is a swing state, and that gives India more leverage than its current power would suggest.

The European Union is a regulatory superpower. The EU cannot project military power globally. The EU's strategic autonomy is limited. But the EU can write rules that affect global business. The EU can set standards that other countries have to follow. Companies that operate in Europe have to comply with EU regulations. This is a different kind of power, but it is real power.

The Gulf states are players. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are wealthy and influential. They are not aligned unambiguously with the United States or any other power. They play multiple sides. They use their leverage in energy and investment to secure advantages.

Brazil is a player. Mexico is a player. In the global order, there are now maybe 20 countries that have to be taken seriously. Not because they control everything, but because they control enough that decisions cannot be made without at least considering their interests.

This is multipolarity. And it is historically less stable than unipolarity.

Under American unipolarity from 1991 to 2015, the world had a hegemon that enforced a basic set of rules. The rules were not universally loved. But they existed and they were enforced. The US Navy enforced freedom of navigation. The US military enforced a stable balance in critical regions. The dollar enforced a global financial system.

The hegemon could impose costs on rule-breakers. It had the power to do so. This meant that the expected cost of breaking the

rules was often high enough to deter rule-breaking.

In a multipolar world, nobody has this enforcement power. Russia can invade Ukraine, and the international community responds with sanctions and condemnation. But Russia is not reversed out. The war continues. Russia has decided that the costs are acceptable, and Russia has the power to sustain that decision.

China is building military bases in the South China Sea, militarizing islands, asserting control over international waters. The United States objects. So do the Philippines and Vietnam and other regional powers. But China is not stopped because nobody has the power to stop China without risking a major war.

A historical parallel is instructive. Pre-World War I Europe was multipolar. The German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Russian Empire, the British Empire, France. Five major powers competing for dominance and influence. Each power had allies. Each power had strategic interests. Each power believed that war might come, but that its own forces could win.

What nobody anticipated was that a conflict in the Balkans between two minor powers would trigger a cascade of alliance commitments that pulled all five major powers into a continental war.

The mechanism was fragile. The tensions were high. The competition was fierce. And when a spark was provided, the entire system was engulfed in conflict.

Modern multipolarity is more resilient than pre-World War I Europe in some ways. The nuclear weapons and the economic interdependence create powerful incentives against major war. If the United States and China go to war, the economic damage would be catastrophic for both. If Russia and NATO go to war, the nuclear risk is enormous.

These constraints are real. They matter. They probably prevent the kind of total war that was possible in 1914.

But they do not prevent conflict. They prevent total war, but they allow proxy wars, economic warfare, cyberattacks, limited conventional conflicts.

The multipolar moment means that conflicts can happen without resolving anything because nobody is powerful enough to impose a settlement. The war in Ukraine continues despite Western support for Ukraine because Russia is powerful enough to defend itself and no one is powerful enough to beat Russia decisively without risking escalation.

The multipolar moment also means that alliances are more fluid. In a unipolar world, being aligned with the hegemon is the safest position. In a multipolar world, the safest position might be to appear aligned with multiple powers while actually maintaining independence.

India does this skillfully. India buys weapons from Russia and from the United States and from Europe. India maintains strategic autonomy. India will not choose between the United States and China, and this refusal to choose gives India leverage with both.

Mexico does this too. Mexico depends on trade with the United States, but Mexico also maintains relationships with other powers. Mexico serves as a potential swing vote on critical issues.

The multipolar moment is also characterized by the rise of alternative institutions. BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) is an explicit institutional challenge to the Western order. BRICS countries represent a majority of the world's population. BRICS countries are establishing their own development bank, their own institutions, their own rules.

This is not yet a counter-hegemonic order. But it is a claim that the Western order is not the only order, and that alternatives are possible.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization serves a similar function

in Asia. Informal groupings like the Arctic Council, various regional organizations, each serve to distribute power in multipolar way.

For the United States, multipolarity is a shock. Americans are not used to thinking in terms of peer competitors. American strategic planning has been premised on the assumption that America is the strongest actor and that everything else flows from this. Multipolarity requires Americans to think in terms of bargaining, of leverage, of coalition-building.

For China, multipolarity is opportunity. China has fought its way into the first rank of powers. China is not satisfied with being a regional power. China wants to be a global power. Multipolarity gives China this opportunity because there is no single power that can prevent China from becoming what it wants to be.

For the European Union, multipolarity is anxiety. The EU is powerful but not unified. The EU has no military of its own. The EU depends on NATO, which is led by the United States. If the United States steps back from its global commitments, the EU does not have the military capacity to replace American power.

For Russia, multipolarity is survival. Russia cannot compete with the United States or China in overall power. But in a multipolar world, Russia can play spoiler. Russia can cause costs for American and Western projects. Russia can be a problem that cannot be solved cheaply.

The multipolar moment is also characterized by the question: What does multipolarity become.

Does it evolve into a concert of powers, like the Concert of Europe that lasted for about a century after the Napoleonic Wars. Five or six major powers that recognize their mutual interest in maintaining order and that therefore cooperate on basic rules.

Or does it devolve into great power competition that is constant and escalatory. Each power building military capacity. Each power

seeking allies. Each power ready for war.

Or does it remain in the current state. Stable but fluid. Conflict at the edges but not at the core. Regional powers having more influence than they do in a unipolar world, but still ultimately constrained by the fear of escalation.

The honest answer is that no one knows. The multipolar moment is still crystallizing. The order that will emerge is not yet determined.

What is clear is that the age of American global dominance is over. The United States is still the strongest actor in most domains. But the United States is no longer powerful enough to write the rules unilaterally. The United States has to negotiate. The United States has to build coalitions.

This is a psychological adjustment for Americans. It is also a practical adjustment. Policy has to change. Strategy has to adapt.

For the rest of the world, multipolarity means opportunity and danger in equal measure. Opportunity because smaller powers have more leverage in a multipolar world. Danger because the absence of a clear hegemon creates uncertainty and the possibility of conflict.

The G7 meets and announces something. It matters, but not as much as it used to matter. The decision of India or Indonesia or Brazil matters more than it would have in a unipolar world.

This is the multipolar moment. It is not the moment anyone would have designed. It is the moment we are in.

CHAPTER 42: THE MIGRATION CENTURY

The interview takes place in a room in Khartoum, Sudan, during a lull in the fighting. A man in his late thirties, named Ibrahim, sits across from a journalist.

Ibrahim is not a refugee. Not yet. But he is preparing to become one. He has already lost his farm. His house was burned in the conflict. His family has scattered. His eldest son is in Egypt. His daughter is in Europe. His wife is with relatives in Khartoum, sheltering. He himself is trying to figure out what comes next.

Ibrahim represents a new category of displaced person. He is not fleeing war directly. The war exacerbated his problems, but his core problem is deeper. For ten years, his farmland has been getting drier. The rains have been inconsistent. The soil has been degrading. The herds have been shrinking.

Climate change is real in rural Sudan. It is not abstract. It is the lived experience of watching the land you depend on slowly become uninhabitable.

Ibrahim is one of an estimated 1 billion people globally who could be displaced by climate change in the next thirty years. That is not 1 billion people fleeing in the next few years. It is 1 billion people who will be pushed out of their homes by rising temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, sea level rise, and resource scarcity.

The number is staggering. Fourteen percent of the world's population. At that scale, migration is not an immigration issue. It is a geopolitical reorganization.

The largest movement of humans in recorded history is beginning. Not all at once. But year by year. Region by region. The pattern is accelerating.

In 2024, for the first time in recorded American history, the

United States experienced net migration of zero or negative. More Americans moved out than moved in. This is a reversal. For 150 years, America has been a magnet for migrants. The United States could absorb migrants and benefit from their ambition and labor. That era appears to be ending.

This is partly political. American public opinion on immigration has turned restrictionist. Both political parties are competing to appear tougher on immigration. The political appetite for large-scale migration is gone.

But it is also partly economic. The American job market is no longer offering the clear advantage it once did. Wages for low-skilled workers have stagnated. The cost of housing has risen dramatically. The path from migrant to prosperity is less clear than it once was.

Europe is experiencing a migration crisis that is reshaping its politics. In 2015, the Syrian war created a massive refugee flow into Turkey, Greece, and further into Europe. More than a million people arrived in Europe in a single year. The political backlash was severe. Far-right parties surged in Germany, France, Italy, Hungary, Poland, and elsewhere.

The crisis has moderated since then. The flow of migrants has diminished. But the political scar has not healed. Immigration has become THE defining political issue in European politics.

In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orban has built his entire political position around resistance to immigration. He has constructed a fence. He has adopted draconian asylum policies. He has positioned Hungary as the defender of European culture against a migrant invasion. Hungarian voters support him for this stance.

In Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) has surged because of immigration concerns, despite Germany's aging population and need for workers.

In Italy, Giorgia Meloni's government was elected partly on a

platform of opposition to migration. In France, Marine Le Pen's far-right movement has always been defined by immigration restriction.

The political economy is clear. Europe's populations are aging. Europe needs workers. The workers that are available want to migrate from developing countries to developed countries. But European voters do not want them. This is an irresolvable contradiction.

The 2026 International Migration Review Forum is being held in New York. Representatives from countries around the world are gathering to discuss migration policy. The conversations are tense. Nobody has solutions. Everyone is angry.

The Global South wants developed countries to accept more migrants. This would relieve pressure on developing countries that are already hosting large numbers of refugees and internally displaced people.

The developed countries want to restrict migration and want developing countries to manage their own populations and conflicts.

Everyone agrees that climate change will drive future flows. Everyone agrees that the numbers could be enormous. The Sahel region of Africa, home to several hundred million people, will likely become increasingly uninhabitable as temperatures rise and rainfall becomes more erratic. South Asia, where the monsoon is essential to agriculture and where sea level rise threatens major cities, will likely experience massive displacement. Central America, where drought and violence have already driven migration northward, will likely see the flows increase.

But agreement that the problem exists is not agreement on what to do about it.

One possibility is managed migration. Legal frameworks that allow workers to migrate in orderly fashion. Agreements between nations about labor migration. Compensation for countries that lose population. But this requires international cooperation, and

international cooperation on migration is almost impossible because public opinion in developed countries is so hostile.

Another possibility is forced relocation within countries. Climate zones will shift. Some areas will become more habitable, others less. The possibility of internal migration on a massive scale is high. In the United States, this might mean that the Great Plains become less habitable, while the upper midwest and northern regions become more habitable. Tens of millions of Americans could be internally displaced just by the normal functioning of climate change.

Another possibility is that massive migration simply happens, and developed countries eventually grudgingly accept it. The barrier to entry rises over time as pressure increases. But eventually, pressure overcomes barriers.

The political calculation is difficult. Immigration is unpopular, but aging developed countries need workers. Climate-driven migration will be enormous, but developed countries do not want to accept it. These forces are in tension.

What is certain is that the next few decades will see the largest movement of humans in recorded history. War, environmental degradation, economic desperation, all will push people to move. The movement will be primarily from the Global South to the developed world.

Europe will likely attempt to seal itself off. Hungary will maintain its fence. Italy will maintain its restrictive policies. France and Germany will experiment with various restrictions. But the pressure is too great. Eventually, some level of migration will happen despite the restrictions.

The United States has more capacity to absorb migration than Europe, but political resistance is strong. The southern border will remain contested. Migration policy will remain a focal point of political conflict.

But what is happening at the edges of the global order is just a preview. Climate-driven migration at scale could be the geopolitical event of the next century. It could overwhelm the capacities of governments. It could trigger conflicts. It could reshape the map.

Israel is already thinking about this. The reality that much of the Middle East could become less habitable. The possibility that massive numbers of people will try to migrate into regions that are more habitable. The borders that Israel maintains could become even more militarized.

Australia is thinking about this. The reality that Australia could become more habitable as other parts of the world become less habitable. The possibility that Australia could see enormous pressure for migration. The current immigration policy is designed partly with an eye to preventing a scenario where Australia becomes seen as a safety haven and is overwhelmed.

These conversations are not public. But they are happening. Governments are preparing for massive climate-driven migration. They are preparing to say no. They are preparing to maintain borders and prevent entry.

But you cannot prepare to keep out a billion people. The numbers are too large. The mechanisms are insufficient. The will is too weak.

Ibrahim remains in Khartoum, waiting. Probably in the next few years, he will join the migration flows. He will either join his son in Egypt or attempt the dangerous journey to Europe. He will become part of the largest movement of humans in recorded history.

His story will be repeated millions of times in the coming years and decades.

This is the migration century. It has already begun. The full scope of it is still to come.

CHAPTER 43: THE POLYCRISIS

The term is awkward. "Polycrisis." It sounds like something made up by academics. Which it was. The World Economic Forum popularized it in 2023 to describe a phenomenon that nobody had a good name for: when everything happens at once.

War in Ukraine. Economic instability in Europe and parts of Asia. Inflation. Supply chain disruptions. Pandemic aftershocks still rippling through the world. Technology disruption accelerating. Climate change producing increasing damage. Institutional breakdown in parts of Africa and Central America. Ideological fragmentation in developed democracies.

None of these are new. Wars happen. Inflation happens. Supply chains disrupt. But they usually do not all happen simultaneously.

The polycrisis is what happens when multiple major stresses activate at the same time, and because systems are interconnected, each stress amplifies the others.

Ukraine produces wheat. When Russia invaded, the supply of wheat to the world market disrupted. This drove food inflation. Food inflation hit developing countries hardest. Developing countries with limited food security had to make difficult choices. Do I import food and damage my currency and trade deficit? Do I accept less food?

Meanwhile, the invasion of Ukraine caused energy disruption. European gas prices spiked. This drove heating costs up. This drove electricity costs up. This drove manufacturing costs up. Companies shut plants. Workers were laid off.

Meanwhile, the pandemic was ending and supply chains were trying to return to normal. But they could not return to normal because the war in Ukraine was disrupting inputs. And the transition back to normal economy was creating its own dislocations.

Meanwhile, central banks were trying to fight inflation by raising interest rates. But higher interest rates slow economic growth. And with war and pandemic disruption already slowing growth, adding interest rate increases meant recession.

The impacts compounded. A company that was already struggling with supply chain disruption and labor shortage faced higher interest rates and had to lay off workers. The laid-off workers reduced consumption. The reduced consumption affected other companies. Layoffs spread.

A government that was facing inflation and debt load and rising interest rates on that debt could not afford the social programs that people wanted. Anger grew. Political instability increased.

In many developing countries, the polycrisis was even more acute. They did not have the economic shock absorbers that wealthy countries have. They could not print money without causing currency collapse. They could not borrow easily because lenders were nervous about sovereign default.

Sri Lanka experienced a perfect storm in 2022. Pandemic had reduced tourism revenues. The war in Ukraine had disrupted supply chains and increased energy costs. Food prices spiked. The government had borrowed heavily and could not service the debt. Demonstrations erupted. The government collapsed. The country experienced a deep economic crisis.

This pattern replicated in different ways in different countries. Egypt, Pakistan, Tunisia, Lebanon, Kenya. Across Africa and Asia, countries faced crises that were not entirely of their own making. The polycrisis had created instability that overwhelmed local capacity to manage.

The financial contagion risk is real. A major default or banking crisis in one part of the world could trigger cascading failures in other parts. The financial system is more resilient than it was in 2008, but it is not invulnerable.

If a major emerging market like Argentina or Egypt defaults on its debt, this affects banks in Europe and the United States that hold that debt. If multiple countries default, the impact spreads. If a major financial institution fails, the panic spreads further.

The interconnectedness of the modern world means that a shock in one place reverberates everywhere. A disruption in Taiwan semiconductor production affects car manufacturing in Germany. A pandemic in one country affects supply chains in another. A war in Eastern Europe affects food security in North Africa.

The polycrisis also means that no single institution or government can solve the problems. The International Monetary Fund can provide emergency financing, but it cannot solve supply chain disruption or war. The United Nations can issue statements, but it cannot enforce its will on major powers. National governments can raise interest rates or cut spending, but they cannot solve global inflation alone.

This is the institutional inadequacy of 1945-era organizations. The United Nations was designed to prevent major power war. It has had limited success. The IMF was designed to manage financial crises and promote stability. But the financial crises it faces now are more complex and interconnected than anything it was designed to handle.

The World Bank was designed to fund development. But development is being disrupted by war, climate change, and pandemic. The WTO was designed to manage trade. But supply chains and technologies are changing faster than the WTO can adapt.

These institutions are still relevant, but they are also increasingly insufficient.

The polycrisis also creates perverse incentives. When everything is broken, the incentive is to grab what you can while you can. For governments, this means prioritizing immediate survival and security over long-term cooperation. For companies, this means securing supply contracts and resources, even if it means damaging

relationships. For individuals, this means preparing for worse, even if collective action would make things better.

This is the tragedy of the polycrisis. The solution requires cooperation. The solution requires long-term thinking. The solution requires investing in resilience and in institutions. But the immediate crisis makes short-term thinking more attractive. It makes grabbing resources look rational when collective action is actually the better strategy.

Why cooperate on climate change when you are facing food inflation right now? Why invest in international institutions when your country is facing recession? Why maintain trade relationships when you are not sure if your supply chains will hold?

These questions do not have easy answers. The polycrisis creates genuine tensions between short-term and long-term interests. It creates genuine tensions between individual and collective interests.

The resilience of the world economy will depend on how well governments navigate this tension. If too many governments choose short-term interests and competitive strategies, the polycrisis becomes worse. Supply chains become more fragmented. Financial markets become more unstable. International cooperation breaks down further.

But if governments recognize the situation and attempt to maintain cooperation despite the pressure, the polycrisis can be managed. It will still be painful. But it will not become catastrophic.

The likelihood is somewhere in the middle. Some cooperation, some competitive behavior. Some investment in resilience, some in arms and defense. The polycrisis will be managed partially and imperfectly.

One specific risk is that a major shock happens while the world is still recovering from the polycrisis. A major hurricane. A pandemic. A terrorist attack. A major cyberattack. A financial crisis. A conflict that spirals.

If this happens while the world is already stressed, the impact could be catastrophic. The system is less resilient when it is already strained. The shock-absorbing capacity is lower. The possibility of cascading failures is higher.

This is why people who follow systemic risks are so anxious. Not because the individual risks are necessarily higher. But because the world is less capable of handling them right now.

The world is in a state of equilibrium that is unstable. Multiple stresses are being managed. Institutions are holding. Governments are muddling through. But the margin for error is low. A push could destabilize the whole thing.

The polycrisis is not a new phenomenon. It is a permanent feature of the modern world. The interconnectedness means that multiple stresses will always be active. The complexity means that the impacts will always be unpredictable. The scale means that the impacts will always be significant.

But the polycrisis of 2022-2026 is particularly acute because it includes pandemic aftershocks, which have unique features. It includes war between major powers in a region that is strategically important. It includes climate change moving from abstract future threat to present reality. It includes technological disruption moving faster than institutions can adapt.

The convergence of these crises is not coincidental. They are connected. The pandemic created economic stress that made countries desperate. The desperation contributed to political instability. Political instability made leaders more likely to take risks. The risk-taking led to war. The war disrupted supply chains. The disruption created inflation. The inflation created more desperation.

This is how a polycrisis works. Events are not independent. They are interconnected. Each event makes the next more likely.

The question is whether the institutions and nations of the world

can navigate this period without a complete breakdown. Whether the system can absorb the shocks without collapsing. Whether cooperation can be maintained despite the pressure.

The answer is not predetermined. It depends on decisions made daily by people in positions of power. Whether they choose short-term or long-term. Whether they choose cooperation or competition. Whether they choose to invest in resilience or in defense.

The polycrisis continues. The stresses remain active. The institutions continue to strain. The outcome is still to be written.

CHAPTER 44: THE MAP WE'RE DRAWING NOW

Look at a globe. Any globe. The political borders drawn on it are fictions maintained by force and paper and the consensus of nations. They are not permanent. They are not stable. They are lines drawn by people who are now dead, and they are maintained by people who are alive, and they will be redrawn by people not yet born.

The question is not whether the map will change. The question is whether it will change through cooperation or conflict, stability or chaos, gradual adjustment or violent upheaval.

The answers are being written right now. Today. This month. This year. Not in some distant future. In the present moment when you are reading this.

Will the United States and China find a way to coexist as peer competitors, or will rivalry escalate into conflict. This question is not decided. It is being decided every day by policymakers in Washington and Beijing. By military commanders. By business leaders. By the choices they make.

The war in Ukraine continues. Every day it continues, the map is being redrawn. The borders between Ukraine and Russia are not fixed. They could be fixed by negotiation or by continued conflict. The outcome depends on decisions being made right now.

Taiwan is 100 miles from the coast of China. It is an island. It is the locus of enormous geopolitical tension. The status of Taiwan is not settled. It could be settled by a military invasion. It could be settled by negotiation. It could remain unsettled indefinitely. The outcome depends on decisions being made right now by leaders in Beijing, Washington, and Taipei.

India and Pakistan. India and China. These are ancient rivalries that are being sharpened by modern weapons and modern capacity to

hurt each other. The borders are contested. The relationships are suspicious. The outcomes are being determined right now.

The Gulf. Saudi Arabia and Iran. Israel and Iran. The region is a tinder box of conflicts and alliances. The map of the Middle East could look very different in five years depending on whether cooperation or conflict predominates. The outcome is being written right now.

Africa. The great power scramble for resources and influence on the African continent is escalating. China has invested heavily. The United States is trying to catch up. Russia is active. The European Union is trying to maintain influence. The future of Africa, where most of the world's population growth will happen, is being determined right now by these competition.

Will the dollar survive as the world's reserve currency. This is not a trivial question. The dollar's status as the world's currency gives the United States enormous power. If that status is lost, if another currency or a basket of currencies or a digital currency becomes the standard, the impact on American power would be enormous.

This is not decided. The dollar is being tested. Alternative mechanisms are being developed. BRICS countries are discussing alternatives. But the dollar remains dominant. Its future is uncertain. The outcome is being determined right now by the choices of central banks and governments and markets.

Will artificial intelligence be governed or ungoverned. This is perhaps the most consequential policy question of the century. An ungoverned AI revolution could create enormous disruption. A heavily governed AI revolution could slow progress. The balance is being struck right now by regulators, companies, and nations. The outcome is not predetermined. It is being written every day.

Will climate change force cooperation or drive conflict. The physics of climate change is settled. The impacts will be significant. But the political and military response is not settled. Will nations cooperate to manage the transition. Will nations compete for resources

and territory as the climate shifts. Will conflict increase as people are displaced and resources become scarce. The outcome depends on decisions being made right now.

Will the Global South reshape the system or be shaped by it. For centuries, the Global South has been shaped by powers outside it. By colonialism. By imperialism. By economic structures designed to benefit the wealthy world. The question now is whether the Global South can reshape the system to better serve its interests. Or whether the old patterns will persist.

This is not decided. India is rising. Brazil is assertive. African countries are playing multiple sides. But the old patterns of inequality and dependence persist. The outcome is being determined right now.

The map is being drawn now. Not on paper. In the real world. Through military postures. Through economic relationships. Through technological development. Through institutional change.

Every country is making bets about the future. Some are betting that peace is stable and investment in civilian infrastructure is worthwhile. Some are betting that conflict is coming and military capacity needs to be built. Some are betting on cooperation. Some are betting on competition.

The cumulative effect of all these bets is that the map is being redrawn.

The thing that no one can know in advance is what the redrawn map will look like. Will there be a new hegemon or a stable multipolar system? Will conflict be managed or will it escalate? Will inequality increase or decrease? Will institutions hold or fail?

These are the questions. The answers are being written now.

You are part of this story. You might not feel like it. You might feel like a passive consumer of news. Like something happening to you rather than something you are part of creating.

But the cumulative effect of the choices of millions of people is what determines the map. Consumer choices about what you buy shape supply chains and manufacturing patterns and resource extraction. Career choices about what you work on shape technological development. Political choices about who you vote for shape institutions and policies.

You are not in a position to single-handedly reshape geopolitics. But you are part of a collective that is reshaping it.

The map we are drawing now is not final. It will be redrawn again. The boundaries will shift. The power relationships will change. The institutions will adapt. This is permanent.

But what is being written now will echo. The choices made today will constrain the choices available tomorrow. The institutions built now will shape the institutions of the future. The conflicts that happen now will create resentments that last for generations.

This is why understanding geopolitics matters. Not for its own sake. But because understanding the map we are drawing helps you make better choices about your role in drawing it.

A globalized world with strong international institutions and trade relationships is a different world than a fragmented world with weak institutions and competitive blocs. The first is more peaceful and prosperous. The second is more unstable and unequal.

But the first requires cooperation. It requires countries to accept limits on their autonomy in exchange for the benefits of being part of a larger system. It requires trust. It requires institutions that work.

The world is currently drifting toward the second. Institutions are weakening. Cooperation is declining. Competition is increasing. The drift is not inevitable. It can be reversed. But it would require deliberate choices by powerful actors and by populations that support cooperation.

The map is being drawn now. What is being drawn is not yet fixed. The outcome is still uncertain. The choice is still available.

That is the final story of geopolitics in 2026. Not that the future is settled. But that it is still being written. And the writing is happening now.

EPILOGUE: THE ONLY CONSTANT

The cafe is in Istanbul, that ancient city that bridges Europe and Asia. It is March 2026, the same month Artemis II launches toward the moon, the same month this book is being read.

A woman sits at an outdoor table, drinking Turkish coffee. She is a professor of international relations, and she has spent the last thirty years watching geopolitics unfold. She has seen the Cold War end. She has seen the rise of China. She has seen the European Union form and strain and nearly break. She has seen the promise of the internet and watched it become a battlefield.

She is thinking about how much has changed and how much has stayed the same.

When she started her career, the world seemed to be trending toward liberal democracy and free markets and cosmopolitan values. The arc of history seemed to bend toward peace and prosperity. The end of the Cold War was seen as the final victory of the Western model. The rest of the world would eventually follow the path that Europe and North America had taken.

That has not happened.

Instead, the world has become more authoritarian in many places. Democratic backsliding has happened in Eastern Europe, in parts of Latin America, in Africa. Strongmen have risen. Nationalism has surged. The cosmopolitan promise has been replaced by assertion

of national identity.

And yet, some things have continued as they were. The fundamental dynamics of power have not changed. Nations still compete for resources and influence. States still pursue their interests. The strong still have advantages over the weak.

She has just finished reading the chapters of this book, and she is thinking about what comes next. The book identifies the key challenges: AI governance, energy transition, critical minerals, climate change, migration, multipolarity, cyber warfare, space competition.

These are real challenges. But they are also symptoms of something deeper. The world is in transition. Not from one equilibrium to another, but in a state of permanent flux.

The only constant is change.

The map is being redrawn. The institutions are being strained. The foundations of the existing order are being shaken. But a new order has not yet crystallized.

She has lived through multiple historical transformations. The Cold War and its end. The rise of the internet and globalization. The attacks of September 11 and the wars that followed. The financial crisis of 2008. The pandemic of 2020. Each of these was presented at the time as a fundamental rupture. A change that would reshape the world forever.

Each of these did reshape the world. But not in the ways anyone predicted. The end of the Cold War was supposed to lead to lasting peace. Instead, it led to a brief unipolar moment that is now ending. Globalization was supposed to create universal prosperity. Instead, it created new inequalities. Technology was supposed to empower individuals. Instead, it created new forms of control.

The change always happens. But it never happens in the way the experts predict.

This is the humbling lesson of geopolitics. The future is not knowable. The best analysis can identify constraints and trends. But the specific way things unfold is always a surprise.

She thinks about the young students she teaches. They are growing up in a world that is fundamentally different from the world she grew up in. They take for granted that they can talk to people anywhere on the planet. They take for granted that information is abundant and mostly free. They take for granted that nation-states are permanent features of the landscape.

In twenty years, maybe less, the world will look different again. Some of the states that exist now will not exist. New institutions will form. New forms of organization will emerge. The technology will advance in directions that seem impossible now.

She does not know what it will be. Nobody does. But she is certain that it will be different.

The book this woman has just read is trying to make sense of the world as it exists in early 2026. It is a snapshot of a moment in flux. The snapshot is true. But it is not final. The world described in these pages will itself change, often in unexpected ways.

The Artemis II mission will launch. It will be a success or it will fail or something in between. The Chang'e missions will continue. The race to the moon will unfold as described or will take a different trajectory than anyone predicts. In five years, the map of space will look different than it does now.

AI will continue to develop. The governance frameworks will be inadequate and will be adapted and will be inadequate again. The technology will surprise everyone. Some of the fears about AI will prove justified. Some will not. New fears will emerge.

Climate change will continue to worsen. The energy transition will happen, but slower than necessary and at higher cost than optimal. The transition will create winners and losers. The political

conflicts over the transition will intensify. But the transition will happen because the alternative is worse.

The critical minerals will continue to be scrambled over. China will maintain significant leverage, but the world will diversify supply chains. New mines will come online. New processing facilities will be built. The prices will fluctuate. The supply chains will remain vulnerable but will become less concentrated.

Migration will continue and will accelerate. The developed world will resist and will eventually accept more migration than it wanted. The social and political disruption will be significant. Some countries will handle it better than others. Some will close their borders, which will not work. Some will open their borders more than planned. The net flow will be toward wealthier regions and toward regions with lower population density and more resource availability.

The multipolarity will continue. The United States will remain the strongest single power for the foreseeable future. China will remain a peer competitor in many domains. India will continue to rise. Europe will continue to assert its regulatory power. The Global South will continue to become more important and more assertive. Power will be distributed. No single actor will be dominant. This will be unstable in some ways and stable in others.

The great power competition will intensify and will be managed. There will be conflicts, but they will likely remain limited in scope. The fear of nuclear weapons and the economic costs of major war will create strong incentives against total war. But proxy wars and economic warfare and cyberattacks will continue. The damage will be significant but will be manageable by the wealthy countries that can afford to absorb shocks.

The polycrisis will continue and will occasionally spike into acute moments. A financial crisis. A pandemic. A major war that temporarily escalates. A climate disaster. But these crises will be temporary in their intensity. The system will be stressed but will

muddle through.

The world in 2035 or 2040 will look different from the world in 2026. But not radically different. The fundamental dynamics will persist. Humans will still have the capacity for both cooperation and conflict. Nations will still compete for power and resources. Technology will still create both problems and solutions. The map will be redrawn but will still be recognizable as a map of nation-states.

What will be forgotten or overlooked in 2035 are many of the specific concerns that seem urgent right now. The particular details of the Ukraine war will be resolved one way or another. The specific people in power will have been replaced. The specific technologies will have evolved beyond current understanding.

What will persist are the underlying patterns. The competition between great powers. The tension between stability and change. The struggle between cooperation and competition. The human capacity for both wisdom and folly.

Understanding these patterns does not allow prediction of the future. But it allows navigation of the present. If you understand that power is being competed for, you can make better choices about where to invest your energy. If you understand that change is constant, you can be less surprised by disruption. If you understand that nations often act in their own perceived interest, you can be less cynical about their behavior.

The woman in the cafe finishes her coffee. The cup is empty. It will be refilled or it will be cleared. Either way, the moment has passed. The time she has spent thinking about the future is past. The present has already become the past.

This is the final meditation on geopolitics. Not that we can control the future. Not that we can predict it. But that we are part of creating it, moment by moment, choice by choice.

The map we are drawing now will be redrawn by others. The

institutions we build will be rebuilt by future generations. The decisions we make will constrain and enable the decisions of our children.

This is the only thing we can know for certain. The only constant in geopolitics is change. The map will not stay as it is drawn now. The powers will shift. The institutions will adapt. The conflicts will resolve or escalate or transform into new forms.

But the understanding that change is constant, that the future is not fixed, that the map is still being drawn, that our role in drawing it matters. This understanding is valuable. It creates possibility. It creates hope. It creates the chance that we might draw it better than we have before.

The woman gets up. She pays her bill. She walks back into Istanbul, into the city that has seen empires rise and fall, that has watched the map redrawn a thousand times, that will watch it redrawn a thousand times more.

She carries with her the understanding that the world is in flux, that the future is unwritten, that the role of each person, each nation, each institution matters.

This is the final lesson. Not prediction. But possibility. Not certainty. But agency.

The map is being drawn now. What happens next depends on the choices we make today.